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ABSTRACT
HISTORIOGRAPHY, DISCIPLINARITY, AND THE FUTURE(S)
OF COMPOSITION
Lisa R. Arnold
April 11, 2011
This dissertation analyzes and critiques the historiography of more than 150 texts
documenting the history of writing instruction in the United States. In examining the
rhetoric of disciplinary historiography, I demonstrate how the historicization of
composition has worked, rhetorically and politically, to highlight and complicate some of
the central concerns of the field while also raising questions about and prompting
proposals for the future of the discipline. To carry out this analysis, I engage in a process
I call metahistorical critique, with which I trace three disciplinary narratives: the role of
first-year composition, the discipline'S legacy of current-traditional rhetoric and
pedagogy, and composition's relationship to other disciplines. I argue that metahistorical
critique can reveal many of the discipline's primary values and practices, which today
create important possibilities and limitations in the ways composition scholars construct
the past, present, and future of the field.
I introduce the dissertation by laying the theoretical groundwork for my reading
of disciplinary historiography using Michel Foucault, Hayden White, and Dominick
LaCapra. In Chapter 2, I focus on how historians have used current-traditional rhetoric
and pedagogy (CTRP) problematically as a trope, neglecting actual historical phenomena.
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In Chapter 3, I argue that composition historians' persistent focus on first-year
composition (FYC) and the debate surrounding its viability as a required academic course
allows the discipline tends to think of and define "work," "writing," and "writing
instruction" as a problematically abstract, monolingual, institutionalized, pedagogically
produced and reader-oriented practice relevant only to Americans. Chapter 4 explores
how the relationship between composition and other disciplines has (or has not) been
historicized in order to argue that the discipline should be rehistoricized as an
interdiscipline. I conclude that if we are to allow for other questions and narratives about
the discipline to emerge, and if we intend to promote ethical ways of engaging with
teachers, students, and the world, we must continually interrogate the prevailing
narratives that shape the field, as well as our habits of thinking, reading, and writing
about the history of writing instruction in the United States and elsewhere.
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INTRODUCTION

The history of writing practices and pedagogy in the United States has become a
central point of research and contention for rhetoric and composition over the last thirty
years, as histories of the discipline constitute an increasingly prevalent part of the
discipline's scholarship. This historicization has worked, rhetorically and politically, not
only to highlight and complicate some of the central concerns of the field, but also to
raise questions about, and prompt proposals for, the future of the discipline. Our histories
and historiographic practices, therefore, are tied closely with the evolution of the
contemporary discipline.
Since Albert Kitzhaber's 1953 dissertation, Rhetoric in American Colleges
(published as a book in 1990), historians of rhetoric: and composition have used their
accounts of composition's past to deal with some of the central questions that trouble the
field, including best teaching practices, especially those that relate to or work against
what compositionists call "current-traditional rhetoric and pedagogy" (CTRP), the role of
first-year composition (FYC) within the discipline and its legacy as a "service" course,
and composition's ties to other disciplines such as rhetoric and literature. Some historians
have also addressed the question of whether, and how, the discipline belongs in the
academy: For example, in her provocative disciplinary history, Composition in the
University, Sharon Crowley addresses this question by tracing composition's history to
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Harvard's introductory composition course, English A, in order to expose how the
discipline's roots in CTRP have been maintained even though composition currently
positions itself as a discipline that professes process (and post-process) pedagogy.
Many historians, just like other scholars in the discipline, disagree about the role
that FYC should play in the discipline: Some, such as Berlin and Joseph Harris, have
used their historical narratives to argue that FYC constitutes the heart of the discipline.
Others, including Crowley and David Russell, argue that their historical research proves
that the discipline's focus on FYC has either "credit[ed] freshman English with a larger
or more cohesive effect than it has ever had" (Russdl 32) or altogether debilitated the
field: " ... the universal requirement in introductory composition, which is the
institutional manifestation of composition's service ethic, has kept the traditional goals of
disciplinarity - the pursuit of knowledge and the professional advancement of
practitioners - beyond the reach of composition studies until very recently" (Crowley
253).
Finally, many historians have debated how the discipline's relationship to other
fields - including rhetoric, literature, communications, education, literacy and linguistics
- should be understood and defined. In his seminal historical work, Composition-

Rhetoric, for example, Robert Connors laments the "decline and fall" of rhetorical
instruction in the modem university and links this faIl to composition's low status in the
university: According to Connors, rhetoric courses were "sought by students" prior to the
Civil War, but by the tum of the century, such courses were instead "despised and
sneered at"; and while professors of rhetoric once occupied the "empyrean of named
chairs," they became, over time, "oppressed, ill-used, and secretly despised" (171-72).
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Along different but related lines, Susan Miller hopes to demonstrate in Textual Carnivals
that composition's disciplinary ties to literature have kept it in a problematically
subservient position; she explains that "the political and social agendas that have placed
native belletristic literature ... in the 'center' of education have worked against language
instruction devoted to writing" (35).
In my dissertation, I analyze the prevailing and competing narratives that have
emerged as a result of historians' responses to the questions described above: How
should the discipline's legacy of CTRP (if it is to bt! interpreted as a legacy at all) be
understood, especially in relation to present concems? What role should FYC have within
the discipline? And finally, how should composition's relationships be defined, and what
are the effects of this relationship on composition's disciplinarity? These questions reveal
larger disciplinary concems that can be usefully illuminated, I argue, through a tracing of
the resultant narratives in and through a variety of disciplinary histories. 1 Of central
importance to this project is my contention that a meta-analysis of composition's
historiography, a process of reading I call metahistorical critique, reveals many of the
primary values, beliefs, and practices that have shaped the discipline, which today create
important possibilities and limitations in the ways composition scholars construct the
past, present, and future of the field. Because the narratives I analyze tend to dominate
disciplinary discourse, I argue throughout this dissertation that metahistorical critique
works against our regular habits of thinking, reading, and writing about the past, resulting
in a disruption of our usual practices and providing opportunities for other questions and
narratives about the discipline to emerge.
1 I defme disciplinary histories as those texts that examine the history of college writing instruction and/or
literacy practices - primarily situated in the u.s. - since the nineteenth century. To limit my focus, I am not
studying histories of rhetoric or oral rhetorical instruction.
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In this introduction, I define and describe in more detail the exigence for the
project, its theoretical framing, the process of metahistorical critique, and the central
questions that drive my research. I also provide an overview of the structure for the
dissertation with brief chapter summaries and the conclusions I make.

Rationale: Historiography, Disciplinarity, and the Future(s) of Composition
According to some scholars, rhetoric and composition's tendency toward selfhistoricization and critique works against its ability to make new knowledge, which
works, in turn, against its future as a discipline. In "Sp(l)itting Images," for example,
Karen Kopelson echoes other scholars' concerns (see John Mucklebauer, Kurt
Spellmeyer, and Jan Swearingen) when she argues that the discipline's ongoing reflection
and debate about its own disciplinary status - a central concern taken up by many,
including disciplinary historians - has produced an obtrusive anxiety about how the
discipline should be defined, which, she claims, "comes at the expense of taking up other
critical concerns and of making other, more innovative and far-reaching forms of
knowledge" (775).
In the introduction to Disciplining English, David Shumway and Craig Dionne,
who use a Foucauldian framework to articulate how academic disciplines work, might
appear to agree with Kopelson's concerns when tht~y explain that disciplinary scholarship
"produce[s] [knowledge that] tends toward dispersion rather than unity" (6). But
Kopelson's hope that composition will move away from its concern about its
disciplinarity in order to produce "more innovative and far-reaching forms of knowledge"
seems unlikely given Shumway and Dionne's description of disciplinary structures,
which, they argue, ultimately revolve around "problems or questions that are in some
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way self-reproducing" (6). In other words, if one of rhetoric and composition's central
questions is whether, and how, the field can be defined as a discipline, then Shumway
and Dionne's explanation of disciplinarity suggests that it is unlikely that rhetoric and
composition will cease corning back to questions about its own disciplinarity. Thus,
composition's disciplinary histories, which reveal and revolve around these primary
concerns, can be understood as texts that occupy a eentral role in the formation and
evolution of the discipline.
Disciplinary histories are also significant texts in the sense that they tend to be
uniquely self-reflective about the discipline. Although she is writing about English
literary studies and not rhetoric and composition, Jessica Yood explains the role of such
self-reflexivity in disciplinary formation in "Writing in the Disciplines." In this article,
Yood identifies what she describes as a "new genre'" of disciplinary discourse in literary
studies that has emerged from the late-nineteenth century to the present (see Gerald
Graff, Richard Ohmann, and Robert Scholes, among others); this genre, Yood argues,
promotes self-reflection and self-conscious critique, "making disciplinary meaning in the
fluid practices of teaching and writing" (537). Not only does Yood's account indicate that
self-reflective disciplinary critique occurs outside of composition, but, in presenting this
kind of writing as a new academic genre, she suggests that it provides a way for valuing
traditionally undervalued or under-represented ways of knowing in literary studies (and
presumably in the university at large), knowledge concerned with pedagogy and lived
experience (537).
Historians within rhetoric and composition have argued convincingly, too, that
their work serves an important role in the evolution and delineation of academic
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disciplines. Maureen Daly Goggin notes in Authoring a Discipline, for example, that
"historical accounts themselves both reflect and help foster the vitality of a disciplinary
community insofar as they are contingent on a group's interests. In other words, history
may both indicate and help sustain those interests" (xiv). Likewise, in Fencing with

Words, Robin Varnum argues that the "new conception" of composition history afforded
by her account of the Amherst composition program "give[s] those of us who teach
writing ... new ways of conceptualizing our professional identity" (33). Ultimately,
disciplinary historicization and self-scrutiny, which some may describe as a compulsive
or navel-gazing practice, is neither unique to composition nor necessarily problematic.
It is because of historiography's role in shaping disciplinary self-perception that

my project aims not only to identify the primary disciplinary narratives found in our
histories, as well as their circulation over time and across texts, but to also explore the
possible reasons for, and consequences of, these trends. 2 Histories of composition are
particularly important for this study in at least two ways: First, histories can provide
compositionists ways to better understand how power works over and across time,
especially as structures of power have influenced beliefs and practices about literacy. In
"History in the Spaces Left," for example, Jacqueline Jones Royster and Jean C. Williams
point out that even those histories composed with the intention of providing alternatives
to the dominant perspectives forwarded by much composition scholarship continue to
obscure certain narratives and silence already marginalized voices. Taking aim
specifically at the way students are represented, the equation of race with basic writing,
Although my focus throughout this dissertation remains on histories of composition, I eventually hope to
study the circulation and consequences of disciplinary narratives as they are found also in proposals for the
future of the discipline. I see proposals for the future of the discipline as important texts that can add to the
conclusions I make in this dissertation because they highlight those disciplinary narratives (and elements of
those narratives) that hold the most power over the way we think, read, and write (about) the discipline.
2
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and the way the African American presence in composition's history has largely been
ignored, Royster and Williams argue that "in officialized narratives, the viewpoints of
African Americans are typically invisible, or misrepresented, or dealt with either
prescriptively, referentially, or by other techniques that in effect circumscribe their
participation and achievements" (579).
Second, histories can help scholars better wlderstand the origins of our
contemporary disciplinary values, beliefs, and practices, leading to future, hopefully
fruitful, critique and revision if these values, beliefs, and practices prove problematic. In
"English Only and u.S. College Composition," Bmce Homer and John Trimbur
challenge basic premises underlying the formation of college composition in the U.S., a
formation that they argue worked to support a monolingual tradition and future in the
teaching of writing. In critically examining this premise, Homer and Trimbur strive to
"examine the history of the inevitable and to identify the cultural logics that produce it"
(596). Such rhetorical work is aligned with my own goals for this project and is
especially important in that it offers, as they argue, "an alternative way of thinking about
composition programs, the language of our students, and our own language practices"
(597).

In spite of the connection between history-writing and disciplinarity in rhetoric
and composition - and although there have been multiple fomms concerning the problem
of historiography in rhetoric (see "Historiography ... I," "Historiography ... II," and
"Octalog" and "Octalog II") - disciplinary historians have rarely explored the rhetorical
implications of historiography in explicit or theoretical ways while also successfully
applying these explorations to their own histories. For example, although both Connors
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and Berlin theorize historiography explicitly in special issues of Pre/Text and Rhetoric
Review devoted to the writing of history (see "Historiography ... I," "Historiography ...

II," and "Octalog" and "Octalog II"), their own histories do not reflect the theory they
espouse. Connors, for example, argues that historians, when composing history, must ask:
"How ... has the culture created rhetoric, and how has rhetoric then recreated the culture?
Composition history cannot exist in a narrow valley of a 'history of ideas' .... Meaningful
historical writing must teach us what people in the past have wanted from literacy so that
we may come to understand what we want" ("Octalog" 7). Here, Connors notes an
important distinction between composition and rhetorical history, arguing that historians
should be able to look beyond published texts to understand the human actors and actions
behind them. Connors' own history, however, is based primarily on textbook evidence
that tends to assume a one-to-one correspondence between actual pedagogical practice
and textbook discourse (a problem I elaborate in more detail in Chapter 2).
Several composition historians have, however, been more reflective than Berlin
and Connors about the rhetoricity of their endeavors. 3 In an essay that argues for a
cultural-historical approach to historiography, for example, Susan Miller contends that
the legitimizing role of many of composition's histories have posed problems in that they
have limited historians' focus to individual actions and events, rather than acknowledging
the necessary interrelation among culture, disciplinarity, and history ("Composition" 32).
And composition histories sometimes reveal historians' implicit awareness of the

When I use the word "rhetoricity," I mean that the way history is written carries rhetorical effect(s).
Specifically, I draw on John Schilb's discussion in "The History of Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of History,"
in which he builds on Hayden White's and Dominick LaCapra's work, to explain: "While more and more
scholars in the discipline of history itself demonstrate awareness that one must distinguish between
'history' as an absent referent and 'history' as the conjecture and representation for that referent, I don't
find in recent histories of rhetoric clear acknowledgement that the authors are composing discourse" (238).

J

8

connections between historiography and disciplinal'ity; this becomes particularly obvious
when dominant narratives are explicitly articulated, challenged, or disrupted. For
example, in arguing that other forms of evidence should be considered in composition's
histories (and in writing his own revisionary history of A.S. Hill), Gerald Nelms
emphasizes what he calls the "tensed unity" in historiography that occurs between
historical "fact" and historiographic "fiction" (377). Likewise, in her analysis of an oftignored NCTE address, Margaret Strain argues for "an alternative way of reading"
historical and archival documents that acknowledges (via Gadamer) the inevitable
"intertextuality" of documents - the "dialectical interplay that permits the text to give
evidence to others which have been omitted, left traces, or presented contradictions to the
one in question" (220).
In spite of these valuable moments of metahistorical awareness, however, scholars
in rhetoric and composition have not explicitly or fully answered John Schilb's call for
disciplinary historians to "examine their discourse with greater self-consciousness,
consider alternatives to it, let their text be a dialogue with other such possibilities, and, in
general, let themselves enter into a dialogue with the metahistorical reflections to be
found now in the discipline of history" (249). I see my project as answering this call, in
that it aims to sysetmatically analyze composition's historiography to expose its
disciplinary effects and implications.

Theoretical Framing
Theories of historiography in and outside of rhetoric (andlor composition), as well
as disciplinary histories themselves, have proved foundational in my ability to organize,
contextualize, and substantiate my understanding of composition's histories. Just as
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Schilb grounds his proposal in "The Rhetoric of History" upon an understanding of how
historians such as Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra have theorized historiography, I
too ground much of my theoretical framing for this project through critical historians'
historiographic theory.4 For example, both LaCapra and Michel Foucault offer useful
ways of thinking about historiography as rhetorical practice. Specifically, in Archaeology
ofKnowledge, Foucault focuses on how the "rules of formation" for disciplinary
discourse work to delimit and determine the claims that can be made. When we ignore
the discursive field as a context for the production of discourse, it becomes easy to
assume that some kind of historical "truth" already exists and is merely waiting to be
discovered; but by acknowledging the way our options for making claims have already
been determined by the discursive context in which we write, Foucault argues, we can
more critically understand, value, and acknowledge the role that "chance, discontinuity,
and materiality" play in the processes of history and history-writing (231).
Likewise, LaCapra argues in "Intellectual History and Defining the Postmodem"
that when it comes to reading and writing (about) intellectual histories, it is easy to
underemphasize or reduce their complexity while also devaluing the relationship between
text and context; he contends that intellectual histories contain both documentary and
performative elements. Instead of understanding history-writing as an attempt to "close"
history, therefore, LaCapra insists that historiography must be understood as a dialectical
process that "comes to terms" with the past and acknowledges its inherent complexity
and contradiction (see "Writing"). In Chapter 1, I discuss the applications of White's,

By "critical historian," I mean those scholars working within (and sometimes outside of) the field of
history who have emphasized (oftentimes using poststructuralist and postmodem frameworks) the politics
of language and representation in their and others' history work.

4
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Foucault's, and LaCapra's theories of historiography to the process of metahistorical
critique.
Most of the extended theorization of historiography in rhetoric and composition
has occurred in relation to debates about rhetorical history/ies and tradition(s), and
although this scholarship is not always easily applicable to composition histories, it has
helped me categorize and contextualize histories according to their various rhetorical
purposes. Among the debates published in Pre/Text, Rhetoric Review, Victor Vitanza's

Writing Histories ofRhetoric, and Graff et aI's The Viability of the Rhetorical Tradition,
several strands of historiographic theory applicable to already-existing composition
histories can be identified: First, Graff and Leff have identified "recovery" and
"rereading" as two major strands of historiography existing in rhetoric. Recovery
histories, which might be defined as those that look to the past to exhume previously
ignored individuals and event and include Royster :md Williams' "History in the Spaces
Left" and Neal Lerner's "The Institutionalization of Required English," as well as
Varnum's Fencing with Words and David Gold's Rhetoric in the Margins. Likewise,
composition's historians have conducted compelling "rereadings" of events, texts, or
individuals important to our histories in order to provide alternative explanations that
question and challenge our original assumptions and current beliefs. Patricia Harkin's
essay, "Child's Ballads," provides multiple alternative readings of James Francis Child,
who is often credited as the founder of English (literature) studies to illustrate how
disciplinary narratives can differ based on the motivations of readers and writers located
in competing disciplinary areas (in this case, composition and literature). Charles Paine
offers a compelling rereading of the discipline's nruTatives about Edward T. Channing
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and A.S. Hill in Rhetoric as Immunity, and in "The Dartmouth Conference and the
Geohistory of the Native Speaker," John Trimbur revisits the accepted history of the
Dartmouth conference by re-examining two documents that have been overlooked in
other histories (see Harris, "After Dartmouth").
Yet another strand of composition historiography has emerged more recently and
is explicitly theorized in terms of rhetorical history by Theresa Enos, Roxanne
Mountford, and Janet Atwill in special issues of Rhetoric Review ("Octalog" and
"Octalog II"), and can be seen in histories that take account of the relationship between
composition and other disciplines, a strand I would call inter- or trans-disciplinary
research. Kathryn Fitzgerald ("From Disciplining") and Arthur Applebee both trace
composition's origins in relation to secondary education; David Russell emphasizes
writing pedagogy across the disciplines; Donna Strickland understands composition not
in terms of its emergence as an individual course, but in terms of the emergence and
. growth of writing programs; Homer and Trimbur argue that the relationship between
composition and modem languages in the 19th century is important in that it can help us
recognize and challenge our assumptions of monolingual ism in composition; Nystrand et
al. trace composition according to its relationship to linguistics and literary study; and in
"The 1963 Composition Revolution Will Not Be n~levised," Jeff Rice considers how our
understanding of the contemporary discipline would change if composition had not
ignored a parallel "revolution" in media studies.
Although I do not use these categories to describe the histories I examine in this
study, these discussions have helped me contextualize the motivation for and purposes of
individual histories, which adds to my analysis of prevailing and competing disciplinary
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narratives in historical scholarship. I outline my categorization of the histories that
comprise my study in Appendix A, and in Appendix B, I illustrate how these histories
have been received and used over time.
Metahistorical Critique
In order to identify, isolate, and analyze the three prevailing disciplinary
narratives for this study - current-traditional rhetoric and pedagogy (CTRP), first-year
composition (FYC), and composition's (inter)disciplinarity - I use a method of rhetorical
reading that I call metahistorical critique, a method I define more elaborately in Chapter
1. In my preliminary reading ofthe most-often cited disciplinary histories in composition,
such as those written by Berlin, Connors, Crowley, and Susan Miller, I traced those
themes or questions that grounded each historian's desire to historicize, and I identified
prevailing narratives when several historians seemed to share common concerns: Connors
and Crowley, for example, both link the contemporary discipline to the loss of a classical
rhetorical tradition; Miller, Crowley, and Connors are all concerned about how
composition's ties to literature have kept it from achieving full disciplinarity; Berlin and
Crowley both concern themselves with the location of FYC within the discipline (Berlin
sees FYC as central, whereas Crowley wants to abolish it); and Connors, Crowley, and
Miller disagree about the discipline'S legacy ofCTRP.
As I read beyond these central texts and navigated other macro- and
microhistories (see Chapter 1 for my definition of these terms), I continued to trace these
narratives as they emerged across texts, paying particular attention as I read to how these
narratives were used: Did the narratives form basic premises for a scholar's argument or
were they presented as a foundation for critique? 'Were the narratives repeated without

13

question or did they evolve in significant ways over time? I also took note of each
historian's stated rhetorical goals and used these descriptions to frame my understanding
of each history's intervention in larger disciplinary contexts.
Metahistorical critique is particularly useful for this project because it not only
illuminates some of our field's primary concerns, but it also exposes those habits of mind
and practice in which composition scholars have been trained to engage. This kind of
analysis, while not producing new history, participates in the revisionist historical
tradition in several ways: First, metahistorical critique analyzes historical narratives in
relation to one another, which foregrounds the assumptions that underlie our field's
seeming "common sense" and marks gaps in our research and understanding of the
discipline. Second, metahistorical critique analyzes how history is used in narratives
about our present and future, which can help us see more clearly whether, and how, those
narratives make claims based on differing interpretations of history. Defined in this way,
metahistorical critique works to disrupt traditional conceptions of time and progress,
which allows for new or revised understandings of the uses of history in composition;
that is, we can understand histories as building upon and complicating one another opening up, rather than limiting, the possibilities for our research, practice(s), and ways
of thinking in the future. Perhaps more importantly., however, metahistorical critique also
encourages the destabilization of prevailing historieal narratives; in other words, when
and as prevailing narratives become visible through the process of metahistorical critique,
this visibility allows for scholars to temporarily isolate, critically analyze, and revise
those narratives so that they can no longer be taken for granted as the presumably
unquestionable "common sense" of the field. This destabilization, therefore, not only
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makes way for alternative narratives of and about 'writing instruction, but it also
legitimizes other ways of understanding and participating in the discipline. Because of its
centrality to my argument, I develop my definition of metahistorical critique further in
Chapter 1.

Qualifications
Before I continue, I want to offer a few qualifications about my project - about its
treatment of time or chronology, about what I see as the purpose(s) of history, and about
the inherent limitations of the study. One of the most important elements of my study has
to do with time: Throughout the chapters that follow, I provide publication dates of the
histories I analyze upon first mention, and I remind my readers of publication chronology
whenever possible. Much of my study is grounded on the premise that the narratives
composed by historians in the 1980s (and occasionally earlier) form the foundation for
later narratives about composition histories. Because our earlier histories are more likely
to have influenced the construction of disciplinary narratives in later histories, my
critique often moves in a seemingly logical progression over time, beginning with an
earlier and ostensibly more influential history to more recently published histories.
But I offer a caveat in this regard: Although my critique most often challenges
those narratives established by earlier histories and holds up recent scholarship as
exemplifying historiographic strategies that effectively challenge problematic narratives,
I want to stress that my approach is not necessarily chronological: First, composition's
foundational histories are not to be disqualified on account of a more recently published
history that offers a compelling challenge. Instead, I call attention to competing narratives
because they provoke new questions about the past and unsettle what we thought was
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known; the evidence does not necessarily discredit previous histories, but adds
complexity to the disciplinary imagination. What's more, just as my own study would not
be possible without the historical scholarship already published in rhetoric and
composition, historical work published in the last decade would not be as nuanced as it is
if previous histories had not come before. Second, some versions of composition's
history reject or challenge prevailing narratives espoused by histories published at around
the same time - so the emergence of competing narratives is not necessarily a neatly
chronological event. And finally, recently published histories - no matter their depth of
analysis or level of challenge to the "common sense' of the field - are not themselves
above critique. Although I often point to specific histories as representing rhetorical
strategies valuable to future historians of composition, I try at the same time to illustrate
both the possibilities and limits of various historiographic approaches (within the limits
of my own analytic capabilities).
This is not to say that I imagine an "ideal" or "true" history of composition or that
I would argue that all historians employ a set of "b{!st" historiographic strategies as they
compose new disciplinary histories. I do not see some versions of history as "good" or
others as "bad," some more "truthful" or in tune with "real" practices than others.
Instead, I intend for this study to illuminate how historical knowledge and historiography
as a rhetorical practice work within the discipline and on scholars, teachers, and students
of composition.
Finally, I want to be clear about the limits of this project: First, my dissertation
does not attempt to evaluate the accuracy of claims made by the historians I analyze. In
positioning the voices of others alongside prevailing narratives, I do not mean to establish
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which voice is "correct"; rather, I use these voices to trouble the rhetorical boundaries
that so often detennine what is "intelligible" within disciplinary discourse. Second,
although I hope someday to apply the theoretical concerns I raise here to the writing of a
new history of the discipline, this study does not pretend to compose a history of
composition, nor does it attempt to engage in the kinds of historical methods and
historiographic strategies I hope future compositionists will engage. And finally, in the
spirit of metahistorical critique, I have tried to remain cognizant of the effects of my own
rhetoric throughout this dissertation.
Summary
In Chapter I, I lay the theoretical groundwork for my reading of the narratives
that constitute the remaining chapters. Using the thl:!ories of historiography elaborated in
Foucault's, White's, and LaCapra's critical historical scholarship, I explore how
historiography influences our perceptions of the past, present, and future. With this
framing, I then consider how disciplinary historiography influences the
professionalization of academic fields to explain the role that disciplinary histories in
rhetoric and composition have had in legitimizing the field and to illustrate the
connection between the disciplinary narratives found in the field's histories and its
proposals for the future of the discipline. Also in this chapter, I elaborate upon my
definition of metahistorical critique as a process of close comparative reading and
analysis of two or more texts that intends to produce a clearer understanding of how and
why rhetorical elements common to each text have remained the same or changed over
time. And in the last major section of this chapter, I describe how I have selected,
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categorized, and contextualized the various histories and proposals for the future of the
discipline that comprise the data for my analysis.
In each of the remaining three chapters, I trace one of the disciplinary narratives
through selected histories to illuminate how the narrative has been perpetuated or
challenged over time and with what political and material consequences. My purpose in
presenting these comparative metahistorical critiques is threefold: First, I hope to explain
how and why the discipline invokes each narrative, especially within disciplinary
histories, and to what ends. Second, I use the analysis to extrapolate and examine the
disciplinary values, beliefs, and practices implied in and perpetuated through historians'
use(s) of each narrative. And finally, I use the analysis to identify the implied and explicit
consequences (both positive and negative) suggested by the use(s) of each narrative in its
prevailing and competing versions.
I trace what I call the current-traditional rhetoric and pedagogy (CTRP) narrative
in Chapter 2, "The Rhetoric of Current-Traditional Rhetoric," focusing specifically on
how historians have used this narrative to characterize public and professional culture,
academic institutions, textbooks, teachers, and students. I argue in this chapter that
composition scholars' use of prevailing versions of the CTRP narrative forward
problematic representations of culture, institutions, textbooks, teachers and students
through a neglect of actual historical phenomena. Specifically, I make a distinction
between the disciplinary imaginary about CTRP and real pedagogical practice in order to
explain the rhetorical effects of referring to CTRP as a real or unified set of beliefs and
practices: the conflation of the imaginary and the n:al produces a flawed ideology of the
discipline that masks the way social inequalities art: actually created and reproduced
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within culture and through processes of schooling. This, in turn, produces theoretical and
material consequences for composition as a contemporary discipline.
In Chapter 3, "The Question of First-Year Composition," I focus on the
consequences of composition historians' persistent focus on first-year composition (FYC)
and the debate surrounding its viability as a required academic course. As historians
engage in the debate, they perpetuate an erroneous assumption that our discipline is best
historicized in terms of English college-level writing instruction in the United States. I
argue that because most contemporary disciplinary histories focus on FYC, the discipline
tends to think of and define "work," "writing," and "writing instruction" as a
problematically abstract, monolingual, institutionalized, pedagogically produced and
reader-oriented practice relevant only to Americans.
Chapter 4, "Composition as a(n) (Inter)Disc:ipline," explores how the relationship
between composition and other disciplines, including rhetoric, literature,
communications, linguistics, education, TESOL, foreign languages, and writing in a
global context, has (or has not) been historicized. I argue that prevailing narratives about
composition's relationship to other disciplines present the field's (inter)disciplinarity as a
necessarily antagonistic or flawed state of being in the academy. I also problematize how
historians' attention to some disciplines (such as rhetoric and literature) over others (such
as education and linguistics) shape the contemporary discipline's primary concerns, and I
analyze the limitations and possibilities of shifting our attention to neglected disciplines. I
argue that we can intervene in the problematic representations that emerge by composing
composition's "story" as an (inter)disciplinary one.
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CHAPTER 1:
HISTORIOGRAPHY, DISCIPLINARITY, AND METAHISTORICAL CRITIQUE

The history of college writing and rhetorical instruction in the u.s. currently
makes up a substantial portion of research in rhetoric and composition, an area that has
been burgeoning since the publication of James Berlin's historical monographs in the
early 1980s. And even when the history of the discipline is not an explicit concern of
composition scholarship, our history is often referenced to substantiate other claims,
especially claims about how the future of rhetoric and composition should, ideally,
unfold. As a field, rhetoric and composition is continually drawn to its past, but the more
historical research is conducted, the more this historical knowledge complicates what we
thought we knew about ourselves. This, in turn, challenges our desire for disciplinary
progress and our hope that we can somehow learn from (or break with) the discipline's
past. Such challenges and complications likewise disrupt the disciplinary narratives we
have established and come back to, time after time.
In later chapters I explore the evolution of a handful of rhetoric and composition's
most common disciplinary narratives; in this chaptt:r, I lay the theoretical groundwork for
my reading of these narratives. Specifically, I first review what scholars in the disciplines
of history and rhetoric and composition have to say about the effects of historiography on
our perceptions of the past, present, and future in order to establish that the study of
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historiography in our own discipline is a worthwhile endeavor. Then, I review what
scholars in the fields of history and rhetoric and composition have said about the
relationship between disciplinary historiography and the professionalization of academic
fields. I conduct this review in order to explain the role that disciplinary histories in
rhetoric and composition have had in legitimizing the field, and in order to make a
convincing case for what I see as a connection betw"een the disciplinary narratives found
in the field's histories and its proposals for the future of the discipline. Third, I define and
elaborate upon my method of analysis for the dissertation, a process of reading and
interpretation I call "metahistorical critique." And in the last major section of this
chapter, I offer definitions for a few key terms that are used consistently throughout the
dissertation, as well as an explanation for how I've selected, categorized, and
contextualized the various historical texts that I analyze throughout the remaining
chapters.

Historiography's Effect(s) on Our Perceptions of the Past, Present, and Future(s)
Scholars in history, especially intellectual history, have become increasingly
interested over the last forty years in the connections between history and rhetoric.
Specifically, those who might be called critical historians - including Michel Foucault,
Hayden White, and Dominick LaCapra - have drawn from rhetorical theory to challenge
traditional historiographic practice in its assumption that historical research, reading, and
writing can be objective. In Rethinking Intellectual History, LaCapra summarizes these
historians' conclusions well when he writes that "a purely documentary conception of
historiography is itself a heuristic fiction, for description is never pure, in that a fact is
relevant for an account only when it is selected with reference to a topic or a question
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posed to the past" (61). Collectively, these historians argue, the ways we read and
interpret historical documents and the choices we make as writers of history are political
strategies: Historiography shapes the way we see and understand the world, which, in
turn, carries intellectual and material consequences for decisions made in the present and
the future.
Scholars in intellectual history were some of the first in the larger discipline of
history to focus on the rhetorical elements of historiography, probably because they are
uniquely positioned, not as "proper" historians - those working in the archives to
describe important moments in history and fill in gaps in our historical knowledge - but
as intellectual historians, who have traditionally documented "great men" and their ideas.
Because they have been trained to take a meta-analytical view of the field in order to
determine and document what makes individual figures and texts historically significant,
the critical historians listed above are well position,;!d to question the positivist tendencies
of traditional history and the rhetorical effects of historiography. ! These historians,
drawing largely from structuralist and post-structuralist language theory, have posed
important questions about language, texts, contexts, and history that are relevant to
rhetoric and composition in general, and especially to my work here. Some of these
questions include: How does discourse work, and what are the effects of discourse on our
ways of being in and thinking about history? What is a historical document, and how

1 Here and throughout the dissertation, I use words such as "traditional," "proper," "significant," "true,"
"fact," "objective," "natural," "alternative," "history," "event," and "real" with a consciousness that these
words are contested because they establish problematic hierarchies of value and normalize the dominant at
the expense of voices and perspectives already marginalized. Although I would prefer to call attention to
the problems inherent to these terms by consistently enclosing them in quotes, this rhetorical strategy
becomes tedious and, what's more, can misdirect the focus of readers. Therefore, I ask that readers assume
that my use of these terms is always self-conscious and intended to highlight, rather than mask, their
problematic status. When I enclose these or other terms in quotes, readers can assume I am referring to
another author's use ofthe term.
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does a document work, both as object and subject? What is the relationship between
language, historical texts, and the contexts in which they were produced and received?
What is the relationship between reading and interpreting historical documents and
writing history? And finally, what makes a historical event real? For the remainder of this
section, I will review how these historians, and others in rhetoric and composition, have
answered these questions in order to establish the ways in which historiography affects
our ways of understanding the past, present, and future of the field.
Scholars in rhetoric and composition have certainly had much to say about how
discourse works (or doesn't), and scholars in history have too, especially when referring
to historiography as a specific and consequential form of discourse. For much of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, historians defended their field as neither an art nor a
science, but as a mediator between the two: on the one hand, historians argued, their work
was scientific in that it excavated and analyzed verifiable facts; on the other,
historiography was in many ways an art form, because it translated what would otherwise
be a mere chronicle of events into a narrative, pulling those facts into coherent form.
Historical knowledge could not be reduced to a simple presentation of historical events,
lacking interpretation; nor did historiography permit one to stray so far from the truth that
a reader might wonder if she were reading fact or fiction. Because they could not be
categorized easily as either artists or scientists, therefore, historians found themselves
having to defend the value of their discipline - which was once unquestioned and
unquestionable - against the rise of industrialism and modem science. As scientific
knowledge (and the value ascribed to it) grew, and as history's place within the academy
appeared less certain, historians - in an effort to mitigate professional anxiety -
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abandoned their stances as intermediaries between art and science and instead began to
call for increased objectivity in both their research and writing. Indeed, it is from this
defensive posture that contemporary critical historical theory emerged, and from which
these theorists - represented here by Foucault, White, and LaCapra - have been criticized
by their peers in the field. 2
The arguments made by contemporary critical historians challenge more
traditional calls for objectivity and empiricism because they recognize the historicity and
slippage of discourse, which points to the impossibility of historical research or writing
ever achieving a purely descriptive mode. Foucault, for example, argues in Archaeology

0/Knowledge that discourse consists of groups of statements, objects, concepts, choices,
and speakers that accumulate to create a "system of formation," which emerges as a
result of repetition over time (74). Foucault's archaeological method of analysis, which is
demonstrated in The History o/Sexuality, Discipline and Punish, and elsewhere, seeks to
illustrate that all discourse "has not only a meaning or a truth, but a history, and a specific
history that does not refer it back to the laws of an alien development" (Archaeology
127). In other words, discourse is only made possible by the past: Discursive
"formations," or "constellations," are constituted and changed over and through time;
they are affected continually by past and present institutions, rules, speakers, and
situations. New discursive formations, according to Foucault, allow for different
possibilities of what might be said and by whom, but they only emerge out of the past.
Similarly, for White, the historicity of discourse implies a continual slippage
between the past, or what has already been written, and the present, the act of writing

I direct my attention to Foucault, White, and LaCapra because I see them as representative of the major
and ongoing historiographic debates in intellectual history today.

2
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about history. White explains: "When we seek to make sense of such problematical topics
as human nature, culture, society, and history, we never say precisely what we wish to
say or mean precisely what we say. Our discourse always tends to slip away from our
data towards the structures of consciousness with which we are trying to grasp them"

(Tropics 1). For White, historical discourse "is always as much about the nature of
interpretation itself as it is about the subject matter" (Tropics 4) because the historian is
continually looking to the past, as represented in the historical document, and making
meaning of it from his or her contemporary position for a specific audience and with
particular goals in mind.
This shuttling back and forth between the past and the present calls into question
what, exactly, constitutes a text or a document, especially in a historical context.
Considered literally, a text would seem to be most easily defined by its material(ity), a
physical (and therefore true) marker of the past. Such a definition positions the text as a
passive object to be worked on - excavated and deciphered by the historian. Foucault
summarizes this approach to the document well:
... ever since a discipline such as history has existed, documents have been
used, questioned, and have given rise to questions; scholars have asked not
only what these documents meant, but also whether they were telling the
truth, and by what right they could claim to be doing so .... But ... all this
critical concern ... pointed to one and the same end: the reconstitution, on
the basis of what the documents say, and sometimes merely hint at, of the
past from which they emanate and which has now disappeared far behind
them; the document was always treated as the language of a voice since
reduced to silence, its fragile but possibly decipherable trace.
(Archaeology 6)
Foucault and LaCapra have both challenged this view of the historical text as a
reconstitution of the past, claiming that such a perspective can become imperialistic in its
efforts to absolutize and reduce the text to a static object (LaCapra, Rethinking 19).
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Instead, they suggest, a more appropriate definition of the historical document would be
one that acknowledges its active role: While we work on it, it also works on us.
For Foucault, defining the historical document as active means that contemporary
historians should work not from outside but from within it, ''to develop it: history now
organizes the document, divides it up, distributes it, orders it, arranges it in levels,
establishes series, distinguishes between what is relevant and what is not, discovers
elements, defines unities, describes relations" (Archaeology 6). Such a view of the
document demands that the historian understand the past as "living, fragile, pulsating," a
view which defines the historian's task not as fixing or settling what we know about the
past, but as persistently reexamining and reorganizing historical texts, both to establish
new relationships among texts and ideas and to identify discontinuity and gaps in our
historical knowledge (11-13).
For LaCapra, an active view of the text means challenging the "concepts of
'inside' and 'outside' in relation to processes of interaction between language and the
world" (26). At one level, this dichotomy is challenged by the fact that actual events
occur at specific times and places, outside of the texts that document them - but these
events are only known to us as history through their textualization. At another level, this
dichotomy is challenged by the historical document in its present manifestation, as a
material object that has managed to stay intact across time and space to arrive in the
hands of the historian who now reads it: The historian brings to the text his or her own
"outside" knowledge, experiences, and worldviews in the act of reading; but at the same
time, the document makes "inside" claims on the reader, bringing her to it, asking that it
be understood on its own terms.
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LaCapra furthers this challenge to the inside-outside binary by distinguishing
between what he calls the "docwnentary" and "worklike" elements of the text:
The docwnentary situates the text in terms of factual or literal dimensions
involving reference to empirical reality and conveying information about
it. The '"worklike" supplements empirical reality by adding to and
subtracting from it. ... The worklike is critical and transformative, for it
deconstructs the given .... one might say that while the documentary marks
a difference, the worklike makes a difference - one that engages the
reader in recreative dialogue with the text and the problems it raises.
(Rethinking 30, emphasis added)
LaCapra's emphasis on the reader here and elsewhere is an important revision to
Foucault's description of the historian's relationship to the docwnent: In order for the
past to be reflected in contemporary historiography as living and active, the historian
cannot be understood as the only one doing work, as Foucault's description in

Archaeology ofKnowledge implies. The text's docwnentary and worklike characteristics
make dialogue between historian and text not only possible, but necessary. Together, the
historian and the text confound the inside-outside binary; historian and text can never be
understood as either fully inside or outside one another, but continually shifting positions,
each making claims on and posing questions of the other.
The shifting positions of the reader and the historical docwnent - the present and
the past - raise the question of context, which surrounds both. Much of the traditional
work of historians has revolved around contextualization - redescribing historical events
as thoroughly as possible using docwnentary and other evidence so as to locate them in
history. More recently, historians such as White have suggested that formalist analysis of
historical texts provides enough of a context that looking "outside" the text becomes less
important. But throughout Rethinking Intellectual History, LaCapra insists upon a middle
ground, claiming that the best historiography is dialogical, acknowledging both the way
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that a historical text makes claims on its readers as well as the context in which the text
was produced.
This stance recognizes the role played by language in its destabilization ofthe
text-context binary. According to LaCapra, "nothing related to the problem oflanguage is
alien to [intellectual history]" (Rethinking 18). Language's role in the muddling of the
text-context binary leads LaCapra to conclude that, in fact, ''texts are events in the history
of language" and he advocates that historians "understand these multivalent events as
complex uses oflanguage," which produce a "context [that] involves the reader in an
interaction among past, present, and future - an interaction having bearing on both
understanding and action" (Rethinking 65). Recognizing the central role played by
language and texts in historical thinking enables us to think about history and historical
texts as active, living, and present - rather than as distant, static objects fixed in the past.
When thinking about context along these lines, then, the question of reality also
arises: On a basic level, what is it that we mean, exactly, when we refer to history? What
is it - language, evidence, imagination - that makes a historical event real? What does it
mean to think historically, and what are its consequences? And how does it become
possible to think, read, and write about history productively if all such attempts are
unreliable, incomplete, and potentially unjust?
The ambiguity of the term history is relevant to my discussion in this chapter
because it carries a complicated past that challenges any easy explanation about what it is
we refer to when we talk about history or, for that matter, reality. Hayden White
describes the term history as ambiguous, specifically because it has been used as a term
of oppression to distinguish between cultures that are supposedly "historical" - those that
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have documented their past - and "unhistorical" - those that have not produced records
of the past and are therefore considered (from Western perspectives) to be outside of
history. Thus, history not only refers to the object it intends to describe (the human past),
but also the discourse surrounding this object (The Content 54-57). White rejects the
traditional distinction between historical and unhistorical cultures on the grounds that
both groups use narrative as a primary mode of discourse to describe real events.
Narrative presents its own ambiguity (albeit one that I consider productive) in that it
illustrates the role that imagination necessarily plays in the representation of "any past,
which by definition comprises events, processes, structures ... considered to be no longer
perceivable" (57). In other words, the use of narrative across cultures points to a powerful
interrelation among language, evidence, and imagination - a combination which some
might view with skepticism but seems to be necessary for any culture to make sense of
the past.
Historical thinking, then, at least in its traditional form, is one way through which
the difference represented by the "Other" - often represented in Western thinking by the
delineation of unhistorical cultures - begins to seem natural, allowing for the
perpetuation of systemic oppression. Understanding the history of the term history as one
that has perpetuated an unjust view of humanity can help us recognize historical thinking
- or what White calls a "historical self-consciousness" - as a cultural, not natural,
phenomenon (The Content 14). Further, this phenomenon helps explain how and why we
think about texts as "historically real," through which "[t]he indexical, iconic, and
symbolic notions of language ... hold out the possibility of ... direct referentiality,
creat[ing] the illusion that there is a past out there that is directly reflected in the texts"
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(The Content 209). Such an illusion, then, would seem to be particularly Western, one
which defines historical events as real "'not because they occurred but because, first, they
were remembered, and second, they are capable of finding a place in a chronologically
ordered sequence" (The Content 20).
The problematic consequences of historical thinking are preserved, I argue,
through two practices standard for historians within any discipline: The preservation and
collection of documents over time, and the uncritical employment of traditional
historiography. In Archaeology o/Knowledge, Foucault argues that all disciplines which
take history as their subject (not just History proper, but the history of ideas, of science,
of philosophy, of thought, of literature, etc.) are concerned with the questioning of the
document. The historian's treatment of the document, for Foucault, plays a pivotal role
between what he calls "traditional" and "new" approaches to history. In traditional
history, monuments become, or are reduced to, documents; but in "new" history,
historians seek to develop an "'intrinsic description of the monument," which shifts the
document from object to subject, becoming a monument worthy of study in and of itself
(7).

The traditional historian's efforts to document monuments are best illustrated in
the existence of the archive, which accumulates and systematically organizes
documentary materials over time. While archives are necessary and useful, failure to
critically examine their workings can reinforce the naturalization of historical thinking.
Foucault argues that the archive is an important space for critical analysis because the
archive acts as a physical manifestation that at once points to our need to categorize,
contain, and "smooth out" history, while also signifying that which cannot be organized
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or explained, that which "separates us from what we can no longer say, and from that
which falls outside our discursive practice" (Archaeology 130-31). Foucault advocates
for new historical research and writing to shift from merely fixing facts and events
(through organization and categorization) to identifying relationships among these facts,
to move from writing "continuous" or ''total'' history to a more "general" history, which
will expose differences, discontinuity, limits, gaps, and the workings of power in the past

(Archaeology 10-13). These new practices of doing history seem to provide one way
through which traditional ways of thinking, reading, and writing about history might be
disrupted.
Although few in rhetoric and composition have theorized the role that language
plays in historiography and historical thinking as extensively as White, Foucault, and
LaCapra have, Nan Johnson and Janice Lauer have both acknowledged the problems that
uncritical historiographic practices can cause in the constitution of our disciplinary
histories. While Johnson ultimately argues for a more traditional approach to historical
research and historiography in her contribution to the "Octalog" conversation about
historiography, she also presents these traditional approaches as highly nuanced and
attendant to the concerns of the critical historians I have discussed so far. She writes that
she "proceed [s] on the assumption that historical research and writing are archaeological
[uncovering and explaining] and rhetorical [history is figurative, not actual] activities. As
an historian, I am responsible both to the claims of historical evidence and to the burden
of proclaiming my enterprise as an attempt to tell 'true stories'" (9-10). Without this
understanding of her position as a disciplinary historian, Johnson implies, her
documentation of history would ultimately fail. A decade later, in her contribution to
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"Octalog II," Lauer seems to think that most disciplinary historians have not adopted
Johnson's approach, complaining that poor historiographic practices in rhetoric and
composition have produced histories that "try to stuff dynamic development into static
categories; that claim definitive status; that distort to promote a thesis, that puff hot air
instead of arguing using evidence; and that ignore many voices to a few within a limited
strand of scholarship" (30).
While many of rhetoric and composition's early histories may not live up to
Johnson's and Lauer's standards, many disciplinary historians have at least addressed (if
not actually applied to their own writing) the political implications of historiography. One
of the most vocal proponents for recognition of the politics of historiography is Berlin,
who insists in multiple publications that disciplinary historians have a responsibility to
acknowledge their particular biases and reject "the claim to disinterested objectivity"
("Postmodemism" 170). Siding with White (among others), he argues in
"Postmodernism, Politics, and Histories of Rhetoric" that "[t]he historian of rhetoric ... is
engaged in a cultural politics that cannot be avoided. In the final analysis, a history
chooses a politics or is chosen by a politics: the issue of power simply cannot be avoided"
(171). In their contributions to "Octalog," both Crowley and Johnson warn of the
consequences when readers and writers fail to critically examine their own
historiography. Crowley writes that "the intellectual categories we introduce in our
histories, or the figures we study, are reified by our readers in such a way as to award
them quasi-metaphysical status" ("Octalog" 7). In other words, without critical attention
to the political effects of historiography, the figures, texts, and events that composition's
historians have deemed significant constitute the common sense history of the field,
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which Victor Vitanza argues is the "most wide-spread form of ideology" and is
"(insidiously) metaphysical [in that it] subscribes to language ... as 'transparent'"
("'Notes'" 65). Johnson agrees with Crowley, arguing that historians must always
struggle with the fact that even when, in theory, we "know that the nature of reality of
past and present is negotiated," even when we "know that what historians do is to compel
an act of attention to a text which is itself an act of attention," and even though we "know
that histories are just stories, historians and readers alike tend to believe and subsequently
proceed as if some stories were truer than others" ("Octalog" 18). Historians must always
negotiate this tug-of-war between understanding the rhetorical nature of language and the
desire to know "reality," Johnson explains, and "[i]t is the energy of this contradiction
that fuels the political impact of historiography and makes this business of accounting for
the past a baffling responsibility" (18).
These political concerns have, in tum, led some historians to focus on the
importance of documenting extra-disciplinary context and the workings of power in
disciplinary history. Robert Connors, Susan Miller, and Charles Paine have each stressed
the importance oflocating composition's history in relation to the cultural context that
surrounds the figures, texts, and events considered significant to the discipline. In his
contribution to "Octalog," for example, Connors dismisses the idea that disciplinary
history should be defined within "a narrow valley of 'history of ideas,' because all of our
disciplinary ideas have been based in people's struggles for a better life .... Meaningful
historical writing must teach us what people in the past have wanted from literacy so that
we may come to understand what we want" (7). In other words, in order to accurately
portray our disciplinary history, Connors insists that historians must represent the
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political implications of that history because literacy itself is an issue deeply intertwined
with dynamics of power at work. Along similar lines, Miller argues in "Composition as a
Cultural Artifact" that the only way to fully understand the development of composition
as an academic discipline is to approach it through a cultural-historical lens, one which
understands composition "as a cultural practice" and which acknowledges how the
cultural ideologies of different periods in our history worked to establish the
underpinnings of our current practices and perspectives (32). Likewise, Paine argues that
in order to "more accurately illustrate the relationships between culture and
composition .... we need detailed accounts of individuals in which the motivation and
actions of individuals can be seen in a richer and more illuminating light" (34-35).
It should be clear by now that historical thinking, interpretation, and writing carry

material and intellectual consequences that ultimately affect how we understand and
participate in the world on a daily basis, and how we pave the way for the future. For
these reasons, careful and critical consideration of our ways of documenting, reading, and
writing history is necessary for those who want to intervene in our habits of thinking,
reading, and writing about the discipline's present and future, as well the students,
teachers, and scholars who participate in it.
Historiography and Disciplinarity
If general historiography carries political implications, it goes without saying that
disciplinary historiography does too. But prior to investigating what these implications
might be - which is what this dissertation ultimately seeks to do - we must first consider
the role historiography plays in shaping academic disciplines, and also why academic
disciplines compose their histories in the first place. More specific to this project's place
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within rhetoric and composition scholarship, I am interested in why exposing the history
oflanguage instruction in U.S. post-secondary education has become an important
activity for the discipline. And along related lines, I want to consider why scholars in
rhetoric and composition have failed to bring sufficient attention to these questions when
our primary focus has always been on the workings oflanguage. In this section of the
chapter, I focus on these questions in order to substantiate my claim (developed in the
chapters that follow) that the way rhetoric and composition writes its history often works,
first, to stabilize the field as a legitimate discipline, and second, to totalize the past or to
smooth out moments of disruption and discontinuity in order to present the discipline as a
unified whole, a process that produces important material and intellectual consequences.
To understand the relationship between historiography and disciplinarity, it seems
necessary to return to my earlier discussion of the workings of discourse. Not only are the
possibilities for contemporary discourse always constrained (and produced) by the past,
but discourse is also limited by the situations, rules, institutions, and speakers that
together create the context for its existence. The discourse produced within the
educational system, then, presents a unique set of characteristics that need to be examined
in order to understand how disciplinary historiography works as a specific, and
meaningful, form of discourse within an academic context.
Institutions of higher education in the United States are constituted, generally, by
a wide array of individual academic departments grouped within larger schools or
colleges, which are usually (though not always) determined according to the professional
goals implied by particular degrees. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, according
to Burton Bledstein, the modem American university set scholars in opposition to one
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other by creating a highly competitive environment that drove individuals to mark
themselves as specialists in a particular area of knowledge out of "fear for the future of a
career" (300). This process of competition and specialization ultimately enabled
departments to expand "by accretion, by means of the simple addition of members who
both individually represented specific areas of knowledge, and individually expanded the
range of a department's specialized offerings," which further benefitted the university
(300). Academic disciplines in the U.S. have evolved, sometimes haphazardly, over time
in response to both internal and external political and social demands, which in tum have
helped define the discourse produced within the academy.
I define disciplinary discourse as discourse that has been vetted by intellectual
peers, a discourse produced by and for scholars to add to a discipline's knowledge base
and prompt further research and the production of new knowledge. Because scholarly
research is published on account of its originality and currency, it may seem safe to
assume that disciplinary discourse would achieve a certain level of objectivity and
validity that other discursive forms do not. But as many scholars know from personal
experience working in the academy, discourse produced within educational institutions is
at least as political as discourse located outside of academia. Further, separating types of
discourses according to their circulation "inside" or "outside" the academy becomes
problematic if one agrees with Foucault, as I do, that educational systems hold the
"political means of maintaining or of modifoing the appropriation of discourse, with the
knowledge and the powers it carries with it" (Archaeology 227, emphasis added). I would
add that, whether it circulates inside, outside, or in between the public and academic
spheres, disciplinary discourse carries a significant amount of political weight in the
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public domain because of the cultural value ascribed by the public to higher education:
Both within and outside of academia, intellectuals act as purveyors and arbiters of what
counts as new knowledge, thus establishing the rhetorical boundaries for the discursive
sphere.
In order to understand disciplinary discourse as a particularly powerful mode of
discourse, it is important to consider how disciplines themselves work. Above, I defined
disciplinary discourse as a form of discourse through which scholars "add to a
discipline's knowledge base and prompt further research and the production of new
knowledge." While I will ultimately maintain that this definition is a valid one, it contains
internal contradictions that can help illustrate how disciplines act as constantly evolving
but seemingly stable entities. The first problem with my definition is that it assumes that
the contents and boundaries of discourse are knowable. I argued earlier that all discourse
has a history; however, it does not follow that this discursive history is known or even
acknowledged in present discourse. Take, for example, the constellation of texts (books,
monographs, journal articles, responses, retrospectives, review essays, book reviews,
online publications, etc.) that are published within a given year and relevant to a specific
discipline: While the constellation might seem at first relatively small (considering the
many constellations in what might be called a discursive galaxy outside the discipline),
only a handful of these texts will be read by an individual scholar, and that scholar will
explicitly reference only a small percentage of that handful in the work that she produces
over the next ten or twenty years. The fact that this scholar is unaware of the larger field
of discourse in her discipline, even within a single year, does not invalidate her work
(unless, of course, she fails to acknowledge the texts deemed by other scholars are most
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relevant to her specific focus); although her knowledge of disciplinary discourse is
limited, our scholar's use of the few texts she is familiar with in later scholarship will
ultimately fulfill my definition of disciplinary discourse, in that it will add to the
discipline'S foundation of knowledge and pave the way for future research and the
production of new knowledge.
Although this explanation might console our hypothetical scholar (and the rest of
us), it does not settle the issue; instead, it leads us to the second problem inherent to my
definition, which is ultimately caught up with the first: My definition assumes that
discourse is positivistic, that what a scholar says and writes in the present explicitly or
consciously takes from and builds upon or revises what was said in the past.3 But in
relation to the discursive constellation of texts available to and relevant within a single
discipline, scholars "do not communicate solely by the logical succession of propositions
that they advance, nor by the recurrence of themes, nor by the obstinacy of a meaning
transmitted, forgotten, and rediscovered; they communicate by the form ofpositivity of
their discourse" - in other words, while what is actually said in a given discipline is not
actually positivistic (because an individual scholar cannot know the full span of a
discipline'S discourse), the rhetoric of disciplinary discourse (the shape of an argument,
the presentation of empirical research, etc.) takes a positivistic form (Foucault,
Archaeology 126). So positivity is a fundamental but ultimately paradoxical characteristic
of disciplinary discourse.
The positivistic element of disciplinary discourse produces rhetorical boundaries
and creates the illusion that disciplines themselves are stable entities; while disciplines
3

When I use the word ''positivistic,'' I am drawing on the (now largely discredited) philosophy that the

development of knowledge is causal and progressive, and that advances in knowledge necessarily occur in
logical and chronological fashion.
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may evolve over time, it can seem as though this evolution occurs in a logical, objective,
and systematic fashion. But when considering a single discipline's discursive
constellation, or the inter- and trans-disciplinary galaxy that constitutes what might be
called academic discourse writ large, it becomes clear that describing the evolution of a
single discipline as logical, objective, or systematic is decidedly illogical. But this does
not mean that a discipline's workings are impossible to decipher. Instead, Foucault offers
a different explanation for how to conceive of disciplines: he argues that disciplines
should not be conceived of as hosts to an infinite number of discursive possibilities, but
as "system[s] of control in the production of discourse, fixing its limits through the action
of an identity taking the form of a permanent reactivation of the rules" (Archaeology
224). While a single scholar may, indeed, face - and take advantage of - a wide range of
discursive possibilities for the production of knowledge, Foucault argues that "it is
probably impossible to appreciate [disciplines'] positive, multiplicatory role without first
taking into consideration their restrictive, constraining role" (224).
The constraint described by Foucault "functions socially much more than
intellectually," according to David Shumway and Craig Dionne (6). Indeed, Maureen
Daly Goggin affirms the importance of the social element in her definition of disciplines,
which she describes as entities "made up of individuals who are enmeshed in complex
webs of institutions that both make possible a range of problems and activities but also
limit these. That is to say, disciplinary practices are carried out in real places by real
people with their own complex arrangements of political, cultural, racial, sexual, and
gendered ideologies and identities" (Authoring xxii). Shumway and Dionne agree,
arguing that the acknowledgement of the specifically social element of academic
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disciplines is one way through which scholars can resist the conventional glorification of
disciplines as ''traditions devoted to timeless essence"; this attitude, they contend,
"misleads us into thinking that, while the quantity and accuracy of knowledge has
changed, knowledge itself has not" (4). In other words, this traditional attitude toward the
production of knowledge ignores the power dynamics inherent to the process of
disciplinarity and the maintenance of the rhetorical boundaries enclosing disciplinary
discourse. Disciplinarity, Shumway and Dionne argue, is ultimately an effort at
unification, an effort which "naturalizes the discipline's boundaries and legitimizes its
right to exclude other disciplines from its territory" (6), thus masking the fact that
knowledge-making is ultimately a culturally defined, supported, and produced process.
As this explanation shows, it is impossible to separate discourse from
disciplinarity, or to remove either from the larger context of the educational apparatus at
work. The push-and-pull relationship between disciplinary discourse and disciplinarity
itself helps explain, at least in part, the purposes that disciplinary histories serve for the
process of disciplinarity and why some histories may enjoy a more popular or positive
reception than others within a given discipline. Disciplines such as psychology,
sociology, history, anthropology, communications, and rhetoric and composition tend to
struggle with their collective disciplinary identities because they can be loosely
categorized together as human sciences, a label which indicates that these disciplines
study human actions and developmental processes. The identity struggle these disciplines
encounter stems, in part, from the fact that human actions and processes are not
necessarily predictable or logical: because humans, as objects of study, resist
stabilization, scholars in the human sciences must engage nonscientific methodologies,
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such as qualitative data-gathering or textual analysis, to approach their subject. While
these methods are necessary and appropriate considering each discipline's subject and
purpose, engaging these methods has the potential to delegitimize a discipline, especially
young or emerging disciplines, in the eyes of those who value more objective and
empirical methods.
Much of the scholarship published within the contemporary human sciences especially that scholarship intended to trace out a discipline's past, mark out its present
boundaries, and/or envision its future - might best be described as anxious. However, this
anxiety should not be seen as necessarily negative; disciplinary histories, for example,
use this anxiety to justify their investigation of the past, an investigation which, in its
uncovering, secures the legitimacy of contemporary disciplines. As such, disciplinary
histories can be considered integral to the establishment of disciplinarity in the human
SCIences.
Even as they collectively stabilize the human sciences within the academy,
disciplinary histories are ultimately constituted by political acts of interpretation. If a
whole genre of texts serves a political purpose, as disciplinary histories do, then it follows
that disciplinary historiography plays a political role in the shaping of disciplines. We
might locate the processes of disciplinarity, then, in the writing of disciplinary history
itself, which is shaped according to the limits and possibilities allowed through
disciplinary discourse. In other words, we can assume that disciplinary historians
interpret the past with a specific interest in supporting a discipline'S claim to legitimacy.
And this interpretation - of events, figures, and texts in a discipline's history - may be
quite reductive because of the political goals of the genre. LaCapra explains why this
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kind of reductivity may be a necessary, albeit problematic, element of disciplinary
historiography:
... a discipline may constitute itself in part through reductive reading of its
important texts .... [which] render the texts less multifaceted and perhaps
less critical but more operational for organized research. Here the
decisive role of certain disciplines and practitioners lies not in the finetuning of a paradigm enunciated in 'founding' texts but in the active
reduction of those texts to their paradigmatic level. (Rethinking 60,
emphasis added)
In other words, while acts of reductive reading may seem counter-productive to a
discipline's explicit goals (and problematic in general), they occur because they help
establish those goals in the first place. Because of the integral place these practices have
in the establishment and maintenance of a discipline's place in the academy, it does not
seem productive to dismiss reductive reading as essentially flawed. Instead, I argue that
scholars should promote a critical awareness and analysis of these practices, so that we
can better understand how and why they occur within the contexts in which they are
produced. Developing this awareness can help advance a meta-critical understanding of
disciplinary values, practices, and beliefs - which, I contend, is vital for disrupting those
that are problematic and promoting those that align well with our scholarly goals.
To understand how disciplinary histories function within rhetoric and
composition, I examine how disciplinary histories function within the discipline of
history, which today struggles with its disciplinary identity even as a comparatively wellestablished discipline in the human sciences. After conducting this brief examination, I
apply the knowledge gained to rhetoric and composition, a much younger discipline with
an arguably shorter past, to help elucidate more specifically why disciplinary histories
have served such an important function for the discipline.
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Earlier, I described history's struggle with its identity as neither an art nor a
science and its attempts to mitigate the anxieties produced by its location. To summarize:
The discipline of history first defended its in-between position as a positive addition to
the academy in that it "occup[ied] ... an epistemologically neutral middle ground that
supposedly exists between art and science" (White, Tropics 27). Later, historians
succumbed to the ideologies extolled by the rise of science and modernity, authorizing
many within the discipline to "[fall] back on the view that history is after all a semiscience" and call for empiricism in research methods and increased objectivity in
historiography (White, Tropics 27). More recently, some historians (including White and
LaCapra, among others) have drawn from structuralist and post-structuralist theories of
language to argue for a more nuanced vision of historical methods and historiography,
one which takes their rhetorical nature into account.
Within historical studies, the subdiscipline of intellectual history works in ways
analogous to disciplinary history in other fields, including rhetoric and composition.
Intellectual history takes stock of those Significant texts and figures that have guided
major transformations in thought and epistemologies. Traditionally, intellectual history
has exhibited little self-consciousness about how or why a text or figure achieved
significance and took the concept of significance for granted, merely documenting these
figures and texts for the purposes of posterity. More recently, scholars such as White and
LaCapra have become interested in what, exactly, constitutes significance in the first
place. For White, it is the underlying rhetorical structure of a historical argument that
determines how a historical text will be received by other historians, as well as the public.
He writes: ''the link between a given historian and his potential public is forged on the
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pretheoretical, and specifically linguistic, level of consciousness" (Metahistory 429).
LaCapra's argument is similar to but less deterministic than White's: "If intellectual
history is anything," he writes, "it is a history of the situated uses of language constitutive
of significant texts" (Rethinking 18-19). In the same passage, LaCapra agrees with White
that the question of language is impossible to ignore when considering the role it plays in
positioning a figure or text as significant within intellectual history, but he also
emphasizes the difficulty involved in defining the consequences of language in a
conclusive way, which is what White's stance implies.
The writing of intellectual history, or disciplinary history more generally, presents
specific problems for disciplinary historians in that they are positioned within the very
discipline they intend to document. White argues that a distinction must be made between
disciplinary historians and other scholars according to the questions they must ask. Some
of these questions include:
What is the structure of a peculiarly historical consciousness? What is the
epistemological status of historical explanations, as compared with other
kinds of explanations that might be offered to account for the materials
with which historians ordinarily deal? What are the possible/orms of
historical representation and what are their bases? What authority can
historical accounts claim as contributions to a secured knowledge of
reality in general and to the human sciences in particular?" (Tropics 81).
Because disciplinary historians write both within and for a given discipline, the way in
which a historian answers these questions will shape not only how the discipline evolves,
but also how current and future scholars perceive, work within, and articulate new
questions about it. In fact, White argues that history would not have achieved
professionalization if it had not "politiciz[ed] historical thinking" - in other words, if it
had not negotiated the contours of disciplinary discourse and "mark [ed] out" what is and
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is not worthy of attention within the discipline through its historiography, history would
not have been able to defend itself as a discipline (The Content 62).
Historians of composition have, like White, acknowledged the problem posed by
their positions writing both within and for the discipline. John Schilb argues that this
positioning works against historians' ability to self-consciously acknowledge the
rhetoricity of their endeavors. He explains that problems in disciplinary historiography
arise because historians "share a belief that composition studies has suffered from lack of
attention to its past ... hold similar notions of the major figures of the past. .. tend to
follow the same principles of periodization ... display similar affinities for intellectual
history, and ... reveal a common desire to see the teaching of writing become more
respectable" (240). Berlin agrees, writing that to avoid this problem, "historians must
become aware of the rhetoricity of their own enterprise" ("Octalog" 6). And in a later
essay, Berlin becomes more specific about how this awareness might be accomplished,
suggesting that historians adopt a historiographic method that:
demands honesty of the historian, a candid acknowledgement of her
ideological stance, her conception of perfect economic, social, and
political arrangements, her vision of utopia .... The historian then owes it
to us and to herself to tell us where she stands so that we can know
whether we want to stand with her. ("Revisionary" 127)
While Berlin's suggestions clearly respond to some of White's concerns, other important
questions emerge: How easily is this kind of self-conscious positioning accomplished in
the actual process of writing history? And in what ways does this positioning move
beyond mere articulation of one's biases to new ways of writing history? My analysis of
the histories themselves in later chapters will address these questions in more detail.
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Given the above explanation for how and why disciplinary histories work within
larger processes of disciplinarity, I'd like to gesture towards the specific questions that
arise in relation to disciplinary histories in rhetoric and composition: What roles have our
histories played in the shaping of our field? How have our histories intervened in
disciplinary discourse to create new possibilities and limitations for what can and cannot
be said in our scholarship? And finally, why has exposing the history oflanguage
instruction in U.S. post-secondary education become such an important activity for the
discipline? Although I cannot dwell on these questions at length here, they ground my
discussion ofthe prevailing narratives found in these histories in later chapters. For now,
I'd like to offer a few hypotheses based on what I've discussed so far in this chapter.
Like the discipline of history rhetoric and composition has politicized historical
thinking and historiography. Scholars in rhetoric and composition have theorized how
disciplinary histories have worked to legitimize the field as a whole. 4 In the introduction
to Authoring a Discipline, an analysis of the emergence and evolution of scholarly
journals in rhetoric and composition over time, Goggin argues that "historical accounts
themselves both reflect and help foster the vitality of a disciplinary community insofar as
they are contingent on a group's interests. In other words, history may both indicate and
help sustain those interests" (xiv). Both Schilb and Paine agree, explaining that our
histories have not merely pointed to and maintained disciplinary interests, but that they
have also been used to appease our anxieties about legitimacy. Schilb contends in "The
History of Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of History" that the writing of disciplinary history
had increased (and continued to increase) in the 1980s because "we have more people
The texts I discuss here are largely aimed at a rhetoric and composition audience. Although they draw on
some of the same theories of historiography I discuss in this chapter, they do not claim to speak to others
outside rhetoric and composition.
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anxious to legitimize the teaching of writing as a serious affair, [who are] therefore
anxious to persuade all writing teachers to think: about the contingent nature of their
pedagogies so they can revise them for better" (237). Paine develops this idea, adding
that disciplinary histories
[are] remarkable ... [in] how self-consciously [they have] strived to be
useful, to help reform the way we teach our students. These histories, in
other words, were more than intellectual delights for those interested in
history; they acted as a social force that shattered ... the pat, tired notions
about how compositionists thought about their discipline, how they
conceived of themselves as members of the English-department
community, and how they taught their students. (27, emphasis original)
The discipline's histories, at least in part, have helped the field achieve
professionalization and legitimacy in the academy, not only in establishing its boundari~s
and scope, but also in changing the attitudes and practices of its members.
By considering the important role language plays in shaping our understanding of
the world around us, we can understand why uncovering previous methods of language
instruction is an important task. Making sense of past pedagogy about language and
actual applications of this pedagogy in writing can provide contemporary scholars a
better sense for how language works, especially in relation to processes of power, and,
more specifically, with a better sense for the mann{!r in which writing and writing
pedagogy has been applied both in and outside of the classroom. Additionally, historical
exploration of post-secondary writing instruction can help us better understand the
relationship between dominant ideologies and processes of schooling: For example, we
could understand Harvard's current-traditional approach toward writing pedagogy in the
late nineteenth century - and its institution in many elite schools across the United States
- as a method through which the elite could indoctrinate an emerging (and potentially
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powerful) middle class in values and beliefs by which they would control themselves and
not encroach on the treasured power of the elite (see for example Miller, Textual
Carnivals 45-76). At the same time, we might understand the conterminously progressive
approach at the private, black liberal arts Wiley College in Marshall, Texas, in the late
nineteenth century (described by David Gold in Rhetoric at the Margins) as an example
of how less powerful populations in the United States made use of alternative writing
pedagogies and practices to subvert and resist the ideologies prominent in elite
institutions such as Harvard. These examples begin to demonstrate the uses and value of
historical research and scholarship in rhetoric and composition.
It should be clear by now that disciplinary histories and historiography more

generally in rhetoric and composition carry consequences that are worthy of study,
especially given the field's focus on language. So why hasn't more attention been
directed toward this genre of texts? Some might argue that historiography has occupied a
significant amount of our attention, at least as evidenced by forums such as Octalogs I, II,
and III, as well as special issues devoted to the subject of historiography (especially in the
context of the history of rhetoric) in Pre/Text and RSQ (see "Historiography ... I,"
"Historiography ... II," and "Feminist Historiography"). Some scholars, particularly
Lauer and Schilb, have pointed to the lack of metahistorical analysis of our disciplinary
histories as a specific gap in our scholarship that deserves attention (Lauer 31; Schilb,
"The Rhetoric" 237-62).
While I agree that these discussions have been important for the discipline's
theorization of historiography, they have not taken as their primary object of analysis the
actual historiographic practices that are employed in the writing of history for the
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discipline. In other words, few in our field have examined the historiography actually
used in rhetoric and composition's disciplinary histories (and when they have, it has been
unsystematic; see for example Lisa Mastrangelo), so although we may agree in theory on
the politics of disciplinary historiography, the discipline lacks a systematic understanding
of how these theories are or are not employed in practice, and with what consequences.

In Appendix B, I trace the reception and use of our disciplinary histories in contemporary
scholarship. This chart shows how our disciplinary histories have been received and cited
and provides justification for my project: I argue that a systematic and critical analysis of
disciplinary historiography is necessary because we rely on and repeat certain versions of
the discipline'S past more often than others. As I show in the chapters that follow,
neglecting competing narratives carries material and intellectual consequences for
students, teachers, and scholars today. Such an analysis is important for rhetoric and
composition because historiography both limits and opens up the possibilities for
scholars' rhetorical construction of, and action within, the present and future of the field.
Metahistorical Critique
The remaining chapters of this dissertation engage in a metahistorical critique of
disciplinary histories in rhetoric and composition. My analysis draws on the theories of
discourse and historiography discussed previously in this chapter, and it is specifically
focused on the structure, trends, and implications of our discipline's historiographic
practices. In this section, I first discuss how my method of analysis is similar to, but
distinct from, others which have been employed to pursue questions about disciplinary
historiography. Then, I use this analysis to forward an extended definition of what I mean
by metahistorical critique in the context of this dissertation. Next, I explain the
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intervention I hope to make within (and possibly outside of) the discipline, and finally, I
gesture toward the implications of this analysis, especially in terms of a revision to
current habits of thinking about history, and historiographic practices more generally,
within the discipline.
Before I proceed, however, I'd like to be clear: By metahistorical critique, I refer
to a process of close comparative analysis of specific rhetorical elements (in this case,
narratives) that are common across a corpus of texts sharing similar rhetorical purposes
(here, texts that historicize an academic discipline) and that are published over a specific
period of time (for this project, texts published between 1980 and 2010). Metahistorical
critique is conducted systematically; that is, I isolate and analyze how a single rhetorical
element manifests itself throughout the selected corpus of texts. I argue that
metahistorical critique provides a critical approach through which scholars can isolate
and analyze the underlying values, beliefs, and assumptions that motivate the production
of a set of texts. I offer this definition only as a starting point: It is developed
considerably in the discussion below and is best understood in practice by my analysis of
disciplinary histories in rhetoric and composition in the chapters that follow.
For most historians, as well as those rhetoric and composition scholars interested
in historiography, my use of the term "metahistorical" likely calls to mind Hayden
White's use ofthe term in the title of his first major publication, Metahistory. My use of
the term is related to, but distinct from, White's. White was one of the first historians to
apply language theory to theories of history and historiography, and his position
remained unapologetically formalist throughout his career, even as his explanations of the
theory evolved. In Metahistory, White argues that before any historical text is written, the
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historian's motives for writing have already been determined by a tropological premisemetaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, and irony - upon which the historian's argument will
be constructed or shaped. The trope that drives any given narrative tends to be chosen
(consciously or not) according to the time period in which the historian is writing
because, according to White, certain forms of argument are valued over others by specific
audiences at particular points in time. Because tropes "prefigure" the text, these tropes
ultimately drive a historian's rhetorical strategies in composing the text. A given
scholar's historiographic "style," White explains, comprises cognitive (argumentative),
aesthetic (emplotment), and ethical (ideological) rhetorical strategies that each allow for
four possible modes of articulation, which inform the text as a whole. These strategies
and modes are available because of the trope that governs the historian's writing. White
argues that although the surface features - or narrative - of a text may appear markedly
different, all historical texts composed during a given time period tend to share common
tropological assumptions at their foundation about what, exactly, makes for a "good" or
"persuasive" historical narrative.
White's intervention in historical theory is significant in the sense that many of
his contemporaries would argue that the "understructure of the historical work" is not
grounded in language, but instead "consist[s] of the theoretical concepts explicitly used
by the historian to give his narratives the aspect of an 'explanation'" (Metahistory x). For
White, the theoretical concepts (or data) that others would argue make up the foundation
of a text actually work with the text's narrative structure to create the illusion that the
surface features of the text constitute its whole. Underneath the text's data and narrative
components, White contends that a deeper "metahistorical" structure - consisting of
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available rhetorical strategies as well as "precritically accepted" linguistic tropes underlies every historical text (Metahistory ix). By understanding the "deep structure" of
historiography as ultimately language-driven, White is able to "characterize ... the
different interpretative strategies" used by nineteenth-century historians (specifically
Hegel, Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville, Burkhardt, Nietzsche, Marx, and Croce) and also to
make sense of the fact that "although nineteenth-century historical thinkers studied
carefully and completely, within the limits of their several competences, the same 'data'
in the historical record, they came to such different and seemingly mutually exclusive
conclusions about the meaning and significance of those 'data' for their own time"

(Metahistory 431). Simply put, White's theory om~rs a language-based way of
understanding how different historians, all writing at around the same time and working
with similar sets of data, can construct seemingly contradictory narratives about what
happened in the past.
White's justification for his theory of historiography has evolved over time. In

Metahistory, White claims that by understanding historiography as grounded in language,
rather than in factual data or explanatory theories, we can then understand historians as
necessarily subjective in relation to their research and writing, which therefore makes it
impossible to make critical value judgments of different historiographic "styles." These
conclusions are particularly valuable for White because they allow him to argue against
those historians advocating for increased objectivity and empiricism in the discipline. In

Tropics ofDiscourse, published five years later, White builds on his previous thesis by
arguing that his theory might "provide protocols for translating between alternative
[historiographic] modes which, because they are taken for granted either as natural or as
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established truth, had hardened into ideologies" which would in turn "permit us to
mediate between contending ideologues" in a more ethical, and therefore meaningful,
way (22). Finally, in The Content of the Form, White argues that shifting attention from
the content of a historical text to its form allows us to interrogate how historians
"establish, through the articulation of their texts, the plausibility of their discourse by
referring the 'meaning' of these ... to a complex sign system which is treated as 'natural'
rather than as a code specific to the praxis of a given social group, stratum, or class"
(193). In other words, White maintains here that focusing on the rhetorical elements of
historiography actually denaturalizes the disciplinary discourse that we so often take for
granted, which opens it up to productive analysis and critique.
I agree with White's focus on historiography-as-rhetorical and appreciate the
larger goals he has in mind for understanding historical texts through this
"metahistorical" lens. White's definition of "metahistory," while not synonymous with
my own, informs my thinking about how historiography works and why its critique is
worthwhile. However, I find fault with White's dogmatically formalist stance, which
opens his theory up for critique on the grounds of it being too relativistic, and also for his
contention that rhetorical tropes "prefigure" - or exist prior to - the text, a claim that
carries potentially oppressive implications.
Although much of White's later theory on historiography, disciplinarity, and
narrative (especially those essays collected in The Content of the Form) seems to be
informed by post-structuralist theory, he never relinquishes his formalist claim that the
meaning of a historical text can ultimately be gleaned from the text itself. For example, in
his discussion of the historiography of the autobiographical text The Education ofHenry

53

Adams, White argues that his formalist analysis addresses the problem of the text-context
binary, which historians continually struggle with (see my discussion of this struggle
earlier in this chapter). He writes that
... the problem becomes resolvable from the semiological perspective ....
[W]hen we inquire into the context of a work such as the Education, we
are interested above all in the extent to which that context provided
resources for the production of the kinds of meanings that this text
displays to us. To have information about this aspect of the text's context
would not illuminate the operations of Adams's work in their
specificity .... On the contrary~ it is the other way around: the context is
illuminated in its detailed operations by the moves made in Adams's text.
(The Content 212).
But by maintaining a clear distinction between content and form, White actually
preserves the text-context binary, in spite of his claims to the contrary. Further, because
White insists that all historiography produced in a given time period shares a common
linguistic trope that shapes a historian's choices, it becomes impossible to make
judgments about the relative value of different historiographic strategies and modes, a
claim that - if pushed to the limit - could be interpreted to mean that any historiographic
practice is acceptable. Indeed, several of White's explanations for his theory seem to
encourage a relativist interpretation; take for example the following quote from The

Content of the Form, in which White discusses the relationship between imagination and
historical "reality": "One can produce an imaginary discourse about real events that may
not be less 'true' for being imaginary. It all depends upon how one construes the function
ofthe faculty of imagination in human nature" (57, emphasis added). LaCapra argues that
this extension of formalism, when applied to historiography, is problematic in that it
reduces "critical self-reflection, theoretical inquiry, and rhetorical mode ... to debates
about the referential content of propositions, the applicability of operational rules of
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method, and the embellishing or expressive style of a constricted, subjective, and often
pear-shaped notion of style" (Rethinking 15). I agree with LaCapra and would add that
this kind of a reduction, which White may not support but for which his theory allows,
enables scholars to disregard the content of historical texts in favor of form, which could,
in turn, facilitate faulty research or claims.
While White has claimed that an apolitical relativism does not necessarily follow
from his formalist stance, I would argue otherwise, specifically because his theory
depends on the assumption that all history is grounded in a tropological paradigm that
exists prior to the text. White therefore conceives of rhetorical tropes (and only a handful,
at that) as natural ways of making meaning in a text. Such a conception not only
privileges dominant ways of making meaning while foreclosing alternatives, but it also
protects White's theory from extended critique: Because White has named specific tropes
as natural and prior to writing, it becomes difficult to identify other narrative forms that
do not fit into his scheme - his theory demands circular logic that draws all possibly
alternative forms of narrative back to its central claim, and he demonstrates this
circularity in many of the examples he provides. Further, White's contention that tropes
exist prior to a text effectively disempowers the writer - either by limiting the
responsibility he must take for his own writing, or by preventing her from intervening in
problematic reading, writing, and thinking habits through her historiographic practices.
Finally, I would even go so far as to argue that White's insistence on an outside
contradicts the foundation for his argument, that our ability to imagine the historical real
- or to think historically - is constructed in and through language: If the "grounds of
[historiography's] coherence and consistency ... , are ... poetic, and specifically linguistic,
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in nature," then it would follow that there is no outside of the text or language - yet that
is exactly White's final conclusion (Metahistory 30).
I find Foucault's archaeological method of analysis more satisfying, for my
purposes, than White's explanation ofthe metahistorical components of historiography.
For Foucault, archaeological inquiry means asking how already existing discourse allows
for, and/or limits, what can and cannot be said in the present and future (Archaeology
131). Foucault prefers to call what he does archaeology because it accounts for how his
analysis of a specific text (or group of texts) illuminates the text's rhetorical action within
larger "systems of simultaneity, as well as the series of mutations necessary and sufficient
to circumscribe the threshold of a new positivity" (The Order xxiii). More tangibly, one
might imagine disciplinary discourse as the sedimentation of texts over time, of which we
can only easily see the surface (or rhetorical boundaries); if we excavate the textual layers
underneath using Foucault's archaeological practice, we begin to understand how the
surface came into being. This kind of excavation reveals that the discursive sphere is
constituted not only by the accumulation of texts over time but also by textual resistance
to rhetorical boundaries, manifested through erosion, fissures, and even clean breaks from
what would otherwise appear to be a cohesive landscape of disciplinary discourse.
Foucault, like White, is primarily interested in language; unlike White, however,
Foucault does not acknowledge an outside of, or prior to, a text - in other words, rather
than being shaped by a "precritically accepted paradigm," a text emerges out of the
discourse that came prior to it. Foucault refuses to prioritize content over form (or vice
versa); instead, he is interested in how both work to constitute a universe of discourse,
within and against which new discursive formations become possible. In The Order of
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Things, Foucault writes that he is most interested in the intersection between the
production (or in his words, ordering) of culture and its formal reception (or reflection),
which raises the question, "[O]n what basis [do] knowledge and theory become
possible"? (xxi).
This question is fundamental for my own ddinition of metahistorical critique,
which is directed at both the content of our prevailing disciplinary narratives - those
figures, texts, and events that we highlight in our disciplinary histories, as well as the
historiography that shapes them. Building on Foucault, metahistorical critique asks, How
has rhetoric and composition "ordered" its culture through the selection and organization
of figures, texts, and events it considers significant to its history? How has the discipline
"reflected upon" - theorized or made sense of - this data through its historiography? In
what ways has the production of particular historical narratives become possible, and in
what ways can we understand the reception of these narratives (which is identifiable
through repetition, resistance, and revision) as evidence of the (implied or explicit)
values, beliefs, and practices primary to the discipline?
What Foucault's archaeology does not do, and what the process of metahistorical
critique must, is acknowledge the marked differences between and among texts,
especially in terms of the politics of production and reception, both within and outside of
the academy. Metahistorical critique must provide contextualization for the texts it
analyzes that is at once sensitive to the purposes or expectations ofthe text's genre,
author, and audience, while also remaining cognizant of the dynamics of power that
surround these purposes and expectations. Additionally, metahistorical critique must
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acknowledge and be realistic about the limitations inherent to historical research and
writing, especially those challenges presented by the archive.
Considering White's and Foucault's shortcomings, LaCapra's analysis of
intellectual historiography comes closest to my own goals for metahistorical critique.
LaCapra takes a middle ground that alleviates some of the problems that White's theory
implies. Historians, according to LaCapra, shouldn't expect a text to be analyzable in and
of itself, because close formalist analysis alone cannot (re)produce the text's context.
Further, he argues that when historians repeatedly fix texts in history - effectively
distancing themselves as readers - they risk sterilizing or limiting these texts as passive
objects. Instead, LaCapra urges historians to acknowledge the ways in which historical
texts actively make claims on readers, while at the same time also identify the context
within which a text was produced and received. LaCapra argues that this kind of
increased contextualization can also help historians avoid the problems implied by
Foucault's approach, in that such contextualization will allow historians to both
acknowledge a specific text's genre and purpose, as well as achieve an improved
understanding of how texts work within their "lived reality" - neither of which Foucault
does adequately (Rethinking 41-42). It is LaCapra's hope that intellectual historians are
able to learn from White and Foucault but also move beyond them to achieve a more
nuanced approach toward history and historiography that is both dialogical between
historian and text and sensitive to the dynamics of power that affect the production and
reception of texts in their particular historical, social, and intellectual contexts.
In Rethinking Intellectual History, LaCapra outlines several major areas of
traditional historiography that have generally been neglected or treated problematically
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by intellectual historians; I would like to review these here because I find them applicable
to my own theory of metahistorical critique. First, LaCapra considers the relationship
between authorial intention and text; he argues that historians should never assume that
"authorial intentions fully control the meaning or function of texts" because such an
assumption ignores the fact that the "author may in good part discover his or her
intentions in the act of writing or speaking itself' (36-37). The relationship between
intention and textual production also raises the issue of interpretation: what makes the
reading of a historical text "good"? For LaCapra, "[a] 'good' interpretation" is one that
does not aim to close the book (so to speak) by assuming a one-to-one correlation
between author, text, and reader, but rather aims to "make [one's] argument as informed,
vital, and undogmatically open to counterargument as possible" and to "[reactivate] the
process of inquiry opening up new avenues of investigation, criticism, and selfreflection" (38). In terms of what I do in the

chapte~rs

that follow, this means that as I read

and analyze disciplinary histories, I must avoid assuming that historians fully intend to
engage in the historiographic practices that they, in fact, use. This kind of assumption
presents obvious problems when, for example, a historian inconsistently applies the
perspective or bias he or she may have clearly outlined in the introduction or preface to
the rest of the text - it would not be fair, in cases like these, to assume that the writer was
fully in control of the historiography that constitutes the text. Language is more
complicated than that.
A second problem that LaCapra addresses is the question of how we should
understand the relationship between texts and society. Because every text is born out of a
tradition of texts and into a particular time constituted by specific and shifting dynamics
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of power, LaCapra insists that all historiographic analysis must keep the "lived reality" of
the production and reception of texts in mind. LaCapra's argument here is grounded in
Derrida's work, which highlights the question of how one can adequately "relat[e] long
and intricate traditions ... the specific period of time ... and the specific text" (44). The
process of establishing this context is not a simple one; texts are best understood,
according to LaCapra, as variations of other texts over time and should be "seen as the
'place' where long tradition and specific time intersect ... [texts effect] variations on both
[tradition and time]" (44). For my own purposes, this means that as I analyze disciplinary
histories, I must consider each one as part of a largt::r constellation of related texts, each
of which is making small interventions in the context of a much longer tradition.
Related to the text's production, we must also consider its reception: LaCapra's
discussion highlights the question of what, exactly, makes a text "significant" or
particularly valuable within the context of its production and reception over time. He
writes that the process of canonization is "a procedure not only of selection but of
selective interpretation, often in the direction of domestication" (45). As such, a truly
"critical historiography" must "relat[e] the existing series of interpretations, uses, and
abuses of a text or a corpus to a reading that one tries to make as good as possible" (45).
In other words, LaCapra implores the intellectual historian to avoid taking the
significance of canonized texts for granted and to strive instead to approach "significant
texts" with a critical attitude, one ''that relates an informed interpretation of complex texts
to the problems of how those texts have been adapted to - and in certain ways have
allowed - important uses and abuses over time" (46). In terms of my analysis of rhetoric
and composition's disciplinary histories, this means that I must consider not only texts in
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and of themselves, but also how others in the discipline have interpreted, used, and
challenged those texts to compose their own. My definition of the process of
metahistorical critique allows for these considerations, especially in that I trace the
articulation and revision of specific disciplinary naITatives across a variety of disciplinary
histories and over time.
Another problem that LaCapra discusses relates to the narrow conception of
relevant discourse communities traditionally employed by intellectual historians: When
referring to significant texts, figures, and events, an intellectual historian is usually most
interested in the discourse community that primarily consists of a contemporary academic
or intellectual audience. LaCapra identifies two problems with this conception: First, it
limits the historian's "attempt to recreate the dialogue of others" to "historicist and
documentary" concerns (50), which prevents historical texts from being understood as
contemporary and living documents that continue to "work" on their readers. Second, the
work of "establish[ing] influence or the existence of a shared 'paradigm' through the
enumeration of common presuppositions, questions, themes, or arguments" can distract
the historian from delving into "how the borrowed or the common actually functions in
the texts in question" (52, emphasis added). And finally, this definition excludes others
beyond the immediate intellectual community who may also be involved in conversations
about the past - including "dead or distant (even future) 'others,'" as well as members of
the general public (52). LaCapra explains that "[t]he contemporary person-to-person
group may have a lesser significance for the actual production of 'ideas' and in any case
its role is always supplemented by relation to others through their texts or other artifacts"
(52). In terms of my study, then, I must not only consider disciplinary histories in terms
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of their intellectual or academic contexts, but also in terms of their relationship to the
past, as well as to those readers, texts, and artifacts that are located outside of the official
disciplinary or institutional context we would generally define as a disciplinary
historian's community. This, in tum, raises the question of whether, and how,
disciplinary histories - and the history of composition itself - interact outside of the
academy and influence the culture at large.
Related to the question of how texts should be understood in relation to particular
discourse communities, LaCapra also examines how we should understand single texts in
relation to whole constellations oftexts (or "discursive formations," as Foucault would
call them). He explains that problems inhere in our desire to "unify" groups of texts as
either continuous, discontinuous, or progressive; ht: wants to disrupt this desire, arguing
that "[t]he relation among aspects or elements of a text, and a fortiori among texts in a
corpus, may involve uneven development and differing forms of repetition or
displacement that put in question simple models of intelligibility" (55). In terms of
metahistorical critique, this means that as I analyze disciplinary histories, I must resist the
urge to always categorize texts according to their unifying properties. While such
categorization is often necessary, a more valuable critique is one which also works
against such tendencies and allows the text to resist a fixed location within a larger
constellation; such practice requires that I engage in dialogue with individual texts,
asking not only where they fit but where and why they don't, and considering what a
single text's ambivalence or resistance to simple categorization might mean.
Finally, LaCapra critiques White's formalist attention to the relationship between
a text and its structure in order to make what I take to be his most important point, that
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the "analytic distinctions or structural oppositions" White is so focused on are ultimately
bound up by the "actual functioning of language, including the use of language by
theorists attempting to define and defend analytic distinctions or oppositions in their
conceptual purity" (57). For LaCapra - as for myself - the reason why we should study
the production and reception of scholarly texts, especially texts that are deemed
significant for a discipline, is not because they had influence, but rather because their
significance can tell us something about the interplay between language and power.
LaCapra explains: " ... dominance implies some form of subordination or exclusion, and
how this relationship is established must be investigated" (58). This explanation justifies
my own focus on what I call the "dominant" narratives that run through composition's
disciplinary histories. I am not so much interested in the existence of these narratives
(though their existence deserves explanation), but instead in how these narratives work to
establish, repeat, contest, or disqualify the values, beliefs, and practices that constitute
and maintain our discipline as such.
At the beginning of this section, I defined metahistorical critique as a process of
close comparative analysis of specific rhetorical elements (in this case, narratives) that
are common across a corpus of texts sharing similar rhetorical purposes (here, texts that
historicize an academic discipline) and that are published over a specific period of time
(for this project, texts published between 1980 and 2010). Drawing on White's efforts to
denaturalize disciplinary discourse through rhetorical analysis but rejecting his formalist
approach, I contend that a comparative critical analysis of historiography can reveal some
of the primary values, beliefs, and practices that shape our scholarship and our teaching,
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which in turn create important possibilities and limitations in the way scholars in rhetoric
and composition think, read, write, and/or teach (about) the discipline's history.
Foucault's definition of archaeology as critical practice helps substantiate my
definition of metahistorical critique, in that it affirms the value of analyzing the
sedimentation of historiography across texts and over time. In excavating the discursive
constellation represented by disciplinary histories in rhetoric and composition, I can
investigate disciplinary discourse - and disciplinarity itself - as a process made possible
only by what was said in the past. LaCapra's warnings about the oft-neglected elements
of intellectual history offer important caveats for what should be categorized as
disciplinary discourse. Specifically, disciplinary discourse can include: the larger
constellation of texts that informs the historian and within which a specific history will be
produced; the historian's previous publications and/or stated intentions for producing a
specific history; and also other scholars' interpretations, uses, and challenges to previous
histories and the general public's reception of previous histories, both of which translate
into contemporary expectations that drive the production and reception of new
disciplinary histories. This context must also be considered in light of institutional and
cultural power dynamics, which may work in favor of or against the production of
specific histories over others. Metahistorical critique must expose and use this context, I
argue, in order to work productively against scholars' habits of thinking, reading, writing,
and teaching. This can, in turn, result in the dialogical attitude toward histories that
LaCapra advocates, which ultimately translates into a disruption of our usual practices of
historical thinking and historiography, providing opportunities for other questions and
alternative perspectives about the discipline's history to emerge.
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Metahistorical critique, while not producing new history, participates in the
revisionist historical tradition in several ways: First, it analyzes historical narratives in
relation to one another, which does not simply explain how and why these narratives
exist, but also highlights how they work: In other words, metahistorical critique
foregrounds the assumptions underlying rhetoric and composition's common sense and
marks gaps in our historical research. Second, metahistorical critique analyzes how
history is used in narratives about our present and future, which can help us see more
clearly whether, and how, those narratives make claims based on variously problematic
or legitimate understandings of history. Defined in this way, metahistorical critique
works to disrupt traditional conceptions of time and progress and allows for new
understandings of the uses of composition history; that is, we can understand histories as
building upon and complicating one another - opening up, rather than limiting, the
possibilities for our research, practice(s), and ways of thinking in the future.
Perhaps more importantly, however, metahistorical critique also encourages the
destabilization of historical narratives; in other words, my analysis questions the
discipline's prevailing narratives, which tend to unify history through processes of
categorization. This does not mean that I hope to dismantle or do away with historical
narratives altogether: this would be naIve, impractical, and impossible. Rather, because
metahistorical critique makes prevailing narratives more visible, scholars can temporarily
isolate, critically analyze, and revise those narratives so that they can no longer be taken
for granted as the presumably unquestionable common sense of the field. This
destabilization, therefore, not only makes way for alternative narratives of and about
writing instruction, but it also legitimizes other ways of understanding and participating
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in the discipline. Finally, such destabilization may help us move away from those
narratives that we no longer find useful or relevant.
Fixing the Field: An Overview of Terms and Categories

Throughout this dissertation, I use a number of terms that could be contested by
my readers. Although I recognize that language is always in flux, and although my
review of the literature above indicates that I should resist categorization altogether, such
definition and categorization is necessary. I offer a few definitions here in an attempt to
stabilize these terms for the purposes of my project and clarify my intended meaning.
I use the terms macro history and microhistory to indicate the span of time and
kinds of events, institutions, or groups of people that a particular history attempts to
document. For my purposes, a macrohistory attempts to provide an overview of major
disciplinary developments over a long span of time. For example, I define James Berlin's,
Robert Connors', and Sharon Crowley'S book-length histories as macrohistories because
each covers 80-120 years of disciplinary developments. Macrohistories also trace
developments in the field according to elite academic institutions, such as Harvard,
and/or a timeline of events that were well-known or visible to those participating in the
field at the time. For example, Berlin, Connors, and Crowley all discuss the reports of the
Harvard Committee on Composition and Rhetoric, which were published and widely
cited in the late nineteenth century, as well as the establishment of major disciplinary
organizations such as the Modem Language Association (MLA) and the National
Council of Teachers of English (NCTE).
A microhistory keeps its focus narrow in comparison, examining developments
over a smaller span of time, a single institution, and/or a specific population (such as
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women or African Americans). Two examples of book-length microhistories that I refer
to in this dissertation include David Gold's Rhetoric at the Margins, which examines
three Texas institutions of higher education that served women, the working class, and
African Americans, and Robin Varnum's Fencing with Words, which focuses on a
particular figure - Theodore Baird - who directed writing instruction at Amherst College
between 1938 and 1966.
Macrohistories and microhistories participate in the construction of prevailing and
competing narratives about the discipline's past. For the purposes of my analysis, I define
a prevailing historical narrative as one that would be recognized by most contemporary
scholars as the common sense history of the discipline. Prevailing narratives are
recognizable because they appear in contemporary non-historical scholarship as
"nutshell" versions of the discipline's history (and then used to ground other claims) or
they are called to mind via a single word or phrase (i.e. current-traditional rhetoric and
pedagogy or CTRP). Usually, prevailing narratives were initially established in earlier
(often macro-) histories of the discipline (see for example, Albert Kitzhaber's dissertation
and James Berlin's historical monographs) and have been preserved over time through
frequent citation and repetition. In the chapters that follow, I analyze prevailing narratives
about CTRP, first-year composition (FYC), and composition's relationship to other
disciplines.
Competing historical narratives are those that offer a version of the discipline's
past that competes with or challenges the version offered in a prevailing narrative.
Competing narratives usually offer new historical evidence or alternative interpretations
of old evidence that adds complexity to - and therefore challenges the viability of -
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prevailing narratives about composition's past. For example, David Russell's
macrohistory, Writing in the Academic DisCiplines, challenges prevailing narratives about
FYC in that he exposes a long history of writing instruction outside of first-year
composition courses and outside of composition studies itself.
Because a single disciplinary history can refer to several different narratives, a
single history may also participate in the construction of both prevailing and competing
narratives. For example, as I argue in Chapters 2 and 3, Jessica Enoch's microhistory,
Refiguring Rhetorical Education, can be seen as both participating in and challenging the

construction of prevailing narratives about CTRP and FYC. In Appendix A, I have
indicated my categorizations of (macro/micro) and the (prevailing or competing)
narratives used within (FYC, CTRP, DISC) the histories read and analyzed for this
dissertation.
In articulating these narratives and illustrating them with textual examples from a
variety of histories, I do not intend to create a false binary between "good" and "bad"
versions of history. Rather, I conduct this metahistorical critique of our prevailing and
competing narratives for three reasons: First, I hope to show how metahistorical critique
can lead to a more consistent acknowledgment and emphasis of the complexity of
composition's past. Second, I intend to outline how specific disciplinary values and
beliefs motivate the construction of our historical narratives. Finally, I want to
demonstrate how a sustained and systematic analysis of our historiography may lead to
productive and continual revision of our historical narratives, as well as a revision of our
habits of thinking, reading, and writing (about) the discipline's past. This final point, I
argue, can lead us, in turn, to revise our interpretations of the present and future of the
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discipline, as well as those students, teachers, and scholars who participate in its
construction.
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CHAPTER 2:
THE RHETORIC OF CURRENT-TRADITIONAL RHETORIC

In contemporary composition scholarship, references to current-traditional
rhetoric and pedagogy (CTRP) are both frequent and unsurprising. We need only look to
a recent issue of CCC - a special issue on the future of rhetoric and composition - for
evidence: Two out of the eight articles refer explicitly to current-traditional rhetoric, and
both of these invoke the discipline's history to make an argument about the future
(Colomb 24; Ianetta 63). More significantly, neither of these essays defmes "current
traditional," suggesting that the concept is so entrenched in our collective imaginations
that it has become a disciplinary given. And although Thomas P. Miller at least employs
"scare quotes" when he uses the phrase in The Evolution o/College English (12, 145,
209), his usage, compounded with the absence of a definition for the term, further
supports my contention that CTRP has become so ingrained in disciplinary rhetoric that it
acts as a rhetorical trope, oftentimes signifying practices, values, and beliefs far beyond
(or beside) its referent.
CTRP, according to prevailing definitions, represents an approach to writing that
values the final product over the process of composition, which in turn values surface
features over the content of what is said and implies a one-to-one correspondence
between a writer's mind and his or her writing. I am able to compose this definition
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because CTRP is recognizable even when it is not named. For example, in two canonical
examples of composition scholarship - Donald Murray's "Teach Writing as a Process
Not Product" and Sondra Perl's "The Composing Processes of Unskilled College
Writers," the phrase "current traditional" is never used, even though the idea of CTRP
clearly creates the exigence for their arguments. I Murray aims to correct approaches to
student writing that emphasize product over process, and Perl presents findings from her
empirical study in order to argue that pedagogical emphasis on error (or surface features)
over content is fundamentally flawed. Composition histories, too, tend to take the concept
of CTRP for granted: Terms such as product, grammar (or error, correct/ion/ness),
form/al/ulaic (or system/atic, standard/ized, mechanic/ai, schema/tic), exposition, and
style (or surface) often substitute for, or are combined with, explicit uses of the phrase
current traditional. Further, references to CTRP are often paired with, or exchanged for,
words or phrases that convey strongly negative connotations - e.g., exclusion(ary),
disappointing, pervasive, decay(ed), static, backward, contentless, and, my personal
favorite, "a recipe for pain" (Crowley, Composition 227).
CTRP can therefore be understood as a rhetorical trope that refers not necessarily
to actual pedagogical beliefs or practices, but instead to what I call, drawing on John
Guillory, composition's "disciplinary imaginary." Describing how the process ofliterary
canon formation works, Guillory defines the imaginary as a "scene in which a group of
readers, defined by a common social identity and common values, confronts a group of
texts with the intention of making a judgment as to canonicity" (28, emphasis original).
Guillory sets this scene against actual pedagogic practice; he argues that the confluence

I I use the term "canonical," in part, because these essays are anthologized in Cross-Talk in Comp Theory, a
common text used to introduce graduate students to the major conversations of the field.
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of practice and the imaginary produces a collective understanding of canons as universal
or real in a material sense. He explains: "There is indeed a real and irresolvable
discrepancy in the relation between the historical specificity of works and the factitious
universality of the canonical form, which aspires to transhistorical validity by masking
the pedagogic function of disseminating this year's orthodoxy" (60-61). In similar ways,
composition's disciplinary imaginary evolves out of the confluence of an imaginary
scene - in which a group of scholars, defined by a common social identity and common
values, confronts an archive with the intention of making a judgment about its
contemporary value - and actual practice located in and lost to history. Because the
archive represents both the presence and absence of local values, beliefs, and practices
always already bound up in the past, the discipline collectively refers to historically
specific and locatable archival materials as though these materials have a ''transhistorical
validity" that represents actual practice across institutions and over time. The disciplinary
imaginary about CTRP, then, takes "found" and "accessible" materials (such as those
presented in John Brereton's The Origins o/Composition Studies: textbooks, institutional
and individual publications, examinations, and student writing) to represent "real" values,
beliefs, and practices (such the early discipline's arhetorical understanding of writing,
overemphasis on the surface features of writing, and problematic assumptions about the
relation between quality of mind and writing).
This distinction between the disciplinary imaginary about CTRP and real
pedagogical practice is an important one for my analysis because most historians refer to
CTRP as a "real" or unified set of beliefs and practices rather than as an imaginary
construction used to forward disciplinary goals. From this point forward, I will refer to
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actual historical phenomena as real (no quotes) and the results ofthe process of
conflation from actual phenomena to the disciplinary imaginary as "real" (within
quotes)? When historians do not make the distinction between the imaginary and real
historical phenomena, their conflation produces an ideology of the discipline that
forwards flawed representations of American and institutional culture, textbooks,
teachers, and students. In contrast, articulating and maintaining this distinction enables
us to interrogate problematic assumptions about the agents of the discipline's history and
to understand better how and for what purposes the discipline perpetuates or challenges
prevailing narratives about CTRP.
Before continuing, I want to offer an important caveat: I do not suggest that in
making a distinction between the real and the imaginary, some historians come closer to
historical "truth" than others. Because real practice will always remain lost to history, the
composing of any narrative must necessarily but will always inadequately attempt to fill
in gaps in our historical knowledge through well-reasoned methods of interpretation; all
historians must ultimately imagine a real that can never be known. My argument,
therefore, is one that advocates historians to employ a critical historiographic strategy,
one which calls attention to the inevitable imprecision of narrative, self-consciously
reflects on the role of the disciplinary imaginary in the construction of narrative, and

By actual historical phenomena, I mean those materially grounded events, practices, beliefs, and values
that are inextricably bound within a specific past and are both documented and undocumented in the
archive. By process of conjlation, I mean the process by which historical narratives create interpretations of
real phenomena through language, thereby moving materially grounded events, practices, beliefs, and
values toward a larger understanding of history, which I refer to as the disciplinary imaginary. Also, I
differentiate my use ofreall"real" from Lacan's and Jameson's use of the Real, which indicates actual
phenomena from which subjects are inevitably separated through language. The Real, in combination with
the Imaginary and the Symbolic, suggests that there is an "outside" to language, which naturalizes the idea
that some figures and perspectives are simply - and must remain - unintelligible because they cannot be
understood within the Symbolic order.
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maintains, rather than settles, tensions about actual practice that emerge through the
telling of a narrative.
My references to CTRP throughout this chapter should not be understood as
references to real pedagogical practice, but to composition's disciplinary imaginary
about CTRP; in other words, I am interested in explicating what I see as the problematic
disciplinary consequences of understanding CTRP as "real," and I am also interested in
how, why, and to what ends the discipline uses CTRP as a trope to represent a set of
values, beliefs, and practices that are decidedly unreal. Of course, my own reliance on
CTRP in this essay - even though I refer to it as an imaginary construction - illustrates
what Karen Kopelson calls a "deep irony" of deconstruction: In examining prevailing
narratives of CTRP, I must also employ the very construction that I see as problematic
(775). With Kopelson, however, I propose that "we make a concerted, collective effort to
release ourselves from" problematic "pattern[s]" of representation (775). In the case of
my analysis, these patterns are those that make the fusion of the disciplinary imaginary
and the "real" appear self-evident, which in tum reifies the aforementioned flawed
representations of culture, institutions, textbooks, teachers, and students and creates the
illusion that these understandings are accurate and natural.
Releasing ourselves from these patterns of representation does not mean, for me,
that the discipline attempt to rid itself of its historical narratives or even value some at the
expense of others. Rather, I contend that, in order to better understand - and possibly
intervene in - those disciplinary values, beliefs, and practices that motivate our theory
and practice, we must not only produce new histories but must also continually and
critically interrogate narratives as they evolve over time in their prevailing and competing
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forms. Metahistorical critique of prevailing and competing narratives about CTRP
illustrates how disciplinary historiography can be understood as a rhetorical practice that
both reflects and shapes the field's larger beliefs, values, and practices. In this chapter,
therefore, I trace what I call the CTRP narrative as it has been used, challenged, revised,
or otherwise confronted, in the discipline's histories over time. In the sections that follow,
I outline what I consider to be prevailing narratives of CTRP, against which I then
compare competing versions of the same narrative articulated in a variety of disciplinary
histories.
My purpose in presenting this critique is threefold: First, I hope to explain how
and (more importantly) why the discipline invokes this narrative within disciplinary
histories, and to what ends. Second, I intend to extrapolate and analyze the disciplinary
values, beliefs, and practices implied in and perpetuated through historians' use(s) of this
narrative. And finally, I use this analysis to identify the implied and explicit material and
theoretical consequences (both positive and negative) suggested by the use(s) ofCTRP
narratives in their prevailing and competing forms.

From Definition to Narrative: Richard Young and Composition Historiography
The discipline's first explicit use of the term "current traditional" can be found in
Daniel Fogarty's 1959 Roots/or a New Rhetoric. As Paul Kei Matsuda points out in
"Process and Post-Process: A Discursive History," Fogarty "describe[d] the 'traditional'
ways in which textbooks taught principles of writing and rhetoric at the time," but his
definition of CTRP did not contain the level of description that we associate with it
today.3 Robert Connors points out that Fogarty "was no friend of composition" - and he

By "definition," I mean a description of a set of beliefs and practices that characterize a concept. This
should be understood in contrast to "narrative," which, according to the OED, is "[a]n account of a series of
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coined the term to generalize, in one fell swoop, "the entire teaching tradition up to that
point" in order to "see it supplanted by a new philosophical rhetoric" (CompositionRhetoric 4). Fogarty's usage was relatively inconsequential until the late 1970s, when
Richard Young elaborated and popularized the idea of CTRP as a position against which
the field might define itself (Connors 70). Indeed, in my review of disciplinary histories,
most of the scholars who measure the evidence of the history of writing instruction
against a specific definition of "current traditional" (see Crowley, Methodical Memory
13; Hollis 34-35) choose the definition Young used in his 1978 essay, "Paradigms and
Problems: Needed Research in Rhetorical Invention." He writes:
The overt features [of the current-traditional paradigm] ... are obvious
enough: the emphasis on the composed product rather than the composing
process; the analysis of discourse into words, sentences, and paragraphs;
the classification of discourse into description, narration, exposition, and
argument; the strong concern with usage (syntax, spelling, punctuation)
and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis); the preoccupation with the
informal essay and the research paper; and so on. (31)
Young's definition of "current traditionalism" made its way (in variously truncated
and/or hyperbolic forms) through the lore and scholarship of the discipline thanks in large
part to this essay, Young's general prominence as a composition scholar in the midst of
the emerging process movement, and the year-long NEH post-doctoral seminar he held in
1978-79 entitled "Rhetorical Invention and the Composing Process.,,4
The idea of "current traditionalism" caught on so quickly after Young added it to
disciplinary vocabulary because the concept, unnamed in composition scholarship up to
that point, had already been circulating as a viable way of thinking about the discipline's
events, facts, etc., given in order and with the establishing of connections between them" - and which
contains agents and conflict.
4 According to Byron Hawk, attendees of Young's NEH seminar included James Berlin, Lisa Ede, Robert
Inkster, Charles Kneupper, Victor Vitanza (among others), and speakers included Linda Flower, Richard
Ohmann, Alton Becker, Richard Enos, Janice Lauer, and Henry Johnstone (among others) (21).
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past, thanks to Kitzhaber's (as yet) unpublished dissertation. In fact, participants at
Young's NEH seminar read Kitzhaber's dissertation, which gave it increased exposure
and contributed to the emergence of prevailing narratives about CTRP and composition
history (Hawk 22; Donahue, "Disciplinary Histories" 232). Although Kitzhaber never
used the term current traditional, Patricia Donahue points out that his description of
composition at Harvard, especially his description of Barrett Wendell's pedagogical
practice, matches "the institutional model that modem historians of composition refer to
as 'current traditional'" (232). Another example of how Kitzhaber's interpretation of
history likely influenced Young's definition of "current traditional" can be seen in his
conclusion that at the end of the nineteenth century, Harvard's 1892 and 1896 "Reports
of the Committee on Composition and Rhetoric" "emphasized only one aspect of
composition - mechanical correctness .... This emphasis on superficial correctness,"
Kitzhaber argues, "contributed in no small measure to the ideal of superficial correctness
that was to dominate composition instruction for many years thereafter" (47).
Although many scholars, including Connors, George Pullman, Matsuda, and
Byron Hawk have commented on the inadequacy of the term current traditional to
accurately reflect the actual rhetoric and practices employed in composition pedagogy
from the mid-nineteenth century into the twentieth, I am interested, for the time being,
not in whether the term is accurate (more on that later), but in how it has been explicitly
and implicitly defined in our histories, how these definitions have produced a prevailing,
seemingly unified, narrative about CTRP, and what disciplinary values, practices, and
beliefs are implied by the general acceptance of this narrative. Both Matsuda and Hawk
have linked the definition's dissemination from Young to two of composition's early
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historians, James Berlin and Sharon Crowley (Matsuda 71; Hawk 49-85); below, I
explicate this link, in order to sketch out an even more intricate web of the CTRP's
genealogy over time and across our histories.
In "Richard Whately and Current-Traditional Rhetoric," Berlin's definition of
CTRP involves a direct (and lengthy) repetition of Young's definition in "Paradigms and
Problems." As he introduces Young's definition, Berlin calls CTRP "the most common
method of teaching writing today" - a claim he reiterates throughout his corpus but for
which he does not provide evidence (10). In his later books, Berlin no longer calls on
Young's definition explicitly; instead, he composes three markedly different definitions
of CTRP: In Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges, Berlin
characterizes CTRP as "the triumph of the scientific and technical world view ... [it]
accepts ... mechanistic faculty psychology, but removes ethical and all but the most
elementary emotional considerations from the concerns of rhetoric" (62-63). Three years
later, in Rhetoric and Reality, Berlin defines CTRP as "positivistic and practical in spirit
... designed to provide the new middle-class professionals with the tools to avoid
embarrassing themselves in print. In short, this was the rhetoric of the meritocracy" (35).
And in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures, which is less a history than a proposal for the
future of the discipline, Berlin provides a more extensive definition ofCTRP, explaining
that:
Current-traditional rhetoric does not deal with probabilities ... but with
certainties ascertained through the scientific method. There is no need to
teach invention ... since the truths of any matter under consideration
reveal themselves to the correct application of scientific investigation ....
The major work of the rhetoric classroom, then, is to teach budding young
professionals to arrange the materials ... their expertise has enabled them
to locate and to express themselves in accordance with the highest
standards of grammar and usage. (28-29)
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What is most interesting to me, in comparing these three definitions, is the evolution of
CTRP from a definition - describing the characteristics of a set of beliefs and practicesto a narrative, containing (as any good story should) agents and conflict. This evolution, I
argue, is one way in which materially grounded and locally real practices are conflated
with the disciplinary imaginary to produce a problematic ideology of the discipline.
While Berlin follows Young in defining CTRP as "a paradigm, a set of implicit
assumptions" in "Richard Whately" (10-11), he conflates "rhetoric" with "paradigm" in
later definitions. Young and the early Berlin use the word "paradigm" to mean "a
conceptual or methodological model underlying the theories and practices of a science or
discipline at a particular time" (OED), and thus "paradigm" can be understood as a
relatively neutral observation about a given community's worldview. However, Berlin's
later designation of CTRP as a "rhetoric" allows him to ascribe it value with political
implications. In fact, grammatically speaking, "rhetoric" in Berlin's description even
possesses agency. In Writing Instruction, CTRP has the ability to both "accept[] the
mechanistic faculty psychology" and "remove[] ethical and all but the most elementary
emotional considerations," against the "concerns" of (true? traditional?) rhetoric (62-63,
emphasis added). In Rhetoric and Reality, rhetoric possesses a "spirit" (35); and in

Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures, it "deal[s}" not '"with probabilities ... but with
certainties" (28, emphasis added). At other moments in these passages, rhetoric seems to
lack agency and is instead acted upon by outside agents, which include for Berlin "the
scientific and technical world view," ''the meritocracy," and "the rhetoric classroom."
Grammatical problems aside (only one of these three nefarious "agents" could
accurately meet the OED's definition of the term as actually "exerting power"), Berlin's
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conflation of "paradigm" with "rhetoric," and then his attribution of power to "rhetoric"
is significant in terms of the kind of narrative it creates for the discipline: CTRP becomes,
on the one hand, an allegorical character spanning a long time period (up to a century
depending on the version of history read) against which the contemporary discipline must
struggle and ultimately define itself. At the same time, contemporary composition must
protect itself from "the meritocracy," a nebulous - and therefore all the more villainous character that deliberately exploits rhetoric, using it in the service of reprehensible
(academic, middle-class, business, scientific ... pick your poison) interests. Charles Paine
comments on this move from definition to narrative in Berlin's work, specifically in his
use of the term current traditional. Citing not only Berlin but also Connors, Crowley,
Donald Stewart, Theresa Enos, and Richard Lloyd-Jones, Paine writes: "As some
historians have portrayed things, current-traditional rhetoric itselfhas come to resemble
one of the villains. That is, current-traditional rhetoric has assumed so central a place in
much of the history that it often seems a central figure in American rhetoric's great lapse
- a historical agent itself' (29, emphasis original). When CTRP becomes an agent in our
historiography, as Paine argues it has, readers are likely to mistake the disciplinary
imaginary for actual practice.
Like Berlin, Crowley argues throughout her corpus that CTRP is the "most
pervasive discursive practice ever used in writing instruction," and not only in historical
terms: she maintains that CTRP continues to be "alive and well" (Methodical xiii, 139).
Also like Berlin, Crowley draws explicitly on Young's definition to compose her own: In

The Methodical Memory, her book-length explication of CTRP' s theory of invention, she
describes CTRP in the following way:
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With regard to invention, I elaborate Young's" and so on" as follows:
current-traditional rhetoric occults the mentalism that underlies its
introspective theory of invention; it subscribes to the notion that
"subjects" - the "matter" of discourses - are mental configurations whose
existence is ontologically prior to their embodiment in discourse; it prefers
the discursive movement from generalization to specification; it
concentrates on expository discourse; it recommends that the inventional
scheme devised for exposition be used in any discursive situation; and it
translates invention out of the originating mind and onto the page. In other
words, this rhetoric assumes that the process of invention can be
graphically displayed in discourse. (13, emphasis added)
And as my italicization of the words above highlights, Crowley follows Berlin in
ascribing agency to CTRP. In defining CTRP as an agent, Crowley may be attempting to
dislodge what she perceives to be a common perception among contemporary
composition instructors: that CTRP is "a natural, self-evident, and universal system for
the invention of discourse written in school" (xii). Specifically, the agency ascribed to
rhetoric is inconsistent with most of Crowley's other descriptions ofCTRP: More often
than not, when Crowley refers to CTRP, she adjusts her phrasing so that the actors who
ostensibly promulgate CTRP practices and beliefs - such as textbook writers, textbook
rhetoric, teachers, and administrators - actually act, in a grammatical sense. 5
But rhetoric's agency in the passage above is significant, I argue, because it
represents one of the few moments in Crowley's work where she clearly defines CTRP as
such. For example, in "The Current-Traditional Theory of Style: An Informal History,"
her 1986 precursor to The Methodical Memory, Crowley never presents a specific
definition of "current-traditional rhetoric"; instead, she assumes -like most composition

5 For example, when she traces the intellectual history of CTRP theory through textbooks, Crowley pins
agency on textbook writers, rather than on CTRP itself, writing: "The list of those who wrote currenttraditional textbooks is impressive, not only because of its size but because some authors held impressive
scholarly credentials, often in fields other than composition .... Hundreds of other current-traditional
textbooks were written by scholars or teachers whose most enduring claim to fame lay in their participation
in the major textbook tradition associated with American composition instruction" (70)
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scholars - that her audience will understand exactly what she means when the following
sentence opens the essay: "One of the more remarkable features of the textbook tradition
now called 'current-traditional rhetoric' is its stability" (233). And in Composition in the

University, the moment in the text that comes closest to establishing a definition for
"current traditionality" describes its presence according to "signs" that "appear in
descriptions of composition programs at colleges and universities all over the country"
and in "the best-selling composition textbooks" which "incorporate process-oriented
composing strategies into a current-traditional scheme" (212). So although Crowley may
hope to denaturalize CTRP, her failure to interrogate the concept in fact cements its
naturalness.
Given that Crowley is a self-proclaimed polemicist, it should come as no surprise
that her historical research on CTRP creates a compelling narrative about its effects.
According to the definition above, CTRP can be blamed for popularizing a theory of
invention that privileges the individual mind and assumes that the quality of an
individual's writing unequivocally reveals the value of the mind at work, which in turn
implies serious, oppressive consequences for students. For Crowley, CTRP "suffers from
intellectual poverty; ... stands in for writing; and ... shifts discursive authority away from
students and onto the academy" (13). Similar to Berlin's version of the narrative - but in
this case directed solely toward the modem university and not necessarily to the world
"outside" of it - Crowley frames CTRP's theory of invention as "complicit with the
professional hierarchy that currently obtains in the American academy" (139). Further,
this theory "compl[ies] with certain institutional needs. And its limitations are not only
pedagogical; they also inhere in its subscription to an outmoded epistemology. Its
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continued use raises a serious ethical question as well" (140). Although the "needs" of
the institution are not specified in this passage, the rhetoric Crowley uses here (and
elsewhere) to describe the consequences of "current traditionalism" is clearly meant to
raise the hackles of those liberal-minded compositionists whom she imagines as her
readers - those who would resist being drawn into "compliance" with "the institution"
and who intend to employ a contemporary pedagogy that avoids epistemological limits or
ethical problems. Clearly, Crowley means to implicate all of us and - more importantly to inspire us to act. Indeed, we seem to be left with no other option, because to challenge
this narrative would ostensibly mean promoting a conservative (oppressive?) pedagogy
that inevitably serves institutional (inhuman?) goals, which would then return us right
back to where we began, with CTRP. Crowley'S historiography, therefore, in masking the
distinction between real practice and the disciplinary imaginary, makes it more likely that
scholars who draw on her work will maintain similarly ambiguous explanations of the
history of writing instruction.
As Hawk and Matsuda point out, both Berlin and Crowley are clear inheritors of
Young's vision of the discipline as evidenced in their repetition and development of his
definition of current traditionalism. But they are not the only influential historians who
refer to Young's definition and develop it as they compose their own narratives about the
discipline: Both Michael Halloran and Connors add to the genealogy of the prevailing
CTRP narrative in significant ways. Like Berlin and Crowley, Halloran, in his early
work, nods to Young as he summarizes what he means by CTRP in a 1982 essay cited in
later histories, "Rhetoric in the American College Curriculum: The Decline of Public
Discourse." Unlike Berlin and Crowley, however, Halloran does not attempt to modify
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Young's definition; he merely paraphrases it to affirm that the shift from oral to written
communication in the nineteenth-century American college forced rhetoric to undergo a
"demotion ... to a minor place in the curriculum" and led to the "detachment of classical
learning from the general concerns of rhetoric" (257). In fact, he emphasizes Young's
role in the propagation of CTRP as a disciplinary concept in order to point to its internal
(and inherent?) contradiction, which in tum allows Halloran to question (but not
necessarily challenge) CTRP's burgeoning status as a disciplinary "given" and highlight
his own purpose in writing the essay. He writes:
Richard Young has popularized the term "current-traditional rhetoric" for
the theory and pedagogy that until recently dominated the wasteland of
freshman composition. The term "current-traditional rhetoric" seems to
me an odd one. First, it's an oxymoron of sorts: what's current is almost
by definition not traditional. More importantly, current-traditional rhetoric
bears very little resemblance to the rhetorical tradition. The question 1'd
like to address in this essay is, How did we get from the rhetorical
tradition to current-traditional rhetoric? (245)
Here, Halloran misses what I think was an important opportunity to challenge the
accuracy, value and consequences ofCTRP's place in disciplinary lore; instead, he takes
its truth - incongruity and all - for granted and perpetuates its "givenness" by repeating
the term, relatively uncritically, through the remainder of the essay and in his later work. 6
For Halloran, the fundamental question about the history of writing instruction in
American colleges is not the concept of "current traditionalism" itself (even though, as I
will demonstrate later in this chapter, it should be), but rather how CTRP came to be.
Halloran's fusion of the "real" and the disciplinary imaginary allows him (and others who

I say "relatively uncritically" because I think that Halloran is doing some important work to challenge the
prevailing narrative in his later work, as I will illustrate later in this chapter. See "From Rhetoric to
Composition," for example.
6
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use his work) to construct CTRP as a straw man that must be knocked down in order for
the discipline to return to the classical rhetorical tradition.
Connors, too, both recognizes Young's role in the dissemination of "current
traditionalism" as a disciplinary given and misses an opportunity to interrogate the
concept as a part of the disciplinary imaginary, separate from actual practice, which may
have unsettled CTRP's hold in the ideology of the discipline. Although he uses the phrase
"current-traditional rhetoric" uncritically in much of his earlier work, he makes an
explicit effort to question the term in Composition-Rhetoric. He explains:
... the original title of this book was to have been Current-Traditional
Rhetoric. I found, however, that as I worked through the chapters one by
one I was becoming less satisfied with that widely accepted term for the
subject accumulating under my pen. Finally, I simply could not underwrite
the term any longer, and in this book I have ventured to suggest a new
term, "composition-rhetoric." (4)
For Connors, composition-rhetoric provides a much-needed alternative to Fogarty's and
Young's phrasing in that it avoids the strongly negative connotations of the discipline's
use of current traditional and can more broadly refer to "that form of rhetorical theory
and practice devoted to written discourse" (6). Indeed, Connors asserts that the term

composition-rhetoric offers the discipline a distinctively positive alternative to the
discipline'S common understanding of CTRP; this alternative, according to Connors, will
encourage the discipline to value - instead of decry - the history of writing instruction in
the United States. Connors argues - against Fogarty specifically, Young implicitly, and
the discipline's view ofCTRP in general-that "composition-rhetoric [is] a genuine
rhetoric, with its own theoria and praxis. Contemporary scholars have strongly criticized
earlier forms of it as being pedagogically destructive, but we should also remember many
things we still find useful in writing pedagogy were evolved before 1960" (7). The term
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is also useful, Connors adds, in that it will prompt composition historians and scholars to
understand the discipline's past as resisting oversimplification and decontextualization.
He writes, "What we have reified as a unified 'current-traditional rhetoric' is, in reality,
not a unified or an unchanging phenomenon" (5). Connors intends, therefore, for his use
of composition-rhetoric to indicate that written discourse "is a modem rhetoric, quickly
changing and adapting, driven by potent social and pedagogical needs .... Thus we can
never speak of 'composition-rhetoric' without stipulation, for it has existed in a variety of
forms and constantly evolved" (7).
Connors' attempt to free composition's history from our contemporary
misconceptions is both admirable and important. However, in spite of his best intentions,
merely replacing one term with another does not dislodge the assumptions that ground
the original - which, I argue, is what must happen if we are to revise our historical
knowledge and historiographic practices in a meaningful way, and which is one of my
primary goals in conducting this metahistorical critique. And indeed, as a textual artifact
of one historian's attempts to do this, Composition-Rhetoric presents a useful case in
point about the difficulty inherent to challenging our prevailing narratives in lasting
ways. Specifically, Connors' history perpetuates two assumptions that stem from
Young's initial definition, assumptions already called into question by other historians
prior to the book's publication: First, while Connors' history is based "on found and on
sought archival sources," these sources include only textbooks, other professional
(published) books, and published journal articles (22). Although the non-textbook sources
add an important dimension to Connors' work that his earlier scholarship often failed to
consider, it is textbook and professional/published evidence that ground Young's
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characterization of CTRP in "Paradigms and Problems," and these sources also form the
basis for many of composition's other early versions of history, including those written
by Kitzhaber, John Michael Wozniak:, Berlin, and Crowley. Because these (kinds of)
sources are what initially substantiated the CTRP narrative - which takes textbooks out
of their specific contexts and purposes to constitute "real" evidence of practice - it seems
likely that (re)using the same sources, in much the same way, would merely reify the
prevailing narrative. Further, Connors returns to textbooks time and again without
heeding the advice of other historians such as Susan Miller, JoAnn Campbell, Gerald
Nelms, and Robin Varnum, all of whom had suggested and exemplified alternative ways
of "doing" history prior to the book's publication. 7 In fact, Connors explicitly
acknowledges and then summarily rejects the revisionist scholarship of Miller, Wallace
Douglas, Berlin, Sue Carter Simmons, and Victor Vitanza in the introduction to

Composition-Rhetoric, dismissing their historiographic strategies as too trendy and
overtheorized. He writes, "Choosing and promoting a theoretical perspective as your own
personal Master Trope - the terministic screen through which you propose to look at
everything - pins you in time, wriggling like a bug on a board. It will sooner or later
relegate your work to the realm of the Historically Interesting" (21). Connors, in other
words, defends his method of analysis and historiographic approach on the grounds that it
will maintain his position as an authoritative historian for much longer than the
revisionist historians he mentions.
Second, while Connors' phrasing is meant to promote an expansive and objective
view of the history of writing instruction that requires constant contextualization and
Some of the alternatives suggested by the historians listed here include the collection of oral histories,
examination of student writing, and acknowledgement of writing and curriculum going on outside of
composition and/or the first-year course.

7

87

qualification, in actual practice, his history continues to project narratives similar to
Kitzhaber's, Berlin's, and Crowley's, among others: Like these other disciplinary
historians, Connors' narrative is based primarily on textual evidence that is mostly
representative of elite universities and published authors; it generalizes about whole
groups of people; and it promotes a static and homogenous view of history. One example
ofthis tendency can be seen in Connors' explanation of the shift from oral to written
rhetoric in American universities, which he explains in the first chapter of CompositionRhetoric: He argues that the "agonistic [oral] educational culture," which was "the
central element in education" for "over two thousand years[,] ... died out almost

completely" thanks, in part, to women's entrance into the academy (26-27, emphasis
added). 8 Throughout the chapter, Connors barely acknowledges other possible reasons for
the shift, therefore neglecting the possibility of other practices that are not represented in
the documents he relies upon; when he does recognize other possibilities, he defends his
line of reasoning as the most plausible by saying that "These [other] reasons for the
growth of written rhetoric, real though they are, do not ... explain the sharp decline of
oral rhetoric and of education in oratory, debate and argument" (54, emphasis added). For
Connors, the classical rhetorical tradition "j[eJll into desuetude" because "it could no
longer be the province of men only [and it therefore] ceased to satisfY male psychological
needs" (54, emphasis added). This "fall" is set against the "rise" of written composition,
which he describes as "the province of both men and women" because it is "private,

Connors grounds his argument on the presumption that oral argumentation is agonistic and masculine;
because it was unacceptable for women to perform publicly in front of men, women's presence in the
rhetoric classroom meant that all students had to engage in writing, a more acceptable "irenic" and
feminine activity, instead (23-68). The premises of Connors' argument in this chapter were met with strong
critique by feminist composition scholars, most notably Roxanne Mountford (see Mountford's
"Feminization of Rhetoric?" and Connors' response, "Adversus Haereses").
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multimodal, interiorizing" (54). In aligning men with the oral tradition and ascribing
classical rhetoric a "high" position from which it can fall, Connors' historiography
constructs late-nineteenth-century writing instruction - and the women who motivated it
- as "low," at least until the supposed revival of rhetoric in the discipline's contemporary
manifestations.
A second example of Connors' tendency to oversimplify the history of writing
instruction, despite his stated intentions, can be seen in his portrayal of "Modem
composition-rhetoric," which for Connors designates the period between 1910 and 1960.
Throughout Composition-Rhetoric, Connors employs this classification to indicate a
"period of relative stasis," after which little that had changed during the "Early
American," "Postwar," and "Consolidation" periods (1800-1910) would change again
until contemporary composition began to demand disciplinary legitimacy. Connors writes
that the Modem period represents the same period ''that is usually associated with the
pejorative uses of the term 'current-traditional rhetoric'" (13). Although Connors clearly
intends to reject the negative connotations implied by CTRP in his use of the phrase
"composition-rhetoric," he ultimately agrees with those connotations when it comes to
the "Modem" period. Indeed, for Connors, the entirety of the period's fifty years is
described as follows:
The Modem period of composition-rhetoric is defined by the almost
absolute reign of a freshman composition requirement and the habits and
industries that grow up around such a dominant institution .... During the
Modem period, it becomes a truism that student dislike for Freshman
Composition is exceeded only by the dislike of its teachers ...
Theoretically, the Modem period features a heavy reliance on the
relatively few rhetorical ideas that lasted through the heavy winnowing of
the Consolidation period .... One of the results of this narrowing of theory
was to make the teaching of writing an intellectual backwater after
1910 .... Composition became known as a low-level grind, as a grueling
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apprenticeship, as a kind of teaching to pass through as quickly as
possible. By 1910, Modem composition-rhetoric wasfirmly in place,
carried forward almost exclusively in textbooks, which represented the
only organ of tradition in the field of composition teaching .... this static
form of composition-rhetoric flourished and spread to generation after
generation of new composition teachers ... who knew no other rhetorical
or pedagogical way .... And so things remained for almost half a century.
(13-14, emphasis added)
Thus, Connors does not do away with prevailing narratives about CTRP, but rather
reinforces them in what he seems to believe is a more complex explanation through his
attempts to periodize the history of writing instruction. In short, Connors' historiographic
practice fails to stand up to his own assertion that "What we have reified as a unified
'current-traditional rhetoric' is, in reality, not a unified or an unchanging phenomenon"
(5). In interpreting textbooks and elite institutions as unambiguous evidence of "real"
practice, Connors' historiography participates in the construction of a flawed ideology of
composition that, as I will demonstrate later in the chapter, implies debilitating material
consequences for the agents of composition, especially students and teachers.
Before continuing, I want to emphasize that I do not mean for this critique to be
interpreted as an attempt to invalidate Berlin's, Crowley's, Halloran'S, or Connors'
historical research; indeed, their work has ultimately enabled my own. Nor do I mean to
imply that we necessarily need to eliminate the narratives that drive our histories, and I
certainly do not want to suggest, as Pullman does in "Stepping Yet Again into the Same
Current," that "[t]rue histories" are somehow separable from, and "less profoundly
motivated by political (or juridical) agendas" than, "rhetorical narrative [s]" (16). So
although the rhetorical power of prevailing narratives about CTRP should be clear by
now, this power should not be mistaken for a problem in and of itself. Instead, I want this
metahistorical critique to illuminate how and why narratives work, as rhetoric, for and
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within the discipline. In effect, I argue that as we construct narratives of and about the
history of the discipline, it is just as important to direct our critical attention to the
rhetorical effect(s) of these narratives.
Rhetoric's "Decline and Fall" and CTRP9

My analysis so far suggests that the definitions of CTRP borrowed, revised, and
advanced by composition historians paved the way for a series of prevailing narratives
that promote a view of history that neglects non-elite institutions and fails to
acknowledge the possibility of diverse perspectives, which in turn limits disciplinary
discourse about contemporary composition and its agents (public and private culture,
academic institutions, textbooks, teachers and students). In this section, I analyze how
these definitions and their attendant narratives are also bound up in historians'
explanation of shifts from oral to written rhetorical culture in mid-nineteenth-century
America. Later, I will demonstrate how these explanations lead to problematic
descriptions of the professional culture of the later nineteenth century and the modem
university. These accounts, especially when they take prevailing narratives ofCTRP for
granted, ultimately affect how historians characterize the agents of the discipline'S past:
institutions (including the academy, curriculum, and classrooms), textbooks (and their
authors), teachers (and their pedagogy), and students (and their writing).
One of the central questions for disciplinary historians has been: How, why, and
to what ends did the shift from oral to written rhetoric in the mid-nineteenth century
affect the teaching of writing in u.s. colleges? Although historians' answers to this
question vary, all who attempt to answer it agree on two premises that relate directly to

9 1 also discuss rhetoric's "decline and fall" as a prevailing narrative about composition's disciplinarity in
Chapter 4.
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contemporary understandings of CTRP, as well as interpretations of institutions,
textbooks, students and teachers: First, disciplinary historians agree that there was a
marked shift, one that affected public and private culture, academic institutions, teachers,
and students. Second, all agree that the shift carried consequences that can be tied to
composition's place in the academy today. While these assumptions are grounded in
historical evidence, a historian's agreement with prevailing CTRP narratives can lead to a
problematic interpretation of available evidence.
Historians who subscribe to prevailing CTRP narratives assume that the shift
from oral to written rhetoric in public culture can be tied to the emergence ofCTRP,
which they then associate directly with a diminishment of civic participation and
democratic debate in public and private culture, a negligence or eclipse of classical
rhetoric,1O as well as the disappearance of the classical curriculum in institutions of higher
education. Paine recognizes and argues against this connection in the introduction to The
Resistant Writer, noting that:

Very often, nineteenth-century composition has been portrayed as an
intellectual and social abyss that swallowed up any and all ideas of
rhetorical complexity. For whatever reasons, went the argument, the
history of rhetoric fell into a period of stagnation and decay.
Concomitantly, so declined rhetoric's prestige and sense of mission; so too
deteriorated the community's sense of importance and purpose. (25)
The association that some scholars in the discipline have made, and which Paine and I
comment on, has enabled scholars to make sense of its past as a cohesive series of events
that have led to composition's contemporary manifestation. In presenting the emergence
and evolution of CTRP as a unified shift, the discipline has often made sense of, and
10 When I use the phrase "classical rhetoric" from this point forward, I use it self-consciously as a contested
term that is often problematically conflated with a single and monolithic Western tradition. Although I
would like to enclose the phrase in quotes every time I use it, I do not because such usage becomes
cumbersome and distracting for the reader.
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subsequently rejected, the developments of the late nineteenth century in order to reach
further back to another ostensibly unified rhetorical tradition that appears to better match
contemporary disciplinary values. 11
Metahistorical critique helps illuminate the problematic consequences of this
association between mid-nineteenth-century cultural transformations and CTRP.
Specifically, this association takes the definition of classical rhetoric for granted, failing
to interrogate the assumptions about race, culture, and class that ground the term. This
failure likewise supports a hierarchy in which classical rhetoric is conceptualized as the
most valuable form of rhetoric, which in turn marginalizes other rhetorical traditions,
practices, and beliefs. Second, it promotes a sense that the shift had consistent effects
across all American colleges. Finally, the contrast of classical rhetoric in opposition to
CTRP frames CTRP as inherently arhetorical. Because the historians who make this
connection are widely cited and not always challenged in our scholarship, we can assume
that these fundamental problems continue to be disseminated. As these basic assumptions
are propagated, then, so are their material effects.
Many historians have argued that the rise of CTRP can be tied directly to the shift
from oral to written rhetoric; these historians all characterize the shift as a defeat for
classical rhetoric in terms of the tradition itself, college curriculum, and American civic
culture in general. Connors makes this connection in "The Rhetoric of Mechanical
Correction," an essay in which he analyzes the shift according to pre- and post-Civil War
cultural change. He writes:

II In addition to problematically presenting the shift from oral to written rhetoric as a unified movement,
historians of composition have often neglected the discipline's historical ties to literacy and education and
have instead tended to privilege the discipline's (weaker) ties to Western/classical traditions of rhetoric.
This neglect works to eclipse composition's interdisciplinarity, a problem I discuss in Chapter 4.
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The forty years 1865-1905 were years of wrenching necessity and
desperate invention for rhetoric. Like the rest of the traditional college
curriculum, rhetorical instruction was forced to move away from the
abstract educational idea of 'mental discipline' and toward more
immediate instructional goals. The immediate goals, in this case, came to
involve, not more effective written communication, but rather, simple
mechanical correctness. (35, emphasis added)
In Composition-Rhetoric, when introducing his historical explanation for composition's
low status, Connors uses more dramatic language to describe the shift:
Before we can understand anything else about the evolution of
composition-rhetoric, we must understand [the] extraordinary decay in
rhetoric's status and perceived worth .... This chapter will examine some
of the reasons for the desuetude into which rhetoric fell during the period
1840-1910, with the resulting disciplinary structure being what I am
calling Modem composition-rhetoric. (172, emphasis added)
As I noted earlier, Connors conceives of "Modem composition-rhetoric" as a static
period in which little rhetorical theory was generated; thus, he is arguing here that
rhetoric's demotion led to stagnation in the American college curriculum and, although
he would not use the term himself, to the perpetuation of CTRP. In this particular chapter
of Composition-Rhetoric, Connors intends his presentation of the supposed fall of
rhetoric l2 to explain the historical precedent that was set in early English departments for
the discipline's contemporary labor practices; he seems to suggest that the rebirth of
rhetoric in the late twentieth century has the potential to disrupt these unethical practices.
But Connors' portrayal of history is oversimplified, which suggests that any solutions
arrived at through this version of history will not fully resolve the problem. In examining
Connors' historiographic approach across these texts, then, we can see how a handful of
"real" practices are fused with the disciplinary imaginary to construct flawed
12 Just as my use of the phrase "classical rhetoric" is to be read as contested, so should my use of the words
"fall" or "decline" to describe what happened to rhetoric in the nineteenth century. As my deconstruction of
composition's historiography in this chapter and others will demonstrate, I do not agree that these words
adequately or appropriately describe this part of composition's history.
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understandings not only of the history of writing instruction but also the contemporary
discipline.
Halloran promotes a comparable version of rhetoric's demise, connecting it to the
shift from oratory to writing as well as to the emergence of CTRP in several essays that
are cited widely throughout our historical scholarship. In "Rhetoric in the American
College Curriculum," he describes the shift as follows:
While the classical idea had not disappeared altogether [by the end of the
eighteenth century], it had gone into a severe eclipse from which it has not
yet emerged, if indeed it ever will. The most obvious changes were the
move to a primary focus on written rather than oral communication, the
demotion of rhetoric to a minor place in the curriculum, and the
detachment of classical learning from the general concerns of rhetoric.
(257, emphasis added)
In "Rhetoric and the English Department," an essay in which Halloran uses the history of
writing instruction and the rhetorical tradition to validate the place of rhetoric in English
studies, Halloran separates classical rhetoric from writing in order to privilege the
classical tradition as a more "advanced art" than the "impoverished rhetorical theory"
represented by writing instruction in the nineteenth century (5-6). In his 1990 essay
"From Rhetoric to Composition," Halloran reinforces this hierarchy, describing the
transition from oratory to writing as one in which "[m ]uch of great value was lost,"
especially rhetoric's civic function (176). He describes the transition as follows:
"Heuristic theory and procedures virtually disappeared, and the sense of audience was
narrowed. In place of a rich array of stylistic forms and techniques was the flat voice of
mechanical correctness. The greatest loss was of a large social purpose for writing, a
social role for which rhetorical art was necessary equipment" (176-77, emphasis added).
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And in the introduction to the edited collection, Oratorical Culture in NineteenthCentury America, Halloran and Gregory Clark describe the emergence of CTRP as one
driven by the modem university's "need for a rhetoric of morally neutral and
exclusionary discourse" to support the "professional ethos" of American culture at the
time. In order to satisfy this need, Halloran and Clark argue, CTRP ultimately
"neglect[edJ classical invention" (21, emphasis added). Like Connors, Halloran
represents the recent history of writing instruction as a marked loss in the context of the
classical tradition of rhetoric. 13 As I suggested at the beginning of this section, Halloran
likely portrays the past this way in order to make it easier for contemporary scholars to
connect current theory and practice with an older and presumably richer tradition.
However, examining the historiography across these texts illustrates how practices at
prominent and elite institutions - practices which, in this case, carry strongly negative
connotations - can become folded into the disciplinary imaginary as "real."
In The Methodical Memory, a book focused entirely on CTRP's theory of
invention and its effects, Crowley seems to agree with Halloran and Clark's explanation
of rhetoric's fall. 14 Invention, according to Crowley, is a necessary element of "the
maintenance of a complete and effective theory of rhetoric" and is "a central insight of
classical rhetoric - that the generation and deployment of discourse is intimately related
to the possession of cultural power" (168). Crowley'S description of classical rhetoric
here is contrasted with contemporary composition: She likens the inventional theories

13 Because my focus is limited only to composition's disciplinary histories, I cannot address how others,
such as literary and cultural historians, have portrayed nineteenth century rhetoric and pedagogy. For one
literary historian's take, readers might consult Sandra Gustafson's Eloquence is Power: Oratory and
Performance in Early America.
14 Crowley'S Methodical Memory takes up previous scholars' claims that CTRP lacked a theory of
invention altogether. She wants her critique to show that CTRP, indeed, had a theory of invention but that
this theory was fundamentally flawed.
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grounding CTRP to the rhetoric of the late Roman Empire, "where rhetoricians earned
their keep by composing and delivering highly ornamented and elaborate display pieces exercises whose wit and ingenuity were meant only to amuse their rhetorically
sophisticated audiences" (168, emphasis added). Just as Halloran and Connors do,
Crowley glosses over specific beliefs and practices so that composition's history appears
unified; this ultimately enables her to link the values of contemporary composition with a
seemingly stronger, more legitimate, tradition.
Finally, Douglas' oft-cited contribution to Richard Ohmann's English in America,
"Rhetoric for the Meritocracy," also frames CTRP (he does not use the term, but he
probably would have had the essay been published after 1978, the year of Young's
definition) against (presumably classical) rhetoric. Although he is "willing to see a
connection between many practices of current composition teachers and those that can be
inferred from the works of any of the great rhetoricians," he rejects some scholars'
argument that composition might be accurately described as "rhetoric under another
name" (98). With more force than Connors, Halloran, and Crowley, Douglas constructs
classical rhetoric in direct opposition to CTRP in order to ascribe the classical tradition
more value. He writes:
... I do not even see anything very interesting in questions that concern a
possible relation between rhetoric and composition, or in those that
concern a reversal of history that might transform composition back into
rhetoric or just make the alleged connection more apparent. The
interesting questions are those that ask why and how rhetoric in its
truncated and debased modem form has been able to survive, and indeed
flourish, as the study of written composition, or as practice in the
production of written composition and communications. (98-99, emphasis
added)
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Just as Connors' and Halloran's historiography simplifies the past, so too does Douglas'
use of words such as "truncated" and "debased," especially when presented in contrast to
contemporary composition.
I am less interested in whether these historians' depictions of classical rhetoric are
accurate (in general, they uphold an idealized version of the Western tradition) than in
how these depictions are used in our histories to obscure the distinction between real
practices and beliefs and the disciplinary imagination. The neglect of this important
distinction promotes a problematic understanding of the history of contemporary writing
instruction in the United States that, in turn, marginalizes other traditions and
perspectives. First, while some of these historians _. Connors and Halloran especially work to contextualize and complicate the shift from a primarily oratorical to print culture,
their efforts are limited because their projects attempt to describe such a large span of
time: It is inevitable that charting the history of writing instruction and cultural
transformations in American colleges across the nineteenth and into the twentieth
centuries will gloss over meaningful details that might give us a more nuanced sense of
history. And second, their depictions of the classical tradition assume that this tradition is
monolithic, uncontested, and can stand for all perspectives and traditions that are civic in
nature. Although these historians' purposes - which are generally related to ascribing
legitimacy to the contemporary discipline - and the limits of their histories are usually
made clear within the texts themselves, the historical narratives contained therein have
been disseminated widely in disciplinary scholarship over the past thirty years. This
dissemination illustrates how the prevailing narratives forwarded within these histories
and others are promulgated to support various purposes, including analyses of
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contemporary student writing, pedagogical and institutional critique, proposals for the
future of the discipline, and continued research in the history of composition. IS
Jessica Enoch's Refiguring Rhetorical Education provides one example of the
effects of this transmission: Enoch's important revisionist work documents the rhetorical
pedagogy of marginalized figures (Lydia Maria Child, Zitkala-Sa, Jovita Idar, Marta
Pena, and Leonor Villegas de Magnon) around the turn of the century. Her portrayal of
these teachers is both nuanced and convincing; however, she frames their practices in the
introduction to the book in terms of the classical rhetorical tradition, making connections
between these figures and "educators such as Protagoras, Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and
Quintilian" (5). Enoch claims that the educators in her study "invented new forms of
rhetorical education that aimed to reshape dominant power structures" (7); however,
because it is unlikely that these educators would have been working solely from the
Western tradition, I question whether or not these pedagogical practices can or should be
traced to classical rhetoric. But at the same time, Enoch's attempt to make this connection
- especially given her citations of both Halloran and Crowley in the same sectionmakes sense: The disciplinary imagination, and the narratives produced therein, does not
provide other ways to explain, authenticate, or even account for, alternative traditions or
practices in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Enoch's view may be limited in part
because she must explain the complex practices, values, and beliefs uncovered by her
historical research according to the discipline's popular conception ofCTRP and its
(apparent) opposite, classical rhetoric. While Enoch's uncovering of these marginalized
perspectives is invaluable for the discipline, couching these perspectives within a
15 In pointing out the uses to which history has been put in composition scholarship, I do not mean to imply
that these purposes are problematic; I merely want to remind my readers of the rhetorical effects of
disciplinary historiography.
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tradition from which they may not have been working risks a recentralization of the
dominant at the expense of the marginalized. In attending primarily to those practices that
"make sense" within the disciplinary discourse authorized by prevailing narratives about
CTRP and classical rhetoric, we may silence already marginalized, historically specific
voices.
Enoch's rhetorical strategy makes sense especially because our historiography
tends to present the classical rhetorical tradition as inherently valuable. As demonstrated
by Connors, Halloran, Crowley, Douglas, and Enoch, disciplinary historians usually
associate the classical tradition with positive language: For Connors, rhetorical
instruction means "effective written communication"; for Halloran, the tradition holds
"[m]uch of great value"; for Crowley, "classical" rhetoric is "complete and effective";
Douglas describes the "classical" rhetoricians as "great"; and Enoch need only list the
tradition by name to remind us of its value. Collectively, these historians employ a
rhetoric that assumes a nearly incontestable hierarchy according to which the classical
tradition holds the most value because of its supposed support of democratic and civic
concerns. While some historians acknowledge the undemocratic and exclusionary uses to
which the classical tradition has been put (including Crowley and Nan Johnson; also cf.
Eagleton), many also defend the tradition in spite of its flaws (Enoch 6; Halloran 177).
This defense likely occurs because the disciplinary imaginary presents both CTRP and
the classical tradition as singular and unified traditions, delimiting other readings of the
same history. As such, historians are confronted with a binary opposition between which
they must choose and ultimately defend, even when that defense implies a promotion of
racist, sexist, and/or elitist views.
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Few historians depict classical rhetoric and CTRP as fundamentally interrelated
traditions. Miriam Brody is one of the few who refuses the prevailing narrative that
implies a clear split between the old and new; as a result, she produces a reading of
history that does not defend problematic perspectives and allows for questions about
history that deserve further attention: She argues in Manly Writing that because
masculine ideology permeates classical rhetoric's explanation of style, gendered writing
has been ''too easily dismissed" by rhetoricians (5). She then connects classical rhetoric's
gendered ideology to the modem composition course, arguing that ''the composition
course ... , however newly minted its gatekeeper function may have been, retained its
place in an older tradition, representing writing at the turn of the century as work for the
manly agon of public life, and the purpose of its teaching as the character training such
agonistic endeavor required" (161). According to Brody, therefore, the classical tradition
not only perpetuated an elitist and exclusionary ideology, but the tradition and its
attendant ideology is directly connected to - not detached from - contemporary
composition, especially CTRP. Brody's argument provides a strong feminist argument
worth considering; however, it still relies on the binary of classical rhetoric versus CTRP.
This reliance demonstrates how entrenched our prevailing narratives have become in the
disciplinary imaginary and how difficult it is to "release ourselves" from those habits of
representation promoted within our prevailing narratives.
Because Connors, Halloran, Crowley, and Douglas connect the emergence of
CTRP with the shift from oratory to writing in the nineteenth century, their
historiography implies that this shift occurred uniformly and produced similar effects
across a variety of groups and institutions. Narratives established in several recent
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histories, however, compete against these claims by considering a wider variety of
archival materials. 16 Enoch's history, in spite of its problematic framing, provides one
obvious case in point that challenges the suggestion of a unified movement from classical
rhetoric to CTRP in late nineteenth-century American culture. Beth Ann Rothermel's two
micro-histories of rhetorical education at Westfield State Normal School in
Massachusetts and Heidemarie Z. Weidner's micro-history of nineteenth-century writing
instruction at Butler University also resist this suggestion: Because they assume that
questions about rhetorical education should remain open to debate, Rothermel and
Weidner argue that rhetorical education did not disappear from the American college
curriculum, especially at smaller institutions, such as private Midwestern colleges and
normal schools, which are largely ignored in macro-histories. In "A Sphere of Noble
Action" Rothermel explains that although Westfield's history may appear on the surface
to support prevailing narratives about the shift from oral to written rhetoric, "close study
also suggests that ... this transformation was a complicated and even incomplete one, one
that I propose to show was more a remolding of the rhetorical tradition than a truncation"
(38-39). Further, Rothermel suggests in both essays that even as a more conservative
curriculum was instituted at the school in the early twentieth century, thanks to the
pressures of the Massachusetts Board of Education, faculty countered this pressure by
"continu[ing] to represent the study of oral and written expression in more complex
terms, as an exploration of the process of communication" ('''Our Life's Work'" 152-53).
Although Rothermel's interpretation of the available evidence is not beyond critique, her

16 As I note in the introduction to the dissertation, my critique often highlights how our historiographic
practices and historical research methods have improved over time, often producing impressive disciplinary
effects. In spite of recent progress in this regard, however, earlier historical narratives often persist in
contemporary non-historical scholarship.
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work is valuable for the discipline because it reminds compositionists that multiple
conclusions can be made about our history; and what's more, we still have much to learn.
Weidner's investigation of the two women who held the Demia Butler chair of the
English department at Butler University similarly challenges prevailing narratives of
CTRP. Her study suggests that rhetorical education was alive and well not only in writing
courses, but also across disciplines, including literature, natural history, and psychology
(63).

Although both Rothermel and Weidner, like all historians, construct a narrative
that is ultimately open to debate, their work deserves attention because it demonstrates
the value of situating various kinds of historical evidence - including "presidents'
reports, board and faculty minutes, university catalogues, instructors' lecture notes and
diaries, faculty publications, student themes and journals, student magazines, and alumni
memoirs" (Weidner 59) - within their socio-historical contexts. This nuanced
examination of the archive not only adds complexity to the disciplinary imaginary but
marks and maintains a distinction between the two. Further, the competing narratives
constructed in Rothermel's and Weidner's research exemplify recent shifts in disciplinary
values - shifts that can be seen, for example, in scholarship that calls for increased
attention to habitually marginalized institutions and voices.
A final consequence of historians' attempts to connect CTRP with the cultural
transformations of the nineteenth century is the characterization of CTRP as inherently
arhetorical. Such a characterization is problematic, first, in that it neglects the initial
connection made by Fogarty between "current" and "traditional" rhetorical practices:
Hawk explains that in Roots for a New Rhetoric, "Fogarty charts Aristotelian rhetoric,
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outlines current-traditional rhetoric, and displays them adjacent to a diagram of the ideas
of Richards, Burke, and the General Semanticists. In short, to discover the new rhetoric
he has to delineate the old rhetorics" (14). In other words, for Fogarty, CTRP is obviously
rhetorical: his complaint about contemporary practice has to do not with the loss of a
classical tradition but with the fact that its pedagogy is based on the classical tradition
rather than a contemporary one (Hawk 14-15). Further, Hawk explains that even though
Fogarty's new rhetoric ultimately rejects the classical tradition, "major figures in the
field, including Young, set up current-traditional rhetoric in opposition to new classical
rhetorics, which supports a narrative of retreat and return: classical rhetoric retreats
during the dominance of current-traditional practices but is returning in the late twentieth
century" (15).
The fact that Young deliberately (and significantly) revised the meaning of the
term current traditional helps to substantiate my earlier claim that part of the reason
Connors, Halloran, Crowley, and Douglas construct prevailing narratives of CTRP
against the seeming demise of rhetoric is not necessarily to represent actual practices but
rather to serve disciplinary needs. These needs are reflected in the disciplinary imaginary,
which appropriates historical evidence for its own purposes, making sense of artifacts
according to larger disciplinary beliefs and values. This kind of appropriation is
inevitable in the construction of prevailing and competing narratives; therefore, it is our
responsibility as scholars to continually analyze our always-evolving narratives to better
understand not only what the discipline gains from our explanations of the history of
composition, but also what it loses. Clearly, the prevailing narratives that emerged out of
Young's reversal helped the discipline connect itselfto a well-respected tradition that
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could add legitimacy to the contemporary field. Further, making this move helped Young
validate his own and others' research in "new classical rhetorics" as viable. But much is
lost in Young's reversal- and even when contemporary historians work to complicate or
dismantle those understandings of our past that have spun out from Young's definition,
they must generally rely on those prevailing narratives for their work to be intelligible
and acquire value within disciplinary discourse.
Another effect of understanding CTRP as fundamentally arhetorical is that it
ignores other ways of interpreting the cultural context that ostensibly produced CTRP, as
well as the purposes for which CTRP might be used. For example, a number of
historians, including Susan Miller, Douglas, Halloran, and Crowley, have blamed Edward
T. Channing, the third Boylston Professor of Oratory and Rhetoric at Harvard, for
formalizing the "split" between old and new rhetoric, which they argue also promoted the
rise of individualism, literary study and CTRP in higher education. 17 Again, these
historians conflate actual practice (in this case Channing'S published writing and
speeches) with the disciplinary imaginary (which interprets the historical evidence about
Channing as representative oflarger cultural and institutional trends).
Elizabeth Larsen offers one alternative to this interpretation in her microhistorical
account of Channing's role in the move from oral to written rhetoric at Harvard. Larsen
revises this characterization by attending closely to Channing's writings and speeches;
she argues that Channing's intentions have been misinterpreted and that instead of
vilifying him according to our contemporary view of history, we need to understand him
as a progressive educator located within, and responding to, his cultural context. She
171 want to stress that I do not endorse the connections made by historians among "individualism, literary
study, and CTRP"; these are not necessarily related but have been made to appear so through
historiographic practice.
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explains that because composition has failed to understand writing within its nineteenthcentury context, as a technology that "had visibly overwhelmed" the orally-based
classical tradition (160), the discipline has also failed to make sense of nineteenth-century
assumptions about writing versus oratory. She explains:
As we examine the model in terms of increased use of writing, we can see
that as writing (and reading) became increasingly influential in rhetorical
education they raised ambiguities. And we can see how aspects of currenttraditional rhetoric - its reliance on innate ability, its turn to the personal,
and its focus on written products and error - can be traced to assumed
differences between writing and oratory. (164)
Specifically, Larsen argues that in order to better understand Channing, we need to
understand all "[t]heories and pedagogy of composition and rhetoric" as "themselves
rhetorical responses that attempt to make sense of the world around" (169). In
interpreting Channing as a figure who was "struggling" with contemporary cultural
developments, Larsen shows how composition can benefit from entertaining multiple
conclusions about historical evidence rather than attempting to settle the issue, as other
histories have done (169).
With the questions raised in Larsen's history, compositionists should move to
understand historical evidence that would otherwise seem current-traditional instead as a
complex, situated, and always-already rhetorical response to cultural changes in the
nineteenth century (169-70). Larsen's analysis provides one example of how future
historians might successfully separate real practice from the disciplinary imaginary
without falling back on prevailing narratives about CTRP to "make sense" of historical
evidence. Indeed, because Larsen measures Channing's speeches and writing against his
own historical and institutional context, instead of against ours, she avoids vilifying
Channing as a figure who stands in for the demise of rhetoric, the rise of CTRP, and the
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long reign of English literary study in the modem university. Metahistorical critique
demands that we acknowledge and borrow strategies such as Larsen's for future
historiographic practice.
The connections disciplinary historians have made between mid-nineteenthcentury cultural change and the emergence of CTRP in college-level writing instruction
have clearly been influential and have enabled us to develop stronger claims for
disciplinary legitimacy. But as we can see from the competing narratives produced by
other historians, the connection is a loose one at best and remains recognizable in
disciplinary discourse due to repeated conflation of actual practice with the disciplinary
imaginary. In his critique of composition historiography at the beginning of Rhetoric as

Immunity, Paine argues "that histories that have ... link[ed] larger cultural issues to
specific phenomena in composition ... have been content to demonstrate merely that such
relationships exist. They do not specify how larger cultural issues have actually
influenced the transformation of composition theory and practice" (30). I agree.
However, I would add that we need to employ metahistorical critique to better
acknowledge the material effects of our historiographic practices. While the shift from
oratorical to print culture is a well-documented one, it is intimately bound up in questions
ofliteracy, inclusion, and education; the causal relationships constructed and forwarded
within prevailing (and sometimes competing) narratives about CTRP produce
consequences that materialize in our interpretations of public and private culture, in our
negotiations with(in) institutions, in the writing of our textbooks, and in the way we
approach pedagogy, other teachers, and our students. Before I tum to the way that
prevailing and competing narratives of CTRP represent institutions, textbooks, students,
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and teachers and to what ends, I analyze, first, how and why these narratives interpret
mid-nineteenth-century culture and the rise of professionalism.

Rhetoric's "Fall" and the "Rise" of Professionalism
Historians who subscribe to prevailing CTRP narratives also point to the rise of
professionalism 18 and specialization in the modem university - associating it with the rise
of industrialism and individualism in public culture - in order to posit that these trends
facilitated the entrenchment ofCTRP in U.S. colleges. While industrial

d~velopment
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public culture certainly affected private and academic culture throughout the nineteenth
century, the discipline's historians tend to emphasize the effects of industrialism within
academic culture in order to demonstrate that increasing division and departmentalization
within the university had deleterious effects on the study of rhetoric in its classical form.
Because rhetoric is interdisciplinary, historians argue, it did not easily fit within a single
discipline - and thus lost its footing in the modem American university. This account
seems logical enough, at least when the modem university is defined according to
examples such as Harvard's, and works, for contemporary scholars, to help explain
rhetoric's fragmented and seemingly inferior location(s) in the academy. Further,
historians explain, the rise of industrialism in public American culture led to increased
demand for specialization of knowledge and thus the valuing of professionalization
within the academy. Largely drawing on Bledstein's discussion of the "culture of
professionalism," composition historians argue that the academic culture of the mid- to

18 When I refer to professionalism in this chapter, I mean for it to refer to those attitudes and desires that
privilege so-called "white-collar" or "middle-class" occupations and the skills associated with these jobs.
While this privileging is not without its problems, I intend for this critique to complicate the flat
negative/positive dichotomy that usually emerges in our disciplinary discourse in relation to this attitude.
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late-nineteenth centuries - associated as it was to industrialism in the public sphere therefore also contributed to the demise of rhetoric and the rise ofCTRP.
As a consequence of this complex web of associations, many composition
histories portray professionalism and practicality as problematic values that are
manifested in the rise of CTRP and lead to social stratification and elitism, which appears
inevitable when culture lacks the supposedly rich and democratic tradition of classical
rhetoric. Such a portrayal is erroneous in that it fails to separate actual practice from the
disciplinary imaginary, ultimately promoting an ideology of composition that ignores
how professional and practical values might also serve marginalized parties and interests
in significant ways. Additionally, this view promotes oversimplified and flawed
explanations of how American institutions of higher education work and have worked
with(in) public culture, how textbooks were written and used, how teachers taught and
thought, and how students performed in (and reacted tq) the classroom in response to all
of these factors. These problematic explanations lead not only to misconceptions of
composition history, but also to unsound views of contemporary education, textbooks,
teachers, and students, two problems which perpetuate systems of injustice that
contemporary scholars wish to subvert. A close analysis of the prevailing and competing
narratives that associate (or attempt to detach) professionalism with CTRP can help the
discipline better understand how these problems occur in our historiography and how we
might avoid them as we continue to uncover new histories of writing instruction.
The association between professionalization and the rise of CTRP can be located
most explicitly in Douglas', Berlin's, Crowley's, and Clark and Halloran's versions of
composition history. The title of Douglas' essay, "Rhetoric for the Meritocracy," almost
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speaks for itself in this regard, but a closer analysis helps demonstrate how and why
Douglas makes this connection. In the essay, Douglas analyzes Channing's and Charles

w. Eliot's roles in the foundation ofCTRP and modem composition at Harvard; as I
discussed above, Douglas is one of the many composition historians who blames
Channing and other Harvard figures for the demotion of classical rhetoric and forecloses
alternative interpretations of them - such as Larsen's interpretation of Channing as a
figure responding to the demands of contemporary culture. In his critique, Douglas links
Channing's description of the modem orator to individualist, private, and professional
values driven by market demands rather than those of the community. Citing Channing'S
Lectures Read to the Seniors in Harvard College (1856), Douglas explains that
Channing's view of the modem orator is:
... a quite radically new view of rhetoric .... Its paradigmatic image is that
of a man thinking, of a man whom "increased knowledge" has made
"more contemplative," less likely to turn to public occasions for
"excitement," who "feel[s] the most deeply when alone," who is not
insensitive to the imagination of the passions, but who is always tempering
them with judgment. Channing's somewhat Platonic effort to preserve the
dynamics of ancient rhetoric by calling up the judgment is a valiant one,
surely. But what one sees, or at least what I see, is a man in a study ...
who is contemplating the information, ideas, and opinions in some
interestingjoumal "devoted to literature, art, and politics." It's all very
solitary, very romantic. Or perhaps, more accurately ... it is a vision of
economic man and of the ineluctable, or at least automatic, controls of the
free market, as they could be transferred to the market place of ideas and
the commerce of public discussion. (116-17)
For Douglas, Eliot's long reign as Harvard's president corresponds with
Channing's role in transforming rhetoric from classical to modem, social to individual,
public to private, and from egalitarian to elitist. Eliot is widely accepted as the figure who
transformed Harvard from a provincial college to elite research university based on the
German model of education, and Douglas' depiction fuses "real" actions with the
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disciplinary imaginary as he ties this transformation directly to the rise of
professionalism, exclusion, and - as might be expected - CTRP. Eliot intended to
promote "only an increasing professionalization of the gentlemanly ... profession"
through the transformation; and while this might seem to justify the specialization and
departmentalization Eliot instituted in the new university, Douglas conflates this
possibility with the disciplinary imaginary when he argues that Eliot's true purpose was
to transform Harvard into a "growth industry" that would make the older, classical
curriculum appear irrelevant and uneconomical for potential students (127). This
conflation assumes consciously oppressive intentions on the part of institutions and
administrators: Although Eliot ostensibly wanted to make Harvard education broadly
accessible to students from all classes, poor students were to be tested repeatedly
according to "a sort of primitive accumulation of value-producing character traits" (128),
while wealthier students, who required no testing, would gain from Harvard "a kind of
moral superstructure, a set of driving principles" that were elitist in nature (129). Indeed,
according to Douglas, Eliot's vision of the "new" Harvard was "one that converted poor
and rich, or anyway those who had endured and demonstrated their 'capacity and
character,' their open-mindedness and 'sense of public duty,' into one body, 'the sons of
Harvard.' To characterize them, Eliot ... went back to the ancient concept of
aristocracy .... an aristocracy of achievement" (129). Eliot's rhetoric, therefore,
demonstrates for Douglas the beginnings of modem composition's "rhetoric of the
meritocracy," which works as "a selection mechanism, a recruiting ground for new men
for the apparatuses of state and industry, some few of whom might even come to walk the
corridors of power themselves" (132). Douglas' elucidation of composition's origins can
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be understood, on the one hand, to benefit the modem discipline in that he calls attention
to and warns against ways in which cultural expectations about literacy - in combination
with institutions, administrators, and teachers - can produce exclusionary views and
practices. On the other hand, because it conflates the "real" with the disciplinary
imaginary, Douglas' historiography rejects other interpretations of the same figures and
texts, while it also eclipses other sites, figures, and practices that also comprise
composition's history - thus promoting a problematically narrow definition of
professionalism. 19
Douglas' cynical view of composition history is cited and supported in both of
Berlin's historical monographs, which suggests that Douglas' explanation held lasting
value for the discipline. In Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges,
Berlin repeats the connection Douglas makes between industrialism and composition
instruction, and makes the connection all the more persuasive by depicting the culture of
professionalism as having monolithic, uniform causes and effects:
Most schools, both private and public, began to view themselves as
serving the needs of business and industry. Citizens demanded it, students
demanded it, and most important, business leaders - the keepers of the
funds - demanded it. The ability to write effectively - then as now - was
one of the skills that all agreed was essential to success; ... Harvard made
the composition class the sole course required of all students in an
otherwise elective curriculum. (60)
In this passage, Berlin moves from an overview of "most schools," to generalizations
about the public's "demands" for "effective" writing, to the institutionalization ofFYC
(and CTRP) at Harvard. Berlin therefore constructs a chain of causation that fixes diverse
groups and perspectives within an expansive - and unrepresentative - view of history.
19 While Douglas' interpretation of Eliot's rhetoric may be defensible, my point here is that Douglas'
historiography forecloses the possibility of other interpretations; this foreclosure is at the heart of the
problem I address throughout the dissertation.
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In Rhetoric and Reality, Berlin borrows Douglas' language to make a similar
connection about the rise of CTRP,2o this time connecting it also to the rise of scientism
in public culture. He explains: "The fact that current-traditional rhetoric was a product of
the new, elective university is crucial. This university, a uniquely American phenomenon
at the time, was at once committed to the scientific method and to the creation of a
professional meritocracy consisting of an emerging middle class" (36). As Berlin
develops this claim, business and industry interests are depicted as ubiquitous and their
effects are, once again, portrayed as monolithic and uniform. The following passage
exemplifies Berlin's historiographic tendencies in this regard:
Since all truth was considered to be external to the individual, to be
discovered through correct perception, the doctors or lawyers or engineers
or business managers - having been certified as experts, as trained
observers, in their disciplines - felt they were surely correct in discovering
that economic and political arrangements that benefited them were indeed
in the nature of things. And the fact that all ofthe members of this new
class tended to agree - tended to discover the same truths - when they
turned to decision-making in political and social matters only confirmed
their sense of being objective and accurate. Thus, acting in the name of
science, the new professionals used current-traditional rhetoric to justify
their privileged status in society. (37, emphasis added)
Here, as elsewhere, Berlin not only oversimplifies the perspectives of the middle class,
but he interprets their perspectives according to his contemporary Marxist understanding
of class; he seems to assume that those people with (or having aspirations to) economic
power always desire and employ that power to marginalize others. Additionally, Berlin's
historiography problematically ascribes a high degree of power to a small number of
people while also flattening their views into a single, unrepresentative perspective. This
Incidentally, Berlin does not cite Douglas in this passage, which suggests to me that the idea of the
"rhetoric of the meritocracy" had become so commonplace to prevailing narratives about CTRP that there
was no longer any reason to locate the origin of this use oflanguage. Indeed, Berlin uses the word
"meritocracy" three times between pages 36 and 37, which serve as the introduction to the section of
Rhetoric and Reality documenting the rise ofCTRP in the American academy.
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inaccurate portrayal associates scientism, professionalism, specialization and the middleclass as inherently negative, just as Douglas does in "Rhetoric for the Meritocracy."
Given Berlin's direct reference to Douglas, it seems likely that Berlin shares similar goals
and intends to inform contemporary scholars about the repressive potential of literacy
education. But Berlin has an additional purpose in composing his histories; as he
examines the history of writing instruction and vilifies CTRP, he hopes that his
monographs will "vindicate the position of writing instruction in the college curriculum"
(Rhetoric and Reality 1). Seen in combination with his attack on the culture of
professionalism in the mid- to late-nineteenth century American college, Berlin's stated
purpose contains a deep paradox: If the discipline were to acquire the legitimacy Berlin
calls for here, this achievement would seem to correspond with the very middle-class
values and culture of professionalism that he critiques. This contradiction becomes
increasingly evident as we examine Berlin's historiography, and it is perpetuated as other
scholars continue to cite his monographs without critically examining the rhetoricity of
his historiography. Perhaps this helps explain why the discipline continues to express
anxiety over its location in the academy despite explicit efforts of scholars such as Berlin
to resolve the problem.
Both Crowley and Clark and Halloran follow Berlin's lead in associating
professionalism directly with the rise of CTRP in the academy. In The Methodical
Memory, Crowley writes that "current-traditional rhetoric works precisely because its
theory of invention is complicit with the professional hierarchy that currently obtains in
the American academy .... the only ... explanation for its tenacity is its compliance with
certain institutional needs" (139-40). Here, Crowley explains the ''tenacity'' of CTRP by
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claiming it carries a specific function in the academy, and with this logic, she sets her
readers up to either agree or find themselves implicated in the problem. These problems
are further cemented by the ambiguity of phrases such as "the professional hierarchy"
and "certain institutional needs" - phrases that confuse the distinction between actual
practice and the disciplinary imaginary.
Clark and Halloran's introduction to Oratorical Culture in Nineteenth-Century
America is more explicit in its condemnation of a similar concept, the "professional
ethos," which they believe, in contrast to Berlin, was more powerful in setting the stage
for CTRP than scientism or industry. For Clark and Halloran, the "professional ethos" of
the mid-nineteenth century "define [s] knowledge-bearing communities as private
enclaves of specialists and knowledge as an economic commodity rather than a moral
virtue" (22). Clark and Halloran argue that it is the "professional ethos" of the nineteenth
century that sets up two separate binaries related to CTRP: in one, the "professional
ethos" classifies "knowledge-bearing communities" as either public or private and in the
other, the "professional ethos" describes knowledge as either "an economic commodity"
or "a moral virtue." While it may be possible for an individual to have the attitude
critiqued by Clark and Halloran, their generalization of the attitude as one held by a wide
variety of people thus glosses over the diverse motives and beliefs held by those who
might be described as valuing the "professional ethos." Clark and Halloran's argument
encourages contemporary scholars to draw on the classical rhetorical tradition to avoid
those problems represented by the "professional ethos" - but in presenting the two in
direct opposition to one another, they forward the same binaries that they claim the
"professional ethos" creates. In so doing, Clark and Halloran portray professionalism as
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having an ahistorical functionalism, suggesting that this attitude led directly to currenttraditional practices. This problematic portrayal therefore reduces the diversity of
perspectives contained within "knowledge-bearing communities" of the mid- to latenineteenth centuries and ignores the complex relationships among cultural values, money,
and power - and how these affect what counts as knowledge.
Paine, Kathryn Fitzgerald, and David Gold each provide compelling arguments
that complicate the assumptions about professionalism made by Douglas, Berlin,
Crowley, and Clark and Halloran. Examining these complications, especially against
prevailing narratives about CTRP, can help the discipline better understand not only the
material consequences of our historiographic practices, but can also help us identify
rhetorical strategies that might "release ourselves from the pattem[s]" of representation
that we find problematic, which in tum will tell us much about the limits and possibilities
inherent to the narratives we construct.
First, Paine, who focuses on the similarities between contemporary composition
and Channing's and A. S. Hill's pedagogical goals, highlights the problems that emerge
when we make causal claims about public cultural trends and changes within academic
culture. His historical work demonstrates that, in fact, "nineteenth-century American
intellectuals ... felt very much at odds with mainstream American culture .... To assume
that Hill, Channing, and other patrician intellectuals were in simple allegiance with
business interests is to subscribe to a clumsy and inaccurate model of class organization"
(22-23). Paine, like Larsen, argues in his analysis of Hill and Channing that, although
their final conclusions about rhetoric may have been misguided, they were responding in
understandable ways to cultural demands. According to Paine, Channing and Hill hoped
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that their instruction in rhetoric would enable their students to insulate (or "immunize")
themselves against dominant culture - objectives that are not outdated, but in fact align
with many of our contemporary goals (180). In composing this history, Paine utilizes
Larsen's historiographic strategy of contextualizing these early Harvard figures according
to their time and place; for example, in his analysis of Channing, Paine argues that
Channing hoped his students at Harvard would learn to use "rhetorical training ... to
'resist' [the] real world - where citizens were coerced into certain habits of
communication - and to bring their newly invigorated versions of proper and ideal
discourse ... into that fallen world" (47-48). Paine positions Hill similarly, writing that
"Because of his experience in journalism and because of his social position as a
Harvardian 'patrician intellectual,' Hill, like Channing, found himself 'at odds' with
mainstream late-nineteenth-century American culture" (87). In considering both figures
according to their social class and intellectual biases, Paine moves away from prevailing
interpretations and forces readers to consider Hill and Channing as figures with goals and
values similar to our own. Employing this interpretive strategy ultimately helps Paine
argue that the public professional culture of the mid- to late-nineteenth century was not as
monolithic in its influence on the academic sphere as prevailing accounts suggest.
While Paine adds complexity to our understanding of the relationships between
nineteenth-century public and academic culture, both Fitzgerald and Gold focus on actual
practices in order to question the negative assumptions underlying Douglas', Berlin's,
Crowley's, and Clark and Halloran's references to professionalism and its variants.
Specifically, Gold's and Fitzgerald's historical research demonstrates the multiple ways
in which professionalism - especially as manifested in vocational or career-oriented
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training - can be interpreted as an educative value, especially for marginalized
populations. In "A Rediscovered Tradition," Fitzgerald focuses on the history of multiple
normal schools in Wisconsin to trace an alternative tradition of writing instruction to the
European influences ofPestalozzi and others. She argues that the normal schools in her
study were able to develop a critical pedagogy, akin to contemporary ideals, within an
otherwise oppressive educational climate because of their unique focus on ''professional
rather than academic preparation" and also because they had access to a European
intellectual tradition of school- (as opposed to college-) oriented theories of education in
addition to the standard composition textbooks normally associated with the rise of CTRP
in American colleges (244, emphasis added). In other words, Fitzgerald argues, it is the
professional nature upon which normal schooling was grounded - the training of teachers
- that allowed a more progressive view of writing instruction to emerge at around the
same time as CTRP was supposedly dominating composition in other U.S. colleges.
Because she examines another site of education, values, and practices - located outside of
Harvard and grounded upon other theories of education - Fitzgerald's analysis favors an
ideology of composition that does not arbitrarily discount the potential value of
professionalism for disciplinary agents. Fitzgerald's historical research thus encourages
compositionists to acknowledge and ascribe value to the professional desires of students,
a move that recognizes the practical concerns that motivate our students. This recognition
is important for students because it values their desires as legitimate; further, this
recognition is valuable because it reminds compositionists to question their assumptions
about or critique of student desires.
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Gold focuses on three educational institutions in Texas "neglected by previous
historical study" in Rhetoric at the Margins: All three of these institutions - Wiley
College, an HBCU, Texas Women's University, and East Texas Normal College"served a similar function ... providing [students] with a means of socioeconomic and
community pride" (115). Gold's study, like Fitzgerald's, takes into account and values
the practical goals of students, whose "main reason [for] attend[ing] college - then as
well as now - is for the purpose of professional advancement" (155). Indeed, although
"[m]any of us in the humanities with liberal or radical sentiments are suspicious of
anything that smacks of professional or vocational training, seeing it as a compromise
with a market-driven value system that already devalues our own work," Gold concludes
that this suspicion is a contemporary interpretation that does not necessarily align with
even the most progressive educators at the turn ofthe century (155). Together, Gold's
and Fitzgerald's histories suggest that dismissing professionalism as a suspect or
worthless value actually reifies the same elitist and exclusionary perspectives that
historians such as Douglas et al. presumably oppose. I would argue, too, that one of the
reasons composition has tended to ignore many of the "alternative" educational sites that
more recent histories have brought to the forefront -- including normals, HBCUs, rural,
female and religious colleges, literary and debate societies, and formal and informal
literacy programs - can be attributed in part to disciplinary historians' focus on an
ahistorical and functionalist view of professionalism. The lack of viability for this focus
continues to be illustrated by the historical evidence present in recent, more nuanced
histories of college writing instruction.
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As we can see via metahistorical critique, Clark and Halloran's definition of
"professional ethos," along with Douglas' and Berlin's "rhetoric of the meritocracy" and
Crowley's "professional hierarchy," reinforces a series of problematic binaries - and,
thus, hierarchies of value - that relate directly to prevailing narratives about CTRP: these
historians set classical against modem, social against individual, public against private,
and egalitarian against elitist in order to discharge the second word of each pair and
promote a particularly ahistorical view of the "culture of professionalism" in the
nineteenth century. This interpretation of history, manifested and forwarded as it is
through prevailing narratives about CTRP, encourages contemporary scholars to glorify a
seemingly monolithic classical rhetorical tradition without regard for the complex history
of writing instruction. This kind of historiography ultimately results in a debilitating
understanding and treatment of students, as well as an oversimplified view of public
culture, institutions, and teachers.
The competing narratives produced in more recent histories such as Gold's and
Fitzgerald's are valuable for the discipline because their historiographic practices
challenge the disciplinary imaginary through a highlighting of new and varied historical
evidence. I argue that this highlighting provides a positive example of how specific
rhetorical strategies might be used by future historians in continuing to challenge and
disrupt binaries such as those promoted by Douglas, Berlin, Crowley, and Clark and
Halloran. Application of these strategies will therefore promote different and enabling
interpretations of composition students and teachers, especially in relation to public
culture and academic institutions. At the same time, Fitzgerald's and Gold's histories,
like many others, must employ prevailing narratives about CTRP to "make sense" of new
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historical evidence. As I noted earlier, this kind of reliance demonstrates the difficulty of
getting away from prevailing narratives ofCTRP. However, I would also contend that
our ability to isolate this part of the problem through metahistorical critique is productive
in that it should motivate future disciplinary historians to find new frameworks for the
interpretation of historical evidence and new language with which to describe it - in other
words, it should prompt "a concerted, collective effort to release ourselves from the
pattern reflected here." As I continue this analysis, I intend to show how the progressive
sequence of dichotomies produced by historians' acceptance of prevailing CTRP
narratives projects chains of association that ultimately restrict the ways in which the
discipline can describe and understand institutions, textbooks, teachers, and students. At
the same time, I will discuss the limits and possibilities inherent to competing narratives
ofCTRP.
Institutions and CTRP Narratives
Although descriptions of rhetoric and composition's institutional context are
rarely separated from discussions of textbooks, teachers, and students in our disciplinary
histories, I separate them here, rather artificially, because doing so allows me to
demonstrate how the power ofCTRP's prevailing narrative(s) enables the discipline to
conceive of these various agents in problematic ways, conceptions which can (and do)
perpetuate systems of marginalization already in place. Specifically, my review of
composition histories suggests that prevailing narrative(s) ofCTRP employ and
promulgate characterizations, first, of the academic institutional context, curriculum, and
first-year composition course as inherently antithetical to the interests of the discipline (in
both its classical and modem configurations), as well as teachers and students. Second,
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CTRP's prevailing narratives designate those textbooks produced during the nineteenth
and most of the twentieth centuries as a homogeneous group that ultimately promotes a
linear, unimaginative, product-oriented view of writing. This characterization is also
often coupled with an implicit or explicit assumption that textbooks directly correlate
with actual pedagogical practice. Third, within prevailing CTRP narratives, teachers and
students are, more often than not, represented as non-agentive subjects who are acted
upon or forced to act by outside (usually inanimate) agents. An exception to this can be
seen in histories that ascribe agency to teachers, in which case their actions tend to be
depicted negatively. Students occasionally achieve agency when framed according to the
CTRP narrative, but when they are, they are characterized as resistant or resenting
subjects, oftentimes in response to teachers but (importantly) not to the institution or
textbooks. Finally, prevailing narratives about CTRP assume that CTRP is a "real"
rhetorical theory and pedagogical practice.
As is demonstrated in Douglas' example in the previous section, for many
compositionists, Harvard is the most readily available institutional analogue for CTRP
(and, for that matter, for FYC, which I deal with in more detail in chapter 3). Patricia
Donahue remarks in her conclusion to a recent collection of disciplinary micro-histories
that nearly every essay in Local Histories refers to Harvard as a disciplinary signifier or
narrative when it is conflated with the disciplinary imaginary to represent the discipline's
origin: "As the story goes," she explains,
freshman writing began to assume shape as a separate academic program
at Harvard in the nineteenth century, and the Harvard model was then
widely reproduced elsewhere .... The Harvard narrative as a story of origin
and imitation has become so deeply entrenched within our discipline as to
function as an "always already" beyond which it can be difficult to go.
(222)
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And although many have disputed the degree of influence ascribed to Harvard by
historians such as Kitzhaber, Berlin, Connors, Donald Stewart, Crowley, and others, the
word "Harvardization" still works as a "useful synecdoche for what happened in the
closing years of the nineteenth century," according to Halloran ("From Rhetoric" 176).
Indeed, even historians who want to work against prevailing narratives of CTRP must
still refer to Harvard to make their work relevant, as many of the micro-histories in the

Local Histories collection show. Despite Donahue's and Halloran's deliberate
acknowledgement that Harvard acts as a signifier for multiple institutions of higher
education and often gets folded into the disciplinary imaginary, neither considers to what
ends this conflation has occurred or why, in Halloran's case, it is worth defending. As I
proceed with this metahistorical analysis, I demonstrate that the "Harvardization" of
composition has limited the discipline's habits of representation and offer an explanation
for how this conflation has nevertheless benefited the discipline in some important
ways.21
If we return to the binaries associated with professionalism, it is not difficult to
see how Harvard acts as CTRP's institutional equivalent: as the quintessentially modem
American university, it celebrates the individual and caters to the elite. Its private and
exclusionary nature gives it (and its students, faculty, and administrators) higher cultural
capital and, ostensibly, more political power. And, according to prevailing narratives,
Harvard's model (of CTRP as practiced in required FYC) carried great influence and was
replicated across institutions of higher education all across the United States (see Stewart
"Harvard's Influence"). In other words, Harvard itself (and its representatives, especially
See also Chapter 3, where I critique the relationship historians have established between Harvard and
first-year composition.
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Channing and Hill, Eliot, and Francis J. Child) has often been blamed for the rise of
CTRP. On the one hand, this fusion between Harvard and the disciplinary imaginary has
highlighted for the discipline the capabilities of an institution to repress and marginalize
those who already hold little power. On the other hand, I argue that this blame is not only
misdirected in that it connects composition studies to a single, unrepresentative
institutional context, but it also constrains the available options for the discipline's selfdescription.
Susan Miller's feminist macrohistory, Textual Carnivals, illustrates how an
attempt to revise previous accounts of composition history becomes limited when it fails
to distinguish between the real and the disciplinary imaginary.22 In this account, Miller
wants to disrupt our most popular disciplinary narratives; specifically, she argues, this
means giving voice and value to those people who composition generally takes to be its
"subjects" - that is, students and teachers - and "making them 'relevant' to contexts we
already find greater than the sum of their parts" (3). Unlike the macrohistories composed
by Berlin and Connors, Miller's analysis is supplemented by archived department
catalogues and institutional surveys, and her intent is to compose a feminist and culturalmaterialist history that highlights the value of student and other "commonplace" writing
practices, especially in contrast to what she sees as a literary bias in English studies.
While her feminist perspective provides an important intervention in traditional
historiographic assumptions and practices, Miller's revisionist attempt fails to adequately
subvert prevailing narratives ofCTRP (or FYC and the literature/composition binary, as I
discuss in Chapters 3 and 4). In her analysis of more than seventy-five catalogues
Of course, as I note in my discussion of the real and the disciplinary imaginary, I do not want to suggest
that a historian can ever directly connect with the real, as it is inevitably lost to the past. My point here is
that Miller takes the disciplinary imaginary for granted and does not explicitly draw attention to it as such.
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representing fifteen universities (67), Miller finds that "Composition has not been a poor
or preservative version of classical rhetoric, or a unified application of the modes and of
mechanical correctness, or an indoctrination to monolithic literary values that appear
designed to counter other professional interests - except in its introductory form" (73,
emphasis original). So, although her study reveals that "[u]ndulating and distinct
curricular purposes comprise 'English' and the writing taught in it," Miller does not
dispute prevailing narratives about freshman composition, Harvard (represented in this
passage by Eliot), and their relationship to CTRP (73). Indeed, for Miller, it is the
formalization of first-year composition, represented in elite institutions like Harvard, that
allows "the new university" - which she describes as "this repressive new institution of
the mother tongue" - to "implicit[ly] discriminat[e] among students" and "organiz[e] and
stratify[] many functions in society" (55).23 Here, we can see Miller move from an
ostensibly "real" practice - the first-year course's "intense focus on mechanical
correctness" (60) - to the disciplinary imaginary without making a distinction between
the two; as a result, Miller's historiography suggests that the establishment of
composition at Harvard was a "conscious[]" decision on the part of administrators, meant
to "test students' knowledge of graphic conventions, to certify their propriety, and to
socialize them into good academic manners" (66). Such historiography effectively
forecloses the rhetorical possibilities through which first-year composition might be
evaluated and described. 24
This preservation of prevailing CTRP narratives about institutions - especially
couched as it is within Miller's feminist and revisionist perspective - results in an
Importantly, English cannot be accurately described as the "mother tongue" in a nineteenth-century
American context.
24 I discuss what I see as possible alternative interpretations more thoroughly in Chapter 3.
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upholding of a problematic ideology of composition: First, this ideology attributes a high
degree of power to academic institutions, which in tum sustains prevailing assumptions
about students and teachers as relatively powerless. Second, it reduces the problem of
CTRP to a single institutional source25 instead of acknowledging the complex relations
among culture, public and private institutions, administrators, students, and teachers - all
of which work together to shape practice. Third, this view of institutions overlooks the
many individuals who actually construct and drive institutional theory and practice. And
finally, this view of institutions assumes that all educational institutions serve repressive
functions.
I wish to emphasize here that our understanding of how academic institutions
have worked in relation to writing instruction will not necessarily change in positive
ways once we turn our attention away from Harvard; rather, I claim that historiography
that maintains the distinction between actual practice and the disciplinary imaginary can
productively disrupt the problems I outlined above, even if the historical evidence
supports prevailing narratives about CTRP. One example of this kind of historiographic
practice can be found in Kenneth Lindblom, William Banks, and Rise Quay's essay
"Mid-Nineteenth-Century Writing Instruction at Illinois State University: Credentials,
Correctness, and the Rise ofa Teaching Class." Lindblom et al.'s analysis ofthe practices
and theory instituted at Illinois State Normal University, which they describe as
"militaristic" and "rule-bound" (96), supports "the more traditional 'Harvard Narrative'
of composition history" in many ways (103). However, their micro-history disrupts
prevailing narratives that associate Harvard's influence with CTRP in that "the context
Some historians have certainly acknowledged the important roles played by John Genung and Fred
Newton Scott in order to show how Harvard's institutional power was challenged. However, my focus on
Harvard here represents the focus of many of our most widely cited histories.
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and timing of [Harvard's] history is significantly different, as are the attitudes with which
correctness was rationalized and enforced" (103). Lindblom et al.'s analysis competes
with prevailing narratives about CTRP in important ways: Specifically, they triangulate
their analysis, examining not just the theories of composition professor Albert Stetson,
but also letters written by two of his students, all in relation to "officialized accounts and
other historical examinations of ISNU pedagogy" (95). Because this triangulation focuses
on a variety of practices usually considered separately, it resists a reductive interpretation
of what might appear on the surface to be yet another example of Harvard's clout.
Further, while Lindblom et al.'s history calls Fitzgerald's generally positive conclusions
about normal school pedagogy in "A Rediscovered Tradition" into question, their history
does not ultimately discount Fitzgerald's research. Instead, they hope that their history
will motivate future historians to value "altemative[s] to a more ideal history of
composition" (112). Lindblom et al.'s work leads to a productive interrogation of both
competing and prevailing narratives about CTRP that neither fully affirms nor denies
these narratives but instead emphasizes the value of keeping our conclusions about
history unsettled, creating impetus for further research.
Metahistorical analysis of Gold's "'Eve Did No Wrong'" and Jane Greer's '''No
Smiling Madonna'" helps illustrate the kind of history that can be masked when Harvard
is assumed to work as an appropriate institutional metaphor within prevailing narratives
about CTRP. In '''Eve Did No Wrong,'" Gold surveys archival documents at Florida
State College for Women, a public women's college, in order to compare student writing
to the prevailing understandings of women's education around the tum of the century.
Instead of assuming that evidence of CTRP in some composition courses represents all of
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the writing and writing instruction that occurred at FSCW - as historians who understand
CTRP through disciplinary representations of Harvard have - Gold looks instead across
the English department's course offerings and, like Lindblom et ai., uncovers a complex
narrative: "Students were ... exposed to a wide range of pedagogical approaches. Under
Chair William Dodd, writing instruction at the college combined a current-traditional
emphasis on correctness with an early and long sustained turn to the social" (WI8I). He
finds that "the rhetorical environment at FSCW created a robust climate of expression for
students that complicates our understanding of the development of women' s education in
speaking and writing" (WI79). Gold argues that "a confluence of competing forces
combined to shape instruction, reminding us that we cannot easily draw clean causal lines
between ideology and pedagogy, fit instruction into neat epistemological categories, or
rely solely on first-year composition for evidence of rhetorical instruction" (WI8I). Here,
Gold explicitly rejects those patterns of representation that encourage scholars to blur the
lines between actual practice and the "neat ... categories" of the disciplinary imaginary.
At the same time, Gold relies on the same problematic categories he wants to work
against - by presenting various pedagogical approaches as current-traditional or socialin order to make sense of historical evidence that would not otherwise be intelligible
within prevailing narratives about CTRP. As a result, Gold's historiographic choices
ultimately reinforce those patterns of representation that designate certain practices as
"dominant" and others as "alternative." These patterns of representation, in tum, solidify
a hierarchy of value that calls attention to certain practices over others and promotes the
sense that seemingly unintelligible practices and perspectives do not fit the discursive
sphere, which therefore makes them seem unsuitable for analysis. Gold's example
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affirms how difficult it is to "release ourselves from the pattern" of problematic
representation and suggests that we need to isolate and define rhetorical strategies that
will more successfully avoid this pattern through continued metahistorical critique.
In "'No Smiling Madonna,'" Greer also uncovers a complex institutional history
that would not be easily explained according to prevailing accounts of CTRP, and I argue
that her historiographic practice illustrates one rhetorical strategy that could help solve
the problems that Gold encounters. In this article, Greer documents the role of "socialist
and feminist" Marian Wharton in her development of the English curriculum at the shortlived People's College, a distance education program located in Fort Scott, Kansas.
Wharton's writing curriculum had as its "explicit goal" the "empowerment of the
working class" (249), but, as Greer's analysis of Wharton and her textbook Plain English
demonstrates, "even the most liberatory educational agendas can inadvertently cooperate
with conservative interests in broader culture" (267). Greer interprets Wharton's
pedagogical approach as both disciplinary and empowering for students; this
interpretation both supports prevailing narratives about CTRP and popular
representations of academic institutional culture at the same time as it rejects these
narratives in favor of competing narratives similar to Gold's. Greer's conclusions about
Wharton and the People's College are deliberately unsettling. She explains that "[r]ather
than attempting to 'salvage' Wharton's pedagogical agenda by integrating ... two
contrasting stories of her work or 'fixing' the contradictions by privileging one story over
the other," she intends for her work to illustrate the value of complexity in our historical
narratives. Because Greer calls attention in her historiography to both the prevailing and
competing narratives that emerge out of a single site of writing instruction and does not
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attempt to resolve the seeming contradictions between these interpretations, she
successfully demonstrates at least one rhetorical strategy with which historians might
subvert problematic patterns of representation.
Textbooks and CTRP Narratives
Composition historians' early overreliance on textbooks as a key source in tracing
the history of writing instruction has been, at this point, well documented by Miller,
Nelms, Varnum, and Gold, among others. I intend in this section, therefore, not to prove
that textbooks have been used problematically in our disciplinary histories - indeed they
have - but rather to analyze how prevailing and competing narratives about CTRP have
both shaped and restricted the discipline's understanding of textbooks. Prevailing
narratives' focus on textbooks has provided an important starting point for the discipline
to understand its history; further, this focus has encouraged compositionists to take a
critical stance toward the rhetoricity of contemporary textbooks. At the same time,
prevailing narratives about CTRP have made it acceptable within the discipline to
interpret textbooks in ways that sustain, rather than challenge, popular definitions of
CTRP through habitual conflation of textbook evidence and the disciplinary imaginary.
Specifically, disciplinary narratives about CTRP promote an ideology of composition that
assumes textbook use has a one-to-one correlation with actual pedagogical practice.
Further, these narratives construct and perpetuate popular misconceptions of teachers,
teaching, students, and student writing. Finally, these narratives and their attendant
ideologies encourage compositionists to interpret textbooks that contain "evidence" of
CTRP negatively, thereby forwarding the view that CTRP is inherently arhetorical and
that "practical" skills are antithetical to the goals of contemporary composition. Through
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metahistorical critique, we can better understand how, and to what ends, competing
narratives have problematized this ideology.
Two early essays by Connors and Berlin provide good starting points for an
analysis of how prevailing narratives about CTRP have framed composition's discussions
of textbooks. In his 1981 essay, "Richard Whately and Current-Traditional Rhetoric,"
Berlin attempts to revive Whately'S importance as a rhetorical scholar; he argues, in
effect, that had certain portions of Whately's rhetorical theory been incorporated in A. S.
Hill's and John Genung's textbooks, The Principles ofRhetoric and The Practical

Elements of Rhetoric, we might not have the same kind of "tradition" as the Hill/Genung
brand of CTRP that, Berlin argues, was evident in composition at the time. What's
interesting to me is not whether Berlin is correct about Whately, but how he ties a
prevailing narrative about CTRP directly to Hill's and Genung's textbooks. Drawing on
Young's definition of the CTRP paradigm, Berlin contends that Young's "list" ofCTRP
features "is immediately familiar to any teacher who has even glanced at the table of
contents of the numerous sample composition textbooks which yearly arrive in the mail"
(11). After quoting Young's definition in full, Berlin turns to Hill's and Genung's
textbooks, claiming that these textbooks comprise "[t]he immediate sources of this
paradigm" (11, emphasis added). Then, Berlin summarizes the features of Hill's and
Genung's textbooks in such a way that they obviously match up with Young's definition
of CTRP: First, "[t]he part of the text concerned with the four modes of discourse
emphasizes argument at the expense of persuasion. Even argument, however, is
diminished as it is made no more than the equal partner of description, narration, and
exposition" (17); this explanation corresponds well with Young's argument that CTRP
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"[classifies] discourse into description, narration, exposition, and argument" (qtd. in
Berlin 11). According to Berlin, "[t]he other part of the text - usually half of the work
and frequently more - is devoted to problems of style and usage" (17); this explanation
supports Young's claim that CTRP has a "strong concern with usage (syntax, spelling,
punctuation) and with style (economy, clarity, emphasis)" (qtd. in Berlin 11) Hill's and
Genung's textbooks "[treat] ... the word, sentence, paragraph, and the essay as a whole"
in order to "[reduce them] to a set of critical principles which are to be applied to the
written product, not learned as a process" (17), which again matches Young's description
of CTRP as "[analyzing] discourse into words, sentences, and paragraphs" and
"[ emphasizing] the composed product rather than the composing process" (qtd. in Berlin
11). While I find Berlin's conflation of the real with the disciplinary imaginary
problematic in ways that I detail further below, his efforts to match historical textbook
evidence with contemporary practice highlights how knowledge of composition history
can add depth to the contemporary discipline's knowledge about itself. Further, Berlin's
emphasis on the connection between contemporary practice and the rhetoric of textbooks
was and is valuable for the discipline because it isolated at least one avenue through
which problematic practices emerge and can therefore, with critical awareness, be
avoided in the future.
Like Berlin's "Richard Whately," Connors' 1986 essay, "Textbooks and the
Evolution of the Discipline." also relies on prevailing narratives about CTRP, a reliance
that helps fix the boundaries of the discipline's habitual approach toward textbooks as
artifacts of pedagogy for analysis. To his credit, Connors' evaluation of Hill's and
Genung's textbooks (among others, including Barrett Wendell's) is much more nuanced
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than Berlin's; just as Paine and Larsen strive to understand Channing within his cultural
context, Connors recognizes that nineteenth-century textbooks represent authorial
responses to cultural demands. He explains: "In Hill, Genung, and Wendell we have the
first attempts at a modem written rhetoric, the first rhetoric of the century to really go
beyond the orally-based theories of earlier rhetoric" (109). Further, in this essay at least,
Connors does not see the emergence of CTRP as a definite signifier for the loss of
classical rhetoric; here and elsewhere in his early work, he emphasizes the connections
between CTRP and the classical tradition?6 In "Textbooks," Connors contends that one
reason "these books are important [is] because they carry on the central formal
characteristic of oral rhetorical theory: they are atomistic in perspective, dividing and
subdividing the subject into many, many discrete classes, levels, figures, skills,
behaviors, and rules" (109, emphasis original).
In spite of these qualifications, however, Connors' conclusions are ultimately
shaped by prevailing narratives ofCTRP, which he describes here as "that set of practical
and theoretical doctrines" that evolved between 1860 and 1900 (107). In Hill's,
Genung's, and Wendell's textbooks, Connors sees the "classic elements of currenttraditional rhetoric": '"the modes of discourse, Unity, Coherence, and Emphasis, the
patterns of exposition, Clearness, Force, and Energy, [and] the organic paragraph" (109).
And although Connors traces the ''formal characteristic [s]" of these textbooks to the
classical tradition, he argues that "much of the theoretical content of these three books

26 See, for example, Connors' 1981 essay, "Current-Traditional Rhetoric: Thirty Years of Writing with a
Purpose," in which he characterizes CTRP as a "dynamic entity forever in flux" that "is a palimpsest of
theories and assumptions stretching back to classical antiquity" (208). However, as can be seen in my
discussion of Composition-Rhetoric at the beginning of this chapter, Connors is not consistent in his
evaluation ofCTRP (or "composition-rhetoric"). Our ability to notice this kind of historiographic
inconsistency - across texts and over time - can lead to further questions and research; I argue this is one of
the values of conducting metahistorical critique.
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was recent" (109, emphasis original). For Connors, because the development of these
textbooks' content is modem, this development illustrates both the rise of CTRP and
composition's detachment from the classical tradition. Moreover, Hill, Genung, and
Wendell "created the rhetorical theory that would shape American composition" and
"[remain] the heart of composition textbooks for over sixty years" (109). Instead of
analyzing the textbooks as evidence of historically specific values and practices,
Connors' interpretation is subsumed within a prevailing narrative of CTRP.
Connors' analysis suggests, first, that the ''theoretical contenf' of these textbooks
was "original," leaving readers with a sense that the texts were composed outside of, or
separate from, specific discursive traditions. This assumption implies, therefore, that the
contemporary discipline can easily dismiss nineteenth-century rhetorical theory and
replace it with a richer tradition, such as that represented by "classical" rhetoric.
Promoting such a dismissal means, in turn, also dismissing the beliefs, values, and
perspectives of those who helped produce rhetorical theory, purposefully or
inadvertently, in nineteenth-century U.S. Second, because these were the "most popular"
textbooks, Connors' analysis does not allow for consideration of other textbooks
produced at the same time, which would have carried influence within other institutional
and disciplinary contexts, even if that influence was less remarkable. 27 As more recent
histories have shown (see for example Carr et al. and Greer), other textbooks were being
produced at the same time as Hill's, Genung's and others, but these textbooks have been
habitually neglected within our historical accounts of writing instruction because of our
focus on dominant institutions, figures, and perspectives. In one sense, this focus has

27 Connors bases his claims of textbook popularity primarily on the number of editions a textbook
underwent and the length of time it remained in publication.
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helped the discipline make sense of larger public and institutional beliefs about literacy in
the nineteenth century, and it is admittedly justifiable in a practical sense, since the
documented popularity of these textbooks helps ground any claims that historians may
wish to make about them. However, Connors' and other historians' focus on these
dominant voices and popular textbooks has been forwarded not only by the material
constraints of archival research, but by also an ideology of composition that hides
ostensibly minor voices and practices.
And finally, Connors' assertions about the longevity and ubiquity ofCTRP are
based primarily on his analysis of textbooks published after Hill's, Genung's, and
Wendell's, which he claims show little development or originality (110). This final claim
forwards the presumption that textbooks represent actual pedagogical practice, which
risks substantiating an unjust and unfortunately persistent stereotype of teachers. In fact,
Connors illustrates how this substantiation can occur when he explicitly places the blame
for composition's supposed "stasis" between 1900 and 1940 (a stance that shifts slightly
but is ultimately maintained in Composition-Rhetoric) on teachers. I quote at length to
demonstrate the nature of his historiography:
The most important cause of the morbidity that has caused some historians
to label 1900-1930 the "Dark Ages" of composition was, however, the
appallingly ignorant and reactionary nature of the audience for textbooks
after 1900: the writing teachers. Interesting theory was not forthcoming
because it did not sell as well as it had in the 1890's. And why not?
Composition was moribund during this time for the same reason that had
caused the popularity of simplistic textbooks a century before: the
qualifications of the teachers in the classrooms. (111, emphasis added)
Here, Connors illustrates the damaging consequences that uninterrogated historiography
can have for disciplinary agents: Because he conflates textbook evidence with the
disciplinary imaginary, which supports prevailing narratives about CTRP, Connors can
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compose a seemingly "logical" chain of causation that both simplifies history and
produces demeaning accounts of teachers and their pedagogical practice. Because
historiography is a rhetorical practice that shapes and supports contemporary values,
beliefs, and practices, and because Connors has been and continues to be widely cited in
disciplinary scholarship, we can assume that this unfortunate chain of associations has
helped naturalize and perpetuate oppressive patterns of thinking, reading, and writing
about teachers of composition, especially those who are already marginalized thanks to
unethical labor practices.
As I noted earlier, many historians since Connors and Berlin have challenged our
discipline's overreliance on textbooks as historical evidence for actual values, beliefs and
practices; however, these challenges do not invalidate the value of textbook analysis
altogether. Carr, Carr, and Schultz, for example, argue in Archives a/Instruction that
their analysis of textbooks in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries avoids the problems
perpetuated by Berlin and Connors because they keep questions about textbook
interpretation open to debate. They stress the importance of placing
textbooks within their tradition ... [in order to clarify] what various books
have in common - the topics conventionally covered in each, the materials
recycled or appropriated from earlier texts in the tradition - and ... also
make[] visible how they differ - their idiosyncratic treatments of familiar
materials, the occasional strategic reworking of normative practices. (1617)
They contend that this contextualization "has allowed us to trace the intermittent
migration of routines, practices, and principles from one tradition to another and to
investigate the quite diverse relationships of each textbook tradition to various cultures of
literacy and modes of textual production and reproduction" (17). Instead of interpreting
textbooks as evidence to support prevailing CTRP narratives or as proof of what actually
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happened in the classroom, as Berlin and Connors do, Carr et al. strive for complexity in
their analysis of nineteenth-century textbooks. In fact, they see their analysis as an
explicit rejection of the way that prevailing narratives of CTRP have dominated textbook
analysis in our histories, writing that:
Close readings across these textbook traditions challenge several familiar
ways of characterizing nineteenth-century textbooks. It is more
appropriate and useful to understand rhetorics as practical than as
belletristic or current-traditional; to see that readers inculcate practices of
analysis and notions of propriety while providing training in oral
performance; and to understand composition books as prompting
invention and composing processes and not simply imposing correctness.
(206)
Carr et al. 's strategies of contextualization are important for the discipline because these
rhetorical strategies at once value the practical goals of students and refuse those patterns
of representation that indicate that textbooks can and should be interpreted as direct
signifiers of actual values, beliefs, and practices.
Carr et al.' s claim that composition textbooks have been and are used rhetorically
supports Greer's and Fitzgerald's analyses of how textbooks were used at the educational
institutions they study; together, these historians demonstrate the value of assuming that
our knowledge about the history of writing instruction remains unsettled. As I discussed
in the previous section, Greer specifically analyzes Marian Wharton's textbook, Plain

English, which ultimately defined the English coursework at the People's College. Greer
finds that Wharton's textbook neither completely afftrms nor rejects common disciplinary
understandings of CTRP. She explains that:
Despite [Wharton's] expressed desire to help working-class students
understand that they could play a role in re-shaping our continually
evolving system oflanguage and thus redefine "correctness," Plain
English is actually a complex interweaving of resistance to and
compliance with the dominant linguistic systems that privilege formality,
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conciseness, and the rules of grammar accepted by the economic elite.
(263)
In the case of the People's College, Greer is correct in conflating Wharton's pedagogy
with Plain English because all courses were taken by correspondence - as such, the
textbook can be understood as a direct representation of Wharton's perspective and
would have had a particularly profound influence over pedagogy. Greer's conclusions
about Wharton are nuanced:
... [Wharton] shifted among contradictory positions: encouraging
working-class students to seize control of language, yet disciplining their
unruly language practices so that critics of the labor movement could not
dismiss them as ignorant; helping to define the mission of the People's
College as an institution that would teach students how to think, yet
developing an English textbook that fits into the tradition of grammar
guides that ask students only to fill in blanks; offering pointed critiques of
the traditional educational establishment and its politics, yet designing a
pedagogy that would then allow working-class students to sound as if they
too had spent years at elite universities. (268)
Greer's analysis about Plain English constructs an important narrative for the discipline
that competes directly with Berlin's and (especially) Connors' conclusions about
textbooks, teachers, and prevailing narratives of CTRP: First, Greer's history uncovers
alternative textbook traditions that are otherwise neglected within prevailing narratives;
second, it challenges flawed assumptions about teachers and about the static nature of
composition pedagogy in the first half of the twentieth century; and finally, it resists easy
explanations for how textbooks "fit" within composition history. Greer's analysis
supports prevailing narratives about CTRP to a certain extent, but it also exposes the
limitations of these narratives. I argue that the discipline can benefit from her
historiographic approach in much the same way that it benefits from Lindblom et al.'s in
that, because Greer refuses to couch her findings neatly within either prevailing or
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competing narratives, she affirms the value of maintaining complexity in the discipline's
representation and interpretation of textbooks.
Fitzgerald, too, arrives at conclusions that compete with Berlin's and Connors':
Her analysis of how textbooks and grammar instruction were used at Wisconsin normal
schools at the turn of the century in "A Rediscovered Tradition" is worth our attention
because it isolates yet another rhetorical strategy that future historians might draw on as
they attempt to effectively subvert problematic patterns of textbook representation.
Whereas Greer interprets the grammar exercises and "traditional" structure of Plain
English as necessarily correlating with arhetorical purposes (and indeed, this correlation

may be correct, given that students were "taught" by the textbook rather than by a
teacher), Fitzgerald's analysis calls this assumption into question. She argues, against
prevailing narratives about CTRP, that the teaching of grammar does not necessarily lead
to an arhetorical or uncritical application of this knowledge, and she grounds her
contention on the different pedagogical traditions that influenced these schools. In her
analysis of the grammar discussions held at a normal-school teacher conference held in
Oshkosh, Wisconsin, Fitzgerald explains:
Though normal faculties bought into the common notion that grammar
study improves logical thinking, their approach to implementing the belief
in their teaching practices was different from that of academic colleges ....
[The discussions about grammar at the Oshkosh conference] effectively
illustrate the point that a pedagogical perspective provided the potential to
pry open academic subject theory to critical evaluation. (236-37)
In other words, Fitzgerald's historical research demonstrates that evidence of grammar
instruction does not necessarily lead to or correspond with the disciplinary imaginary's
definition of "current-traditional" pedagogical practices. Metahlstorical critique helps us
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understand, value, and build upon Fitzgerald's contribution in the context of other
historiographic practices and prevailing narratives about CTRP.
Finally, Berlin's and Connors' historical work rests on the assumption that
"[d]uring the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries, composition theory
and pedagogy were overwhelmingly shaped by one great force: textbooks" (Connors,
"Textbooks" toO). But, as Robin Varnum's research reminds us, this claim rests on
another problematic assumption: that textbooks were always used in writing instruction.
In Fencing with Words, Varnum provides a compelling counter-history to those histories
that depend on textbook evidence. She takes as her subject the Amherst 1-2 writing
program, overseen by Theodore Baird, which used no textbooks whatsoever and
positioned student writing at the center of the classroom. Much of her evidence stems
from archival research at the institutional site, as well as collection of oral histories from
Baird's students and colleagues. She argues that the Amherst program, and others like it,
"has been overlooked" because "it flourished during a period when the teaching of
composition was supposed ... to have been governed by an obstructive 'currenttraditional paradigm'" (7). Further, Varnum argues that "the kinds of materials historians
have chosen to examine and the lenses through which they have examined them have
kept them from seeing some of what was to be seen" - such as sites of writing instruction
that lacked textbooks" (7). Metahistorical critique brings Varnum's history into high
relief when set against prevailing narratives about CTRP. Specifically, Varnum's focus
on absence highlights the disciplinary imaginary's dependence upon "found" and
"accessible" materials, a dependence that obscures the fact that historical archives contain
both present/locatable and absent/lost beliefs, values, and practices. Varnum's history
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contributes to the discipline, then, not only in that it adds to our general knowledge of
composition history, but also in that it reminds us that we need to continually pay
attention to absences or gaps in our knowledge and to always maintain distinctions
between real (often absent) practices and the disciplinary imaginary, which is built out of
available artifacts. When we do this, I argue, we move closer toward "releas[ing]
ourselves from" those problematic "pattern[s]" of representation of textbooks, allowing
for new and surprising interpretations of pedagogical practice that values the everyday
challenges faced by teachers and students of composition.

Teachers, Students, and Prevailing Narratives of CTRP
Just as certain institutional and textbook examples become folded into narratives
about CTRP as "real" signifiers of bad theory and practice, so too do teachers and
students. In this section and the next, I conduct a metahistorical critique of prevailing and
competing narratives about CTRP in order to explicate how the discipline has represented
teachers and students and with what theoretical and material consequences. Many
disciplinary historians have brought students and teachers to the forefront of their
histories to demonstrate the marginalized roles they have historically occupied due to
unethical cultural, institutional, and administrative views and actions. However, my
analysis reveals that these same historians - who hope their scholarship will promote
inclusive and ethical approaches to students and teachers - have often composed histories
that unwittingly reinscribe the same patterns of injustice that they hope to work against.
This becomes especially clear when examining histories that forward prevailing
narratives about CTRP, in that the historiography contained therein promotes an ideology
of the discipline in which students and teachers are presented as individuals who either
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lack agency or are acted upon by outside agents (including culture, institutions, and even
textbooks). When teachers are described as having agency according to prevailing
narratives, their actions tend to be described negatively. And students who attain agency
in our histories are most often depicted as resentful or resistant to the classroom
environment. In my analysis of prevailing and competing narratives of CTRP in this
section and the next, I maintain that the discipline's ability to treat teachers, teaching,
students, and student writing fairly and to represent them ethically in our scholarship (in
the present, past, and future) depends, in part, on our willingness to interrogate,
acknowledge, and manipulate both the possibilities and limitations inherent to our
narratives about CTRP.
Brereton's The Origins o/Composition Studies provides one example of a history
that composes a prevailing narrative about CTRP in relation to students and teachers.
This collection was and continues to be an important contribution to composition history
in that Brereton reproduces primary materials previously only available in archives including original composition textbooks, institutional surveys, student writing,
examinations, and journal articles - for the discipline's use and analysis. Brereton clearly
intends to challenge some popular misconceptions about composition's history: He notes,
for example, that "early composition theorists and practitioners were very aware of what
they were doing, and often made quite conscious choices .... And the documents display a
great deal of diversity, which may belie the notion that things were so uniform - or so
uniformly bad" (xiv). However, Brereton's historiography in the introduction to the book
conflates the disciplinary imaginary with the beliefs, values, and practices specified
within these documents and belies his earlier qualifications because he repeats a version
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of the prevailing CTRP narrative. He connects CTRP with the loss of a classical tradition
in American colleges, writing: "This book chronicles the move from composition at
every stage of a student's college career to composition confined to the first year, and
from a saturation in a rhetorical tradition of some two thousand years to its replacement
with a new, streamlined curriculum which ... emphasized error correction and the five
modes of discourse" (17). Continuing, Brereton connects the shift to CTRP with the
writing teacher, who can best be described as "the accomplice of the authorities, or in fact
the enforcer .... a stem taskmaster skilled in rooting out falsehood and cant" whose
pedagogy was largely "adversarial" (19). Students, according to Brereton, "were
expected to listen, to be kept under control, and to be passive learners" (18), performing
"in fear of the teacher's scorn" (19).
Although Brereton does not dwell for long on these characterizations, the effects
of his historiography are important to consider: Because he fails to distinguish between
the specific contexts in which these documents were produced and the disciplinary
imaginary, which allows for and supports prevailing narratives ofCTRP, Brereton's
historiography supports an ideology of composition that represents teachers, on the one
hand, as agents of institutional desires who act out what little authority they have in
opposition to students. Students, on the other hand, are characterized as passive subjects,
acted upon by both teachers and institutions. While Brereton is careful to qualify most of
the other claims he makes in the introduction to Origins, his subscription to prevailing
narratives about CTRP in the case of teachers and students demonstrates, first, how
difficult it is to move away from these narratives in meaningful ways even when one's
intention is to highlight the specificity of the archive. And second, this subscription to
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prevailing narratives about CTRP illustrates the consequences of our habits of
representation: Because Brereton's contribution to composition studies is widely cited
and highly regarded in the discipline, his repetition of problematic patterns of
representation has the potential to make these characterizations of students and teachers
appear "natural" to those who take his historiography for granted.
By the time Origins was published, many of the stereotypes of teachers and
students in the above passages were already in place. For example, in much of his work,
Connors attributes the rise of CTRP to the demands made on composition teachers by the
individualized attention to students required in the teaching of writing (in contrast to
oratorical instruction, which could be given in lectures to large groups of students), as
well as by increased college enrollment. In Composition-Rhetoric, he claims that
"Composition courses of the latter nineteenth century became hells of overwork that

drove away all those teachers who were upwardly mobile and ground down those who
were not" (189, emphasis added). In The Methodical Memory, Crowley arrives at similar
conclusions, writing that CTRP attained popularity because of this overwork. She
explains that "if the theory of composition used were highly formalized [with CTRP], the
work of grading papers could be simplified, since harried teachers could ignore the
content of their students' themes and would only need to assess the degree of their
conformity to the formal features prescribed by the lectures and the textbook" (11,
emphasis added). Between these two passages, Crowley and Connors construct a familiar
narrative that clearly connects prevailing narratives of CTRP with teachers: Institutional
demands create "hells of overwork" that require teachers, in their "harried" state, to
scramble for "simplified" solutions that they can "prescribe" to students. In these
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passages CTRP seems to have been born out of teachers' ignorance of rhetorical theory
and lack of agency (or creativity) when confronted by the institution's new standards.
Many have substantiated Connors' and Crowley'S contention that composition
teachers around the tum of the century experienced an increased workload, in part
because they had to teach writing instead of oral rhetoric to large numbers of students. I
am not disputing this fact. What I would like to call attention to, here and elsewhere, is
how Connors' and Crowley'S historiography supports a particularly negative depiction of
teachers, a depiction that ultimately engenders theoretical and material consequences for
the contemporary discipline. Connors and Crowley intend, in this passage and others like
it, to establish that there is a historical precedent for the unethical labor practices that can
be seen today in composition studies (and, for that matter, in the university at large).
However, because they describe composition courses in the late-nineteenth century as a
form of "hell" and teachers as eager to escape, Connors' and Crowley'S historiography
also promotes an ideology of composition that represents teachers as passive subjects
who would acquiesce to teach writing under these circumstances only because they had
no other choice. This conception of composition delimits how the discipline perceives
teachers' desires and also how it defines ''work.'' Connors and Crowley, in other words,

speakfor teachers and impose their own values onto diverse figures who occupy very
different moments in history than our own. When our historiography constructs
representations of teachers as passive, as Connors' and Crowley's do, this representation
carries over into our contemporary interpretations of the needs and desires of teachers.
This representation, therefore, works rhetorically to keep teachers in their often-already
marginalized locations in the academy.
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Susan Miller disagrees with Connors' and Crowley's claims about the relationship
between changing institutional demographics and the rise of CTRP, but metahistorical
critique shows that Miller's historiography ultimately forwards similarly problematic
representations, in this case of students and student writing. In an effort to highlight the
oppressive potential of institutions, especially in relation to students, Miller argues in
Textual Carnivals that the rise of CTRP occurred as a deliberate effort (made by an
unspecified but reprehensible agent) to stratify and exclude students within the new
professional culture of the university. Against Connors' and Crowley'S explanations,
Miller writes:
We consequently mistake a cause for a result if we attribute new
composition assignments and textbook treatments of them to numbers of
students. Instead, those numbers and textbooks precisely fit the purposes
for establishing such a course at all. Both the earliest 'theory' behind
composition and its practical implications divided written texts from
actual writing situations. (61)
Indeed, for Miller, it is the (malicious) academy that, through its institutionalization of
FYC and promotion ofCTRP, "strip[s] from new students and a nation of unschooled
potential writers their needs and desires to create significant pieces of writing" (55), that
"reduce [s]" student writing to "objects of inconsequentiality" (59), and, in turn, abandons
student writing, which is "left in its self-contained world of textual features, where its
consequences are already limited to intransitive matters of 'quality'" (198). In other
words, because Miller takes the existence and effects of CTRP for granted, she portrays
student writing as though it can have no value if it is the product of CTRP, and she
depicts students as helpless subjects upon whom CTRP works.

28

28 The problems I note here about Miller's representation of students and student writing are exacerbated by
the fact that she never analyzes actual student writing in Textual Carnivals.
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Miller's historiography results in a debilitating representation of students:
Because students are represented as passive, it is the institution that must change; until
the institution acts differently, students will continue to produce poor or
"inconsequential" writing. The problem with this depiction has not to do with whether or
not the institution has power (indeed it does), but rather with the fact that, within Miller's
historiographic framing, students can and never will have power, which therefore
devalues any writing that they happen to produce?9 Further, Miller describes those
individuals who lack an education as a "nation" of "potential" writers - according to her
historiography, until they have been "schooled," individuals are not and cannot be
authors. Again, because the institution is depicted as having an overwhelming degree of
power, the individual who writes - as well as what he or she composes -lacks value.
Commendably, Miller intends her history to rescue students from exclusionary values,
practices, and beliefs; this goal is shared by many scholars in composition. But despite
her best intentions, Miller's descriptions of students and student writing, in these
passages and elsewhere, ultimately reify these problematic values, practices, and beliefs
because they rely on prevailing narratives about CTRP.
Alternative Representations: Teachers, Students, and Competing Narratives of
CTRP

Several historians offer compelling alternatives to Connors', Crowley'S, and
Miller's characterizations of students and teachers. I argue that these characterizations are
available to these historians because they resist merging the real with the disciplinary
imaginary; in maintaining the distinction, historians compose competing narratives about

29 Importantly, when Miller writes about students in contemporary composition, she attributes and even
emphasizes their agency as writers. See for example "How Writers Evaluate Their Own Writing."
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CTRP. In this section, I analyze competing narratives within the context of prevailing
narratives about CTRP in order to demonstrate, via metahistorical critique, how
alternative representations of teachers and students can produce different material and
theoretical consequences for the discipline and its agents. Although these competing
narratives are not always effective at fully revising problematic patterns of representation,
I intend for this analysis to show how a self-conscious interrogation of these patterns is
an important first step in eventually subverting or disrupting them in lasting ways.
Susan Kates' Activist Rhetorics and American Higher Education, 1885-1937
provides alternatives to prevailing representations of teachers and pedagogical practice
during the late-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. Through her analysis of three
groups of educators working at markedly different sites - Mary Augusta Jordan of Smith
College, Hallie Quinn Brown of Wilberforce University, and Josephine Colby, Helen
Norton, and Louis Budenz of Brookwood Labor College - Kates provides compelling
evidence that demonstrates that rhetorical education likely occurred during the
Progressive Era, a time period that other historians such as Connors dismiss as dominated
by CTRP. Additionally, she uses this claim to make a clear distinction between the
disciplinary imaginary and actual people and practices. She explains that ''these educators
drew attention to language 'deviations' of their students in ways that did not simply
divide language practices into 'correct' and 'incorrect' English .... they recognized and
respected the ways that language is tied to a sense of self and community" (15). Because
she makes this distinction clear, Kates portrays teachers as having agency and good
intentions. Kates' descriptions of Jordan, Brown, Colby, Norton, and Budenz stand in
stark contrast to Connors' and Crowley'S descriptions of pedagogy and teachers around
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the tum of the century: These educators, according to Kates, are deliberate in their
pedagogical approaches, knowledgeable about the workings of language, and sensitive to
their students' needs and positions in the world. In short, Kates' historiography constructs
an interpretation of these educators that understands them, generally, within their
historical contexts rather than her own.
Like Kates, Beth Ann Rothermel's history of writing instruction at Westfield
State Normal School offers a generous interpretation of faculty values, beliefs, and
practices about writing throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.
Rothermel, like Kates, describes Westfield's teachers as thoughtful, intelligent, and
considerate of their students. Further, she describes professors as having support within
an institutional context that promoted "[a] faith in the role of teachers, regardless of
gender, as molders of community" - which she argues encouraged writing instructors to
adopt active roles in the education of their students (39). Rothermel's historiography
conveys that teachers had agency at Westfield Normal: She explains that, once the
Massachusetts Board of Education pressured the school to change the curriculum so that
it would be more "professional" and "practical," the facility resisted - they

followed directives only in part, designing courses in composition that
continued to require study in the 'practical art' of rhetoric .... They also
continued to promote student involvement in extracurricular activities ....
Westfield instructors of the late-nineteenth century strove to prepare
future teachers not just to 'write and speak,' but to feel 'at home ... on the
platform.' ("A Sphere of Noble Action" 54, emphasis added)
Westfield's faculty, according to Rothermel, "design," "promote," and "strive" - verbs
that imply the kind of creativity and agency that is required in everyday teaching, in the
nineteenth century and today.
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Some, such as Melissa Ianetta, might argue that Kates' and Rothermel's
historiography constructs an "ideal" pedagogue, a representation that could be flawed in
and of itself. In "Disciplinarity, Divorce, and the Displacement of Labor Issues," Ianetta
warns against those "stories of disciplinarity" that become "emancipation narratives"
through their historiography (69). I agree: without critical analysis, "ideal"
representations will produce new problems and gaps in our knowledge. While we should
continue to conduct critical analyses of all historiography, it is important to recognize the
rhetorical consequences of assuming, with Kates and Rothermel, that teachers have (and
have had) agency. I argue that this assumption is important and correct, not only because
it acknowledges complex workings of power, but also because it encourages multiple and
diverse interpretations of contemporary teachers. In assuming that teachers have some
degree of agency, intelligence, and creativity, we not only add complexity to our
historical knowledge, but we also add complexity to the disciplinary imaginary, which
helps make distinctions between real practices and the imaginary more obvious. This
added complexity, in turn, encourages compositionists to engage in new patterns of
listening to and representing teachers in the past and in the present, which can reshape
our narratives in ways that will subvert, rather than reinscribe, systems of
marginalization.
Students and student writing also attain complexity in histories that highlight the
differences between the real and the disciplinary imaginary and produce narratives that
compete with those such as Miller's. Those historians who have examined actual student
writing in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have found that writing is not
"insignificant" to the students themselves, nor is it "'self-contained" or "intransitive," as
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Miller assumes it to be. The descriptors exemplified in Miller's work (and others)
devalue student writing as unreal and assume that the "practical implementations" of
CTRP "divide[] written texts from actual writing situations" (Miller 61, emphasis added).
While Miller intends for this characterization to highlight the oppressive potential of
academic institutions, it in fact has the rhetorical effect of delimiting the possible and
appropriate desires of students and overlooks evidence of these desires in student writing
itself. Thus, it seems safe to say - and indeed, metahistorical analysis of competing
narratives shows - that the desires outlined by Miller and others likely represent our
desires, not those of students in the past or present. Just as problematic representations of
teachers and pedagogical practice perpetuate the systems of oppression that scholars in
contemporary composition hope to disrupt, so too do flawed representations of students
and student writing.
In "Thinking Like That," Kathleen Welsch finds evidence that student writing
was relevant to and meaningful for students in the nineteenth century, even as she
measures this evidence against the disciplinary imaginary. Through a close examination
ofthe writing of Mahala Pearson Jay, a 22-year-old female student at Oberlin and
Antioch Colleges, Welsch contends that "Mahala no more wrote in an academic vacuum
than students do today; the context of her time provided her compositions with a logic
relative of her historical moment as well as her choices as a writer" (16). Further,
although Mahala's expository writing "offers no personal disclosures about her life or
interests," this does not mean that it is "unengaged" or "impersonal," descriptors used by
Connors to describe the effects of CTRP on student writing in his 1987 essay, "Personal
Writing Assignments" (Welsch 19-20). Welsch's interpretation disrupts popular

151

assumptions about students and student writing as framed by prevailing CTRP narratives.
I argue that because Welsch presents student writing as engaged and personal, her
historiography constructs a representation of students themselves as having value - a goal
that clearly aligns with those of contemporary compositionists. Welsch's analysis
illustrates an important strategy with which historians might rhetorically maintain a
separation between actual practice and the imaginary.
Some historians, including JoAnn Campbell and Sue Carter Simmons, interpret
students as having agency through close analysis of their writing. Both of these historians
examine student writing at Radcliffe, and both conclude that female students' writing
exemplifies personal agency; they do not agree, however, about how this agency can or
should be interpreted. Metahistorical critique of these histories allows us to compare how
and why these authors construct their arguments in different but related ways, to
acknowledge and interrogate the disciplinary values that these arguments uphold, to
recognize gaps in our knowledge, and to isolate the limits and possibilities of our current
historiographic practices.
In "Controlling Voices: The Legacy of English A at Radcliffe College 18831917," Campbell conducts a textual analysis of themes written by three Radcliffe
students, Dorothea, Annie, and Mary Lee, in order to examine these women's
experiences of writing and pedagogy at Radcliffe. She finds that two of the women,
Dorothea and Mary, both recognize and respond negatively to the "banking theory of
education," which was "alive and well at the turn ofthe century" (475). The awareness
Campbell ascribes to these students encourages us to understand students as having
agency in response to composition pedagogy; however, because Campbell's
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interpretation is couched within prevailing narratives of CTRP. Her reading of one of
Mary's essays draws on common assumptions about the effects ofCTRP on student
writing:
In this lucidly angry essay, completely covering several pages and all the
margins, Mary articulated her needs as a student: to be allowed to give
opinions in a voice she felt expressed her individuality, and to receive a
response to the content of her writing. The emotional pain of English A is
reflected in her language of physical abuse, "bumped and battered."
Although she didn't turn this draft in, she saved it along with her other
themes, a record of the effects of an emphasis on correctness and what the
student lacks. (475, emphasis added)
On the one hand, because Campbell's reading is backed by factual evidence that
students at Radcliffe did not meet regularly in conferences, her interpretation of these
students' writing seems plausible and affirms the repressive potential of teachers and
institutions that composition has come to recognize and resist. On the other hand,
however, Campbell's interpretation leads to a limited understanding of students and
student writing: In the passage above, Campbell assumes that because Mary's writing
"completely cover[s] several pages and all the margins," Mary is angry. Here, it seems
that Campbell relies on the disciplinary imaginary to help her make sense of Mary's
anger, which leads her to interpret Mary as a student who is resistant to the teacher, who,
in his "emphasis on correctness and what the student lacks," prevents her from "giv[ing]
opinions in a voice she felt expressed her individuality" and ignores "the content of her
writing" (475). Mary is also angry because the institution and first-year composition
"abuse" her and force her to save, but not turn in, the draft. While Campbell may indeed
be correct in her interpretation of Mary, the fact that this interpretation so closely matches
the representation of students and student writing in prevailing narratives about CTRP
should prompt us to consider other readings and the conclusions to which they lead.
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Simmons' interpretations of student writing in "Radcliffe Responses to Harvard
Rhetoric" offers an example of an alternative reading. In contrast to Campbell, Simmons
finds that student writing - even theme-writing that meets "standard" academic
expectations - is subversive. Simmons evaluates the writing of one student, Annie, which
was produced in multiple composition courses over the span of her college career.
Simmons' analysis aligns with Welsch's contention that what we would label "academic"
writing today is not impersonal or unengaged; Annie's acquisition of so-called academic
discourse, Simmons argues, allowed her to "[find] ways of writing with authority that
positioned [Barrett] Wendell [her professor] as her equal. Annie found ways to integrate
successfully her commitment to teaching and her observations and experiences as a
student with the academic writing requirements she had to meet" (281). Because her
conclusions are similar to Campbell's but give more credence to student writing
according to the terms set by the students themselves, Simmons' analysis provides an
alternative explanation for student responses to pedagogical practice and institutions,
which in tum leads to a more nuanced understanding of composition history and
contemporary students.
Although Simmons and Campbell agree that students at Radcliffe were resistant
to institutional and pedagogical constraints, Simmons' refusal to confuse actual practicein this case academic prose - with the disciplinary imaginary, which assumes that
academic prose is not personal, allows her to produce a more complex interpretation of
students and student agency. While Simmons' interpretation may not ultimately be
correct, and it does not necessarily discount Campbell's interpretation (since after all, we
can never know the true desires or intentions of students), I argue, as I did in relation to
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teachers above, that Simmons' historiographic strategy is significant here. Like Kates'
and Rothermel's rhetorical strategies, Simmons' historiography forwards an assumption
that students have agency and act on that agency in complex ways that do not necessarily
match what the collective disciplinary imaginary suggests. Because Simmons promotes
this assumption through her historiography, she refuses the folding ofthe real into the
imaginary and advances other ways of thinking, reading, and writing about students and
student writing. In turn, the discipline comes one step further to releasing itself from
problematic patterns of representation, especially those perpetuated within prevailing
narratives of CTRP.

Conclusion: Releasing Ourselves from the Pattern
In dissecting disciplinary historiography across texts and over time, my analysis
demonstrates that prevailing narratives about CTRP have served important rhetorical
purposes for the discipline: Many of our early historians, including Berlin, Connors,
Crowley, and Miller, were motivated by the potential ways in which the writing of
history could help the field reject potentially oppressive pedagogical and rhetorical
practices. As the discipline continued uncovering its history, prevailing narratives about
CTRP helped composition highlight and move away from problematic practices. My own
goals align with these early historians: I too hope that my scholarship will support and
advance ethical values, beliefs, and practices.
This critique also shows that prevailing narratives about CTRP forward
problematic representations of teachers and students. These representations - which
neglect multiple and varied actual practice as they describe nineteenth- and twentiethcentury composition classrooms as "hells of overwork," teachers as "stem taskmasters,"
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and student writing as "objects of inconsequentiality" - produce serious material
consequences for students and teachers today. If we fail to intervene in these
historiographic practices, we participate in the continued marginalization of students and
teachers, especially those who lack institutional, economic, and/or cultural power.
Although more recent historians, including Welsch, Kates, Rothermel, Campbell, and
Simmons, have begun to revise our historiographic practices in meaningful ways, the
competing narratives about and against CTRP that they produce often continue to rely on
prevailing narratives - the same ones that have produced problematic ideologies of the
discipline. This reliance exemplifies both the difficulty of maintaining a distinction in our
historiography between real practices and the disciplinary imaginary, as well as the
power of prevailing narratives, which seem to demand that new scholarship be
"intelligible" according to its habits of representation.
The process of metahistorical critique exemplified in this chapter can help
contemporary compositionists recognize, isolate, and revise the discipline's
historiographic practices. Further, this process can help future historians of composition
disrupt those practices that produce marginalizing effects, harness those practices that
promote social justice, and foster a greater awareness of how historiography works as a
rhetorical practice with significant political and material consequences.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE QUESTION OF FIRST -Y}:AR COMPOSTION

Just as references to current-traditional rhetoric and pedagogy (CTRP) in our
histories often stand in for, or point toward, other disciplinary concerns, so too do
references to first-year composition (FYC).i For historians of rhetoric and composition,
FYC represents a locus of origin for the discipline, sometimes even standing in for
composition writ large. Additionally, FYC has helped perpetuate long-standing debates
in our histories and elsewhere about whether or not the course should be universally
required. Although disciplinary conversations and debates surrounding FYC are quite
familiar to contemporary scholars, I argue throughout this chapter that FYC's centrality
to particular threads of composition history ultimately limits how contemporary
composition defines "writing," "writing instruction," and its "work."
In this chapter, I argue that first-year writing courses' centrality to the discipline's
prevailing historical narratives carries material and intellectual consequences for students,
teachers, and scholars of composition - especially given recent calls in our scholarship

1 When I refer to FYC, I refer to introductory writing courses intended for fIrst- or second-year students at
the college level; for the sake of language diversity, I use "fIrst-year course" and "freshman course"
somewhat interchangeably with FYC throughout this chapter. However, I am aware that these designations
do not, and cannot, account for the diversity of writing programs or introductory writing courses
institutionalized within the United States and abroad; I use the designation self-consciously as an
inadequate but necessary "umbrella" term for the prevailing historical narrative that I describe and
challenge throughout the chapter.
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for the internationalization of the discipline (see for example Christiane Donahue, Bruce
Homer and Min-Zhan Lu, among others). Because most contemporary disciplinary
histories focus on the teaching of English composition in the United States from the latenineteenth century on, I argue first that rhetoric and composition has problematically
limited the purview of its "work" (by which I mean research and scholarship) to sites of
English-only, college-level writing and writing instruction in the U.S .. Second, I contend
that rhetoric and composition's histories have implicitly defined "writing" as an
abstracted, monolingual, institutionalized, pedagogically produced and reader-oriented
practice relevant only to Americans. And finally, I argue that the discipline's historical
accounts define ''writing instruction" as a practice that occurs only within formal
institutions of higher education and usually in the context ofFYC, employs arhetorical
pedagogical methods, and produces inherently negative effects for students and teachers.
Together, these implicit (and sometimes explicit) definitions set rhetorical constraints on
the ''work,'' ''writing,'' and ''writing instruction" that can be considered "intelligible"
within contemporary disciplinary discourse.
In the sections that follow, I demonstrate how disciplinary histories of rhetoric and
composition have habitually traced the discipline's origins to Harvard in 1885, have
assumed the centrality ofFYC, and have used this assumption to produce limiting
definitions of our key terms. I use specific examples from our most widely cited histories
to illustrate how the discipline's historiography has constructed a central role for FYC
and has helped maintain debates from which contemporary scholars have made a
concerted effort to move away. Then, using examples from recently published histories of
composition, I contend that these definitions can only be revised and broadened through a
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troubling of the discipline's habits of historiography. And finally, in an effort to dislodge
these problematic assumptions and sketch out possible revisions to contemporary
definitions of "writing," ''writing instruction," and composition's "work," I propose that
composition scholars engage in a systematic troubling of its historiographic practice
because the discipline's current "common sense" results in material and intellectual
problems for contemporary students, teachers, and scholars. Through this troubling of
disciplinary historiography, I contend, composition can better account for a variety of
educational contexts, a diverse range of students and teachers, and can more consistently
acknowledge the wide range of research outside of FYC that contemporary scholars
already undertake.
Harvard = FYC = Composition: An Equation that Doesn't Add Up
Our most frequently cited histories locate the discipline's origins at Harvard in or
around 1885, the year that Harvard began requiring all freshmen to take English A, a
year-long writing course? John Brereton traces the contemporary discipline to this point
of origin because the course represents the "first modem composition program" (8).
Brereton argues that the course was important not because it was the first time
composition courses were offered in higher education (it wasn't), but because Harvard's
program was the first writing program, and it successfully "allied the modem university
with a new emphasis on English and ... raise[ d] writing and English literature to the level
of more hallowed studies like mathematics and classics" (8-9).
While I don't dispute the facts presented by Brereton, I am interested here in
accounting for how our assumptions about Harvard's influence have produced the
historical narratives about FYC most familiar to us today, and with what consequences.
2

For about a decade before 1885, the course was required of all sophomores.
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This tracing of the modem discipline to Harvard is also often justified through a reference
to Harvard's influence as a "leader of the time in curricular reform" (Berlin, Rhetoric and
Reality 20). The logic proceeds as follows: Because Harvard instituted a single course in
composition as a general-education requirement in the late-nineteenth century, and
because Harvard was the most influential institution of higher education in the United
States, first-year courses in composition were developed at colleges all across the
country. Moreover, the logic suggests, the content of these courses and the pedagogical
approach(es) used at Harvard were imitated invariably across institutions over time.
I challenge this logic by claiming that composition's origins and content are
provisional and are ultimately determined by our historiographic choices. Using
metahistorical critique, I outline below how our prevailing narratives have produced this
logic and "normalized" it, making it available for frequent (mostly unchallenged)
repetition in contemporary scholarship. In the analysis that follows, I question the
centrality of Harvard and English A, as well as FYC, to our understanding of the
discipline'S history.
We can see how Harvard's influence came to be taken for granted in our histories
by examining portions of Albert Kitzhaber's, Robert Connors', and James Berlin's
histories alongside one another. In Rhetoric in American Colleges, Kitzhaber writes that
Harvard's English A was "the parent of all latter courses in freshman composition .... For
the remaining years of the nineteenth century it was regarded as a model course in
rhetoric and widely imitated throughout the United States" (61, emphasis added).
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Likewise, Connors' attention to Harvard in the introduction of CompositionRhetoric demonstrates his perception that the contemporary discipline originated at
Harvard and can be traced from that point of origin. In the section devoted to the
Consolidating period of composition-rhetoric in America, during which
the theories and methods of composition teaching were consolidated in
colleges," the only institution described in any detail is Harvard,
ostensibly because English A became "the prototype for the required
freshman course in composition that within fifteen years would be
standard at almost every college in America. (11, emphasis added)
And in Rhetoric and Reality, Berlin uses the same language as Connors when he
describes Harvard's English program as the "prototype" for the contemporary English
department (20). But unlike Connors, who sees Harvard's "consolidating" influence as
problematic because it "radically simplified" a previously complex "generation of
competing ideas and theories" about writing (Composition-Rhetoric 12), Berlin portrays
the early instantiation of the English department at Harvard more optimistically in that he
claims that its "initial purpose ... was to provide instruction in writing" (20, emphasis
added). While Berlin agrees with most historians that the institution of entrance exams in
writing and English A at Harvard was intended to appease the public and act as a stopgap
for the growing number of middle-class students who desired and were gaining access to
a college education, he ultimately sees English A as the last vestige of the older (but
presumably better) classical curriculum which held that extensive instruction in rhetoric
was a necessary component of the curriculum for college students. In fact, English A
provides for Berlin evidence that, at Harvard, "writing [was considered] so central to the
new elective curriculum ... that ... by 1894 [it] was the only requirement except for a
modem language, and by 1897 was the only required course in the curriculum" (20,
emphasis added).
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In addition to a near-universal locating of composition's disciplinary origins at
Harvard and within the context of FYC, historians have often conflated FYC with the
discipline as a whole. Within the context of the recent history of the field - by which I
mean the development of composition since the 1950s - our tendency to produce this
conflation is understandable: After all, the establishment of the Conference on College
Composition and Communication (CCCC) in 1949 was grounded upon the question of
how best to approach the first-year course, which at the time varied between required
freshman-level communications and composition courses. And 1963 marks for many the
beginning of the contemporary discipline in large part because it was the first year when
CCCC was devoted primarily to composition and rhetoric, rather than speech
communications (see Kitzhaber "4C"). Stephen North explains: "This group [CCCC]
could then, as now, claim an institutional power base of considerable potential. The
freshman course was something nearly all of the rapidly increasing number of college
students would take, and represented in many cases the largest chunk of an English
department's budget" (14).
I am not arguing against the realities of FYC that grounded our contemporary
evolution or to suggest that teaching is not a central part of our work. Rather, my purpose
in outlining this history is to illustrate how our historiography is at least partially
responsible for the rhetorical possibilities available to us today in making sense of the
past, present and future of composition. According to this account, then, it seems that our
contemporary efforts to professionalize the discipline have been substantiated as a result
of the apparently ubiquitous requirement of FYC. Composition managed to achieve status
as a "legitimate" academic discipline as a result of these mid-century developments, all of
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which were premised upon the existence of the first-year course; this fact has led scholars
documenting the discipline's history to conflate FYC with the discipline as a whole.
But locating the discipline's origins at Harvard and conflating composition with
FYC results in particularly narrow ways of thinking, reading, and writing about the
"work" of composition and posits narrow definitions of what counts as "writing" and
"writing instruction" in our scholarship. In questioning Harvard's and FYC's centrality, I
align myself with David Russell, who argues that "a narrow focus on the history of
composition courses may ... credit freshman English with a larger or more cohesive
effect than it has ever had" (32). And this narrow focus has important consequences.
Going beyond Russell, I mean in this chapter to interrogate not only the basic assumption
that our discipline is best historicized in terms ofFYC as it was first established at
Harvard, but also to challenge the assumption that our discipline is best historicized in
terms of English-only, college-level writing instruction in the U.S. 3 Instead, I use
metahistorical critique to suggest that the outlining of a more expansive past - one that
acknowledges multilingual writers, international institutions, and formal and informal
sites of writing instruction - enables a more productive future for the discipline.
Historiography and the "Abolition" Debate

When historians conflate the introductory course with composition as a whole,
they do so by constructing FYC as central to - if not comprising the entirety of - the
writing curriculum at most academic institutions. With this conflation, composition's
"work" appears to be grounded on the existence ofFYC, which misguides scholars'
3 In fact, some of the rhetorical problems that I address throughout this chapter are complicated by the fact
that scholars rarely distinguish between "disciplinarity" - an abstraction (see my definition in chapter 1)and departments or programs, which are locally designated "units," materially grounded in specific
institutional contexts. Although I try throughout this chapter to remain aware of and maintain this
distinction, I run into problems because the histories I examine often fail to make this distinction.
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attention toward debates about the course's legitimacy. Specifically, these debates center
on whether or not first-year courses should be required of all university students. To be
sure, contemporary scholars have urged composition to move beyond these debates. And
while we can see some progress in this regard in recent publications, especially
scholarship that proposes a shift in curricular and disciplinary focus from FYC to vertical
"writing studies" programs (see Charles Bazerman, S. Miller, Doug Downs and Elizabeth
Wardle), I argue that we cannot effectively move beyond these debates until we
recognize - and dislodge - their cementation within our histories and, thus, within the
discipline's prevailing narratives about FYC.
Because our histories have primarily focused on documenting the development
and evolution of freshman writing since the late-nineteenth century on, disciplinary
historians have used their work to contribute, in no small part, to these debates. In order
to demonstrate how these debates show up in our histories through particular
characterizations of FYC, I present textual examples from three of composition's bestknown and widely cited historians: Berlin, Connors, and Sharon Crowley. These excerpts
show how our most popular histories participate in the rhetorical production of a history
that remains locked on Harvard and introductory writing, sustaining what some might
call an excessive attention to debates about FYC's requirement as a general education
course. I use this metahistorical critique to argue, ultimately, that historians' participation
in the "abolition" debate has constrained the discursive sphere in profound and
consequential ways, especially in relation to those definitions of disciplinary "work," as
well as "writing" and "writing instruction," that are currently available to
compositionists.
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James Berlin introduces Rhetoric and Reality by characterizing the first-year
writing course as one that "responds quickly to changes in American society as a whole,
with literacy ... serving as the intermediary between the two - between the writing course
and larger social developments" (5). He concludes the book with the following
characterization:
Writing instruction has been dramatically transformed in the past twentyfive years - a transformation that is salutary and ongoing. We have begun
to see that writing courses are not designed exclusively to prepare students
for the workplace, although they certainly must do that. Writing courses
prepare students for citizenship in a democracy, for assuming their
political responsibilities, whether as leaders or simply as active
participants. Writing courses also enable students to learn something about
themselves, about the often-unstated assumptions on which their lives are
built. In short, the writing course empowers students as it advises in ways
to experience themselves, others, and the material conditions of their
existence. (188-89)
Berlin's description is an optimistic one. For him, freshman composition is flexible,
democratic, and adaptive to political and cultural change, and also empowering to
students.
Robert Connors does not share Berlin's optimism about what the freshman course
can or should be. In "OverworklUnderpay: Labor and the Status of Composition
Teachers since 1880," an essay that historicizes composition's - and composition
teachers' - ostensibly "low" place in the academy, Connors reinvokes the "decline and
fall" narrative (discussed in chapters 2 and 4) and summarizes the history of writing
instruction as follows: "Rhetoric has changed in a hundred years from an academic
desideratum to a grim apprenticeship, to be escaped as soon as practicable" (181). For
Connors, the change occurred, first, because the shift from oral to written rhetoric in the
mid- to late-nineteenth century created "a completdy different set of demands" for
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teachers. "Writing," he explains, "is an interior activity, and although techniques can be
used to share writing among students, a primary tnmsaction in any serious composition
course came to be seen as between the student and the teacher. Each student came to be
seen as deserving a measurable individual chunk of the teacher's time and energy" (184).
Second, because composition was one of the few courses still required in the modem
research-oriented university of the late-nineteenth century, and because college education
was becoming increasingly accessible, student numbers in the courses increased
dramatically. According to Connors, then, the freshman course demands intensive
interaction between student and teacher; it expects individual and autonomous writing
practices; and, as I discussed in the previous chapter, Connors believes that the first-year
course produces a "hellish" classroom and oppressive professional environment from
which teachers want to escape.
Crowley composes perhaps the most scathing review of the first-year course. In
the lead essay of Composition in the University, she writes:
University and college faculty imagine composition as the institutional site
wherein student subjectivity is to be monitored and disciplined. The
continuing function of the required composition course has been to insure
the academic community that its entering members are taught the
discursive behaviors and traits of character that qualify them to join the
community. The course is meant to shape students to behave, think:, write,
and speak as students rather than as the people they are, people who have
differing histories and traditions and languages and ideologies. (8-9)

While Connors focuses on the effects of FYC for teachers, Crowley focuses on the
consequences for students: according to her account, the first-year course "disciplines"
students into academic and social conformity, which ultimateiy benefits those already in
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power, in this case university and college faculty - and in other passages, the general
public and even capitalists. 4
Berlin's, Connors', and Crowley's competing characterizations of FYC reflect
many of composition's larger concerns about its "work." The tensions that inhere within
their historiographic practices embody the same tensions with which the discipline as a
whole struggles: On the one hand, according to Connors' and Crowley's accounts, the
universal requirement of FYC troubles our progressive sensibilities about the
relationships among literacy, education, and power. On the other hand, for historians such
as Berlin, the requirement of freshman composition provides us first with a site from
which we might, as individual teachers and scholars, provoke social change and, second,
a site from which we can engage in research and produce new knowledge on writing
processes and pedagogies. In other words, the progressivism valued by so many
compositionists - a value upon which the contemporary discipline has largely defined
itself - can be either oppressive or liberating, depending on various cultural, institutional,
and pedagogical contexts. Further, because our "work" - by which I mean both pedagogy
and scholarly research - has been grounded, historically, in the first-year composition
course, we have been, and continue to be, tom between either detaching ourselves from
the "low" and service-oriented image implied by a general education course or engaging
with it to support our civic-minded research and pedagogical goals.
The competing representations of FYC offered by these historians connect
directly to the positions these historians take in larger disciplinary debates about the
course's viability as a required part ofthe university curriculum. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
Although Crowley's argument may seem extreme and has been critiqued by a few such as David Russell
and Bruce Homer, others have repeated her claims without question (see Debra Hawhee's "History and the
Harbrace College Handbook" and Donna Strickland, "The Emergence of Writing Programs" for example).
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Berlin sees FYC as central to the discipline; in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures, which is
less a history of the field than a proposal for its future, he reasons:
While those in literary studies in the English department may have argued
that writing was an accomplishment easily mastered in the lower grades,
the testimony of experience in the United States ... indicated otherwise ....
Rhetorical accomplishment acquired through direct instruction in the
college classroom had always been an important fixture of the college
curriculum in the United States. (27)
In contrast, Crowley favors the abolition ofFYC as a universal requirement, arguing in
"A Personal Essay on Freshman English" that the lmiversal requirement "exploits
teachers of writing, particularly part-time teachers and graduate students" (Composition
241); "[it] exploits students" (241); "[it] has negative curricular effects" (242); "[it]
negatively affects classroom climate" (242); "[it] has negative disciplinary and
institutional effects" (243); and "[it] has negative professional effects" (243). And
Connors - who dubs the contemporary debate spurred forward by Crowley the "New
Abolitionism" - agrees that the first-year course should not be universally required,
writing, "1 still believe that we have more of a chance today than ever before to rethink in
a serious and thoroughgoing way the best methods for working on student literacy issues
and that we can do so without harming the best interests of either our students or our
colleagues" ("The Abolition Debate in Composition" 294).
Positioning these textual examples alongside one another allows for a
metahistorical view of prevailing historiographic practices, which produce
characterizations ofFYC that carry rhetorical consequences and create boundaries for
disciplinary discourse. Berlin's, Connors', and Crowley'S representations ofFYC are
strategic and enable these scholars to effectively participate in the debate about FYC's
viability as a required course; each history takes a strong and competing stance in relation
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to the debate. For Berlin, because the course authorizes student participation in public life
- a primary goal for many compositionists - it should be understood as central to the
discipline. But because Connors and Crowley understand the universal requirement of
FYC as having a marginalizing effect on students and teachers, the best way to relieve the
field of its tacit participation in such marginalization is to do away with the requirement,
allowing students to self-select the course.
Although Berlin's, Connors' and Crowley's historical accounts about FYC - and
the positions they take in relation to the debate - are probably the most familiar to
contemporary scholars, they are not the only compositionists who have used disciplinary
history to adopt clear positions in the "abolition" debate. For example, in a special issue
of CCC honoring the journal's fiftieth year of publication, Marjorie Roemer, Lucille
Schultz, and Russel Durst historicize the debate over FYC's usefulness as a required
course to ultimately defend its value. They argue that FYC is:
... our primary field site: the site which generates most of our scholarship
and research, the site where we train graduate students to be teachers, the
site that spawned the Writing Across the Curriculum and other disciplinebased writing programs, the site that inaugurated the field of basic writing.
It is where we do our most visible work and where others learn from us.
(385)
In fact, they argue, scholars who favor the elimination ofFYC as a required course
uphold a "fundamentally elitist view of the English department mission and its move
toward full disciplinarity" (378).
Maureen Daly Goggin and Steve Beatty also use an account of the discipline's
history to voice their concerns about FYC's viability. In "Accounting for Well-Worn
Grooves: Composition as a Self-Reinforcing Mechanism," they argue that FYC achieved
a flawed but dominant status within the discipline because of three closely related events
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at Harvard in the late-nineteenth century: the creation of the entrance exam, the formation
of English A, and the report of the Harvard Committee on Composition and Rhetoric
(36). Goggin and Beatty contend that "[t]here is precious little evidence that compulsory
first-year composition has ever worked" (36), but they do not support FYC's abolition;
instead, they argue that the only way composition can escape from its "groove" is
through the construction of a "parallel alternative system that focuses on the study of
literate practices" (56).
As these examples illustrate, historians promote a particular view ofFYC's place
in contemporary composition studies through strategic historiographic practices. But as I
indicated earlier, I am less interested in which side of the "abolition" debate each
historian ends up on than in how these historians construct the debate through particular
representations ofFYC and the discipline as a whole, and with what consequences. While
all of these textual examples provide compelling reasons to question or defend the value
of FYC, the debate itself is limited and limiting because it relies on an assumption that
FYC is central to understanding and resolving composition's disciplinary challenges. 5 As
such, each of these historical accounts forwards a narrow definition of what counts as the
discipline's '"work" - a definition that conflates FYC with composition as a whole and
presumes the centrality of FYC to the purview of composition scholarship. This
conflation is further solidified by the historical nature of these accounts: Because each
scholar adopts a historical perspective, it becomes difficult for readers and critics,
especially those without historical expertise, to enter the debates without adopting similar

As I note in the introduction to this dissertation, I see some of composition's contemporary challenges as
related to an increasingly diverse student population, the need for global communications, our lack of
knowledge about K -l2 and extracurricular writing practices and pedagogy, and the academy's increasing
reliance on contingent faculty.
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asswnptions about FYC's relationship to the history of composition. In order to avoid
these problems, I argue that contemporary scholars need to challenge accounts of
disciplinary history that centralize FYC, especially those that use this centrality to bolster
argwnents about the course's ultimate viability.
Because of the conflation between FYC and the discipline as a whole,
composition is conceived within many historical accounts as a discipline of writing and
writing instruction produced within and for the purposes of general education in the
United States. From this portrayal, ''writing'' can then be constructed rhetorically as an
abstract, reader-oriented process in which teachers act as passive conswners of studentgenerated prose. Implicitly, then, ''writing'' in these accounts really means student
writing, in English, produced for the purposes of institutional assessment and
advancement. Further, ''writing instruction" is narrowly conceived as a form of
composition pedagogy authorized by and for institutional purposes, produced in relation
to students, who preswnably receive and employ it for educative ends. And finally,
composition's ''work'' is portrayed in these historical accounts as clearly related to the
goings-on of FYC, which places rhetorical constraints on alternative definitions of the
''work'' that can or should be included within composition's purview.
In contrast, when historians portray FYC and, thus, the larger discipline using
more expansive definitions of composition's work - definitions that, for example,
understand FYC as one writing course among many or that look outside of higher
education for evidence of writing and writing instruction - their argwnents can go much
further in expanding the discursive sphere and promoting sustainable futures for the
discipline. With broader definitions about what counts as the discipline's work, the
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"abolition" debate becomes less relevant or useful. What's more, historically grounded
arguments about composition's purview carry more clout when refusing to focus
narrowly on FYC because they can affect disciplinary and curricular decisions beyond
the first-year course. And having more flexible definitions of what counts as disciplinary
work requires that critics wishing to engage historically grounded arguments present their
own assertions according to these larger definitions. Such an unsettling, in turn, holds the
potential not only to fundamentally change historiographic practices but also to broaden
the definitions of "work" considered intelligible within composition's discursive sphere.
FYC and Composition's "Work"

My discussion above of the connection between disciplinary historiography and
contemporary debates surrounding FYC's viability as a required university course
provides a clear example of how our prevailing narratives about FYC - narratives that
locate composition's origins at Harvard in the late-nineteenth century - maintain such
limiting debates and resist expansive definitions of what constitutes composition's
''work.'' The limitations of our discourse become particularly evident in light of the
changing contexts of higher education in the twenty-first century, in which the ''work'' of
our discipline should address global contexts of writing, multilingual students, writing
across disciplines and outside of the academy, and writing practices and pedagogy in K12 education. In this section, I move away from the "abolition" debate and concentrate
particularly on the specific intellectual and material consequences produced for our work
by uncritical repetition of prevailing narratives about FYC. I propose that the discipline
reread and reconsider its prevailing historical narratives through the lens of metahistorical
critique in order to open up the discursive sphere. This proposal is grounded in a central
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premise throughout this chapter - that we cannot alter the discipline's problematic
"common sense" in a meaningful way until we locate and disrupt those prevailing
narratives in our histories that allow for its rhetorical production and maintenance.
When our histories encourage us to trace our origins to Harvard, we are more
inclined to pursue and portray our contemporary work within the rhetorical boundaries
such a context implies: Our work makes the most "sense" if it relates to elite American
institutions of higher education and remains relevant to introductory college
composition. 6 Although my argument may seem circular in that it relies on the notion that
Harvard actually represents American higher education, this is part of my point: the
discipline's historiography encourages this kind of circularity and ignores the underlying
class and resource biases that have likely motivated compositionists to perpetuate this
association. These boundaries, therefore, pose challenges for the identification and
development of writing research that is not directly related to FYC and/or to higher
education in the U.S.; as a result, other contexts for composition research - including
pedagogical practices employed within primary and secondary schools, or writing
practices in international contexts - are more likely to be neglected or marginalized. Let
me be clear: I am not attempting to argue that such research does not get published;
rather, I am arguing that compositionists are less likely to imagine or identify research
outside of these boundaries, especially if their livelihood (tenure) depends upon swift
publication. 7 Ultimately, keeping FYC in the center when we map out the discipline's

6 Going further, one might even argue that our prevailing narratives encourage us to frame our work within
those nineteenth-century contexts of writing instruction tied to Harvard and English A.
7 Although it may seem as though I am overstating the case here, a quick examination of the last year's
issues (March 2010 - March 2011) of College English and CCC helps substantiate my point: Not counting
review essays, CCC published 19 articles related to university contexts, I article related to multilingual or
international contexts, 2 articles related to non-university contexts of writing, and 3 articles that did not
clearly fit into any of these categories. The case for College English is slightly different, in that three of the
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"territory" hinders many scholars' efforts to disrupt the conflation ofFYC with the larger
discipline. 8 And this kind of historiographic mapping further limits the success of our
efforts to broaden the work that we can conduct as composition scholars.
Byron Hawk and John Heyda have critically examined the reasons why we so
often consider FYC the center of the academic curriculum and our scholarship.
According to both Hawk and Heyda, FYC occupies a central place in disciplinary
narratives because the course represents the locus of composition's struggle for identity at
different moments in the discipline's history. As I discussed in the previous chapter about
CTRP, the emergence of required composition at Harvard in the nineteenth century often
marks for the discipline the "decline and fall" of rhetoric, which in turn enables
composition to construct a "narrative of retreat and return" (Hawk 14). According to
Hawk, the narrative is most often constructed as follows:
The early nineteenth century ... saw the devaluation of rhetoric due to
the Enlightenment elevation of logic, the value of romantic individuals,
and the rise of national literatures throughout the nineteenth century. To
fill the void left by rhetoric's displacement, composition emerged in the
late nineteenth century largely due to a literacy crisis that provided the
exigence for what has become first-year composition. But the separation
of composition from literature through the development of a separate
conference in 1949 allows a space for rhetoric's return. (14)

last six issues have been special issues devoted to a single topic (Jewish rhetorics, Chinese rhetorics, and
contingent faculty). In the issues that were not special issues, 14 articles were clearly related to university
contexts, 2 related to multilingual or international contexts of writing, 1 related to non-university contexts
of writing, and 3 that did not fit into these categories. For more on the relative invisibility of international
and multilingual issues in composition scholarship, see Christiane Donahue's 2009 article,
"'Internationalization' and Composition Studies: Reorienting the Discourse."
8 Of course, FYC's centrality in our historical narratives provides only one explanation for why
compositionists habitually focus on the classroom context. Tom Fox offers another reason that emphasizes
the complexity of this issue when he argues that "composition's constant focus on pedagogy" can be
explained by the fact ''that the classroom is where composition teachers usually feel their absence of
political power [in relation to the rest of the academy] the least. There, at least marginally more than in
other institutional arenas, we have the feeling that somehow we control the conditions of our work" (568).
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This narrative, Hawk explains, satisfies composition's "situational need to delineate a
territory ... (to define a them to exclude and an us to identify with)" (14, emphasis
original). Likewise, Heyda employs a territorial metaphor to explain the emergence of
CCCC in the 1950s and the "Fight[] over Freshman English" that ensued between
communications and composition, writing "Both [communications and composition] had
claims ... to large chunks of a vast but unstable expanse ofacademic real estate reserved
for first-year literacy courses, and wrangling over these claims was due to take center
stage" (665, emphasis added). As he explores the role played by communications in the
solidification of composition's disciplinarity, he argues that the struggle between the two
disciplines was, in effect, necessary for composition to delineate its disciplinary territory.
We can see from both Heyda's and Hawk's accounts that the discipline's
narratives about - and attitude toward - FYC are, more often than not, strategic. Much
like CTRP has become a part of the disciplinary imaginary and stands in for "real"
practices and beliefs, prevailing narratives about FYC are meant to do much more than
merely paint a factual portrait of the discipline's history. They are meant, also, to
demarcate historical eras and events against which the contemporary discipline can
measure itself in terms of origins and progress, and these narratives, as Lisa Ede points
out in Situating Composition, are motivated by the implicit and seemingly unquestionable
goal of achieving disciplinarity (17). And while I do not mean to dismiss the value of this
documentation or suggest that historians themselves are not aware of their own strategies,
I want to highlight, through metahistorical analysis, that the rhetoric of this

documentation produces intellectual and material effects for the discipline's future(s).
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When it comes to the discipline's territorialization of "academic real estate,"
prevailing narratives that position FYC in the center of our debates tether disciplinary
conceptions of the "work" of composition to English-speaking pedagogical contexts
within the American higher educational system. Hawk's description of the retreat-andreturn narrative provides a helpful case in point: First, as Hawk portrays it, the narrative
depends upon a narrow definition of "literacy crisis," a definition based on Harvard's
series of reports in the late nineteenth century documenting the "illiteracy" of the middle
class hoping to gain entrance to the school. But such a definition is obviously problematic
in that literacy, for the purposes of Harvard, means much more than the basic ability to
read and write; it values reading and writing in English only; and it assumes an audience
of a particular social class with a negative attitude toward the influx of immigrants
arriving in the United States around the turn ofthe century. This definition, in other
words, assumes an audience who would understand and identify with the "Enlightenment
elevation of logic," ''the value of romantic individuals," and the "rise of national
literatures.,,9 Second, composition's development is narrated as a direct response to
Harvard's establishment ofthe required first-year-course. In this way, we implicitly
define "writing instruction" as that which occurs as unspecialized, general-education
training within contexts of higher education. In composing and sustaining this narrative
in our histories, we limit our ability to justify ''work'' that moves outside of or beyond
these definitions. Because we keep FYC in the center when we map out the discipline's

9 For examples of test essays that illustrate this point, see David Bartholomae's "Writing on the Margins:
The Concept of Literacy in Higher Education."
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territory, our efforts to broaden the work that we can conduct and/or market as
composition scholars are restricted. 10
Our centralization ofFYC within disciplinary histories points toward another
problematic assumption related to the discipline's "work": our prevailing narratives about
FYC assume that the course is ours. Just as the abolition debate's focus on FYC
problematically constrains disciplinary discourse, prevailing historical narratives that
centralize FYC are premised on a faulty assumption that the discipline "owns" first-year
courses in writing. In fact, whether or not composition hopes to keep FYC as a mainstay
in the university and disciplinary curriculum, this assumption of ownership may prevent
us from communicating effectively, as rhetors, in response to university administration
and the general public, parties that often (also) assume ownership of FYC. Chris Fosen's
"University Courses, Not Department Courses" offers one illustrative case in point: In the
article, Fosen describes his experience as a member of the English composition faculty at
California State University-Chico who struggled, alongside other members of the
department, to resolve tensions between composition's expectations about the purposes
of and best pedagogical approaches for FYC - which defines FYC as a discipline-specific
course - and the university's expectations for FYC - which sees FYC not as a
"department course," but as a "university course," a part ofthe general education (GE)
curriculum. Fosen argues that because he and his colleagues at CSU-Chico conceived of
FYC as a part of composition only, they were unable to translate their disciplinary
discourse so it made sense within the "grammar" of GE. He argues that

10 More often than not, those scholars who do conduct research outside of university contexts are labeled as
somehow "outside of' composition (see for example Deborah Brandt, who is usually defined as a "literacy
scholar" rather than a compositionist).
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we should consider the notion that composition is a general education
course owned and often tightly controlled by the university. First-year
composition is not solely our course; it serves multiple acculturative
purposes in the university, and many discourses outside of composition
impinge on how it is taught and administrated. (12-13)
Only when "we recognize the institutional pressures to serve that writing courses may
face within general education," Fosen argues, will we "be better able to respond to them"
(13). No matter how often members ofthe discipline may resist the "service" orientation
of FYC, this orientation will always exist so long as the first-year course remains a part
of the general education curriculum. Instead of merely resisting the location ofFYC
within the academy, compositionists will be best served by working to dislodge FYC
from its central location within disciplinary discourse and (re)defining the discipline
according to alternative terms of what counts as our "work."
When we refuse to portray FYC as central to the discipline's past and present, we
can understand and evaluate FYC as a course not necessarily owned by composition, as
Fosen advocates, and therefore as not necessarily central to our ''work.'' While some may
read my call for this refusal as a call for the elimination of FYC altogether - returning us
to the tired abolition debate or moving us toward the supposed end of the discipline - I
want to clarify that this refusal would merely result in the decentralization of FYC within
disciplinary discourse, which does not mean that concerns about FYC or teaching would
or should be pushed out of the discursive sphere altogether. I argue that this kind of a
rhetorical shift can actually provide the discipline with a more flexible and therefore
more convincing base from which to claim its legitimacy. Decentering FYC allows us,
first, to achieve greater rhetorical control over our contemporary location in the academy,
and it also allows us to revise our historical narratives in meaningful ways. Specifically,
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releasing our ownership of FYC encourages us to trace our disciplinary origins not only
to Harvard but to a wide variety of educational contexts, including mono- and
multilingual environments; elementary, secondary and post-secondary institutions; and
formal and informal educational situations located within and outside of the United
States. This retracing, in turn, creates new conditions of possibility in our discourse conditions that encourage, perhaps even demand, that we acknowledge contemporary
writing and research across cultural, national, and linguistic borders.
William DeGenaro's account of the rise of the two-year college (TYC) in the
United States provides one example of an alternative educational context through which
we might (re)trace the discipline's history and also with which we can critique our
"work," especially as it relates to the "ideology of service" that haunts composition's
contemporary and historical identity. DeGenaro argues that the history of TYCs runs
parallel to the history ofFYC in four-year institutions of higher education in that both are
grounded on inherent and problematic paradoxes related to the concept of equal
opportunity; importantly, both histories point to problems related to the "low" value of
certain kinds of labor in the academy:
The origins of first-year composition and the community college follow
strikingly similar trajectories. Both composition and the two-year college
boast mythologies of equality and assistance for those entering higher
education who are perhaps less prepared for the academic rigors therein.
Yet critics have pointed out that the community college has played a role
in decreasing the aspirations of its students .... Critics of college
composition, similarly, have argued that the writing course has been used
as a tool for ideological and linguistic discipline and conformity ....
Sketching the similarities between these two movements within higher
education is a means for further understanding the disparaging of lowerdivision labor. (195-96)
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DeGenaro's research demonstrates the value of investigating educational histories outside
of the generally accepted context for the discipline, FYC: Not only can this kind of
investigation refuse the centrality of the first-year course, but it can help us develop a
richer portrait of the discipline's history and it demonstrates how new analytic tools such
as metahistorical critique can be used to address contemporary concerns in composition.
Collectively, analyzing Hawk's, Heyda's, Fosen's, and DeGenaro's scholarship
through a metahistoricallens helps illustrate how our understanding of composition's
purview is determined, in part, by disciplinary historiography and begins to illuminate the
different trajectories of inquiry that might be followed once we interrogate basic
assumptions grounding the discipline's prevailing narratives about FYC. These
narratives, which locate the discipline'S origins at the moment in which FYC was
instituted as a required course for freshmen at Harvard, restrict what counts as
composition's work, which, in turn, produces several important intellectual and material
consequences: First, as Christiane Donahue makes clear in her 2009 article,
"'Internationalization' and Composition Studies," the production of research about
writing and writing instruction outside of American contexts of higher education "has
been highly partial, portraying the issue in particular ways, largely export based, that ...
might create obstacles for U.S. scholars' thinking and thus impede effective collaboration
or 'hearing' of work across borders" (214). I attribute this partiality in part to prevailing
narratives about FYC. Second, prevailing narratives about FYC mask composition
practices and pedagogies outside of U.S. institutions of higher education. This problem is
heightened when we consider those practices and pedagogies engaged by groups already
habitually marginalized in our scholarship, such as multilingual people and members of
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the working class. Third, prevailing narratives about FYC normalize certain pedagogical
practices that might be interpreted as problematic - such as maintaining a singular focus
on essay writing - that might tie us to the past instead of allowing us to account for, and
participate in, changing contexts of writing in the present and future. And finally,
prevailing narratives about FYC in our histories work against the desires of contemporary
scholars who wish to revise conceptions of what counts as composition's work in a
lasting and meaningful way. To counter these problems and open up rhetorical space for
alternative andlor new definitions of what can be valued as our work, we must reevaluate
our prevailing narratives, reject the centrality ofFYC to our understanding of history, and
trace our origins to other educational sites, especially those that are informal or
unauthorized, multilingual, and international.

FYC and "Writing"
Just as prevailing narratives about FYC maintain narrow definitions of what
counts as appropriate '"work" within composition, these narratives also sustain limited
definitions of what counts as "writing." Tracing the discipline's origins to Harvard means
we are more (though not necessarily) inclined to define ''writing'' as it would be defined
within Harvard's particular institutional and historical context: as college-level, studentgenerated, pedagogically mandated, institutionally confined prose written in English for a
single audience, the teacher, whose job is to read, evaluate, and return. ll Clearly, many
contemporary compositionists have resisted such a definition through their research and
teaching - demonstrating that the discursive sphere is not as restrained as the above
definition suggests. I argue, however, that the dominance of prevailing narratives about
11 Although these characteristics may not be unique to Harvard - indeed, they could be applied to most u. s.
universities - my point is that, because we trace our origins to Harvard (which is often held up as the
quintessential American university), our attention remains locked on university-level writing practices.
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FYC in our histories (and elsewhere) works rhetorically to sustain related, seemingly
"common sense" assumptions about writing that carry important intellectual and material
consequences. In this section, I elaborate what I see as three specific consequences of the
uncritical repetition of our prevailing narratives about FYC: First, our prevailing
narratives ignore informal sites of writing and writing instruction; second, they construct
students as uneducated and lacking agency; and third, they neglect multilingual and
international sites of writing and writing instruction. I conduct my analysis by presenting
examples, when available, of recent historical research that disrupts our prominent stories
about what counts as writing. I use these examples not because they are well known, but
because they are not - they are promising, but relatively anomalous, examples of recent
historical research. I analyze these competing narratives through the lens of
metahistorical critique to illuminate gaps in our historical knowledge and point toward
the enabling effects that occur when we produce revise our narratives and refuse to take
FYC's centrality for granted.
When our origin story and associated narratives about FYC are not challenged in
our histories and elsewhere, our historiography perpetuates assumptions that writing
worth studying is produced within predominantly white American four-year college
contexts. When we unsettle Harvard's place as the discipline'S primary point of origin,
we can then imagine new histories that centralize other points of origin, highlighting
perspectives and harnessing values that have been traditionally marginalized in our
histories - activities which enable new conceptions of the discipline'S future. For
example, Kathryn Fitzgerald's research on normal schools establishes an intellectual and
pedagogical connection between normals and composition. Fitzgerald argues in "A

182

Rediscovered Tradition" that "several contemporary attitudes about composition theory,
methods, teachers, and students" can be traced back to European pedagogical traditions,
which promoted "the interrelation of theory and practice; the responsibility of the
discipline for teaching teachers to teach; the agency and autonomy of the teacher; the
linguistic competence of the student; and the possibility of a critical stance toward
textbooks" (225). In contrast to historians' habitual focus on seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury theory produced by rhetoricians such as George Campbell and Hugh Blair,
Fitzgerald's focus allows composition to mark out a different kind of heritage, one that
does not denounce the recent past and that values the education that occurs outside of
traditional four-year college contexts. This shift in focus, in turn, encourages scholars to
consider new interpretations of teachers and students, such as those who are portrayed in
Fitzgerald's description above as having agency, independence, creativity, and
intelligence.
Jacqueline Jones Royster and Jean C. Williams, as well as Susan Jarratt, have
published microhistories that challenge assUI)lptions of Harvard's centrality to the history
of composition and provide clues about the intellectual and material consequences that
.may result if we engage in a more systemic disruption of the Harvard narrative.
Specifically, both Royster and Williams' "History in the Spaces Left" and Susan Jarratt's
"Classics and Counterpublics" explore the institutional significance of Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), which were established at around the same time that
major curricular and structural changes took place at Harvard in the mid- to latenineteenth century. In contrast to prevailing narratives about FYC, which assume
Harvard had a monolithic influence on other institutions' curricular decisions, HBCUs
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such as Fisk, Atlanta, and Howard universities modeled and maintained a curriculum
based on that of classical liberal-arts colleges such as Amherst, Weslyan, and the Seven
Sisters Colleges, which emphasized the study of speech, debate, and writing framed
within the tenets of classical rhetorical theory. In centralizing institutions habitually
marginalized in our histories, the narratives produced by Jarratt and Royster and
Williams should remind us of the limits of Harvard's influence, as well as the limits of
our historical imaginations: Disciplinary histories that repeat the "narrative of retreat-andreturn" described by Hawk base this narrative on the centrality of predominantly white
and elite institutions of higher education. I argue that shifting our perspectives to HBCUs
and related sites of schooling helps illustrate the value of refusing to centralize the
Harvard version ofFYC within our historical narratives: Jarratt's and Royster and
Williams' scholarship highlight the endurance of rhetorical education through the
nineteenth century and into the twentieth and emphasizes its particular importance for
marginalized populations. 12 Together, the historical research produced by Fitzgerald,
Jarratt, and Royster and Williams shifts our attention to the diverse range of educational
contexts within what we define as the tradition of higher education. We must build from
these examples if we want to redefme "writing" as that which is not necessarily tethered
to the development ofFYC at Harvard, or to the traditional college context.
At the same time, these histories, which are all histories of post-secondary
education, should remind us of the limits of our assumptions about where we should look
for historical evidence of writing practices. Only a few disciplinary historians have
looked beyond the first-year writing curriculum for evidence of writing practices, and
12 Of course, these historians are not the only scholars who make this point; see also Jessica Enoch and
David Gold, among others, who historicize other populations and institutions in the U.S. habitually
neglected in composition scholarship.
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even fewer have directed their attention to secondary or elementary sites of writing
instruction and practice. 13 I interpret this scarcity of research as a consequence of
prevailing narratives about FYC, which assume the educational context for FYC - the
traditional four-year college - is central to our understanding of the discipline's past,
present, and future. As a result of this assumption, prevailing narratives about FYC
produce problematic constructions of students, their educational histories, the first-year
course, as well as the larger discipline.
Specifically, narratives that assume the centrality ofFYC and Harvard portray
students as neophytes in the first-year writing course, new to writing and new to writing
instruction. Because our historical representations have traditionally begun and ended
with FYC, historians have often failed to acknowledge the long history of writing
experience and schooling that students bring with them to FYC. When previous writing
or writing instruction is acknowledged, it is often portrayed as problematic or inadequate
- an experience to be erased or corrected by FYC. As a consequence of these limits in our
research (or the limits of our lack of research), students are understood to be passive,
inexperienced, uncritical and easily malleable, and FYC is portrayed as having a
significant and permanent influence on students' writing lives. While these claims may
be somewhat accurate for particular students, assuming it of all disables an ultimately
empowering conception of students and also limits our ability to teach them effectively.
Examining the few histories that do acknowledge writing practices and
pedagogies outside of FYC and prior to higher education can help us imagine how
revision of our prevailing narratives about FYC might help dislodge narrow and
13 Here, I refer specifically to histories of rhetoric and composition; histories in the field of education have
documented pedagogical practices within primary and secondary schools, but these escape our attention
because they do not obviously "fit" within the discipline.
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problematic views of students, the first-year course, and the larger discipline. Susan
Miller's 1991 account, one the first disciplinary histories to contest FYC-heavy
descriptions of composition's history, compiles a "print ethnography" of university
catalogues between 1920 and 1960 to illustrate the wide variety of composition courses
available to students during an era some historians have dismissed as stagnant (67). She
writes that when we associate the discipline primarily with FYC, ''we cage ourselves" by
"cooperat[ing] with a bad story" that ascribes value to literary writing over and against
"low" or "common" writing (76). David Russell's Writing in the Academic Disciplines
also moves beyond FYC and stands as the only comprehensive macro-history of writing
and writing instruction across the disciplines and outside of composition to date. Just as
Miller's examination of university catalogues challenges assumptions about FYC's
centrality to the discipline'S history, Russell's exploration calls attention to the
inadequacy of this assumption. Although "the great majority of students have had no
conscious, systematic, discipline-specific writing instruction" (18), at least not until the
last few decades when WAC and WID programs began to be established, Russell finds
several "tacit traditions of student writing" that have evolved across disciplines over the
past 150 years, traditions that include ''the notebook, the research paper, the laboratory
report, the case study, the essay examination, and so on, through which faculty have
taught students the writing of the discipline, though perhaps less consciously or less
effectively than with direct instruction" (19). Importantly, Russell points out the limits of
his research, writing that "these tacit traditions ... have rarely been studied, much less
from a historical perspective" and the sources he does use are "inevitably piecemeal and
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often ambiguous" (19, 20) - suggesting that much more historical research needs to be
conducted.
Miller's and Russell's explorations of the writing curriculum beyond FYC and
outside of composition provide us with several historiographic lessons: First, prevailing
narratives about FYC limit the discipline's ability to define its work as legitimate. Miller
writes that "if we look for a history of 'composition' as a history of its freshman conduct
- the mechanical, modal repressions that naturalistic historians of composition focus on we cannot find a legitimizing past" (76). Additionally, narratives that maintain FYC's
centrality within the writing curriculum produce marginalizing consequences for student
writers. Miller argues that "composition's own version of its historical legitimacy in
rhetoric and its limited self-definition as a freshman course allow new departments
devoted to the 'best' written language [English literature] to perpetuate the claim that
they can judge, and dismiss, the majority's perpetually worst" (76). In other words, when
we historicize composition by exclusively following the FYC trajectory, we participate in
a privileging of popular conceptions of "literature" (for Miller, this means the passive
consumption of texts), which diminishes the value, and thus plausibility, of advanced
study in and the production of "non-literary" writing. 14 Such a privileging, Miller's logic
suggests, therefore strips students of their agency, diminishing their potential to become
active participants as writers in the world around them.

14 In building on Miller's argument here, I distance myself from Miller's assumptions about the study of
literature; while she equates literary study with passivity, my own experiences as a student and teacher of
literature have demonstrated that literary study is often an engaged and engaging pursuit. I build on Miller
here not because I necessarily agree with her premises, but because I find her conclusions about students
valuable and indicative of what a historian's attention to students and student writing outside ofFYC can
give to the discipline.
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Russell's historical research in writing across disciplines affirms Miller's
argument in that following a narrow FYC historical trajectory masks writing that occurs,
and has historically occurred, outside of composition. Compositionists who assume
FYC's centrality to the history of the discipline are more likely to also assume that FYC
is central to their students' contemporary writing experience and education. As a result of
these assumptions, compositionists may convey to their students that writing or writing
instruction outside ofFYC is less valuable, and perhaps less rhetorical, than the writing
produced in the context of the first-year course. What's more, when this misperception of
"writing" is forwarded - implicitly or explicitly - through our historiographic or
pedagogical approaches, we sustain disconnections that already exist between rhetoric
and composition and other academic disciplines. Historians such as Russell actively work
to prevent such disconnections; however, I argue that such problems are inevitable until
we systematically resist those prevailing historical narratives about FYC that sustain
them.
But beyond highlighting these rhetorical effects, both Miller's and Russell's
histories gesture toward other research and historiographic strategies - including
metahistorical critique - that future historians of the discipline can employ to avoid this
centralization. Miller urges scholars who refuse FYC's centrality to the discipline'S
history to identify "disruptions in nineteenth-century educational history temporarily"
because these disruptions provided "legitimacy ... to many kinds of writing," not just
literary writing (76).15 The gaps acknowledged by Russell might be read as evidence of

15 By "disruptions," Miller is referring to historical evidence that has largely been overlooked in our
disciplinary narratives, including the evidence from the early twentieth-century course catalogues she
examines in Textual Carnivals. She writes: "The catalogue descriptions of English, which evolved into an
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those "disruptions" that Miller believes deserve more attention. Both Miller's and
Russell's histories help open up opportunities for future research and complicate our
prevailing narratives about FYC. Together, Miller's and Russell's works demonstrate that
it is through an awareness of and highlighting of inconsistencies that compositionists can
add complexity to our historical knowledge and, perhaps, reconstruct our sense of the
future.
One inconsistency that deserves further interrogation is illustrated well by Lucille
Schultz's research in nineteenth-century writing practices and pedagogies at the primary
and secondary levels of schooling - the only history of its kind directed toward an
audience of compositionists. In The Young Composers, Schultz locates composition's
beginnings not at Harvard but at the establishment of primary and secondary public
schooling in the United States. In so doing, Schultz calls into question the basic and
prevailing assumption that composition history can and should be traced to institutions of
higher education. She argues that this assumption ignores the majority of the U.S.
population in the nineteenth century, a population who would have been much more
likely to have been schooled in writing at the elementary and secondary levels but much
less likely to have had access to college. As such, Schultz argues, we miss some of
composition's strongest theoretical and practical ties, as primary and secondary schools
are "where what we think of as personal or experience-based writing began" and "where
the democratization of writing was institutionalized" (4). In other words, just as Miller's
and Fitzgerald's histories do, Schultz's history provides composition with a more
expansive version of its recent past.

increasingly literary curriculum, show the centralized composition that historians have addressed to be one,
but not necessarily the overriding, kind of writing that English fIrst included in its curricula" (68).
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But Schultz's research does more than merely give composition a past that it can
smile about: First, her history reminds us that students come to college and the first-year
course with many years of schooling and writing experience behind them - not all of it
worth erasing or in need of correction. Second, her history disrupts our most basic
assumptions about what counts as "writing" in our histories. While prevailing narratives
about FYC would define "writing" as motivated by and produced within college contexts,
Schultz's history broadens the discursive sphere to suggest that "writing" worth our
attention might in fact be produced outside of, even prior to, the college experience. And
our attention need not ground itself in primary and secondary sites of education - with
Schultz's revisions to our narratives, we might be more eager to more consistently
historicize the "extracurriculum," as advocated by Anne Ruggles Gere, or religious
spheres where literacy practice and instruction habitually occurs but is rarely studied, and
to writing produced in informal contexts prior to college.
In its expansion of the discursive sphere and our historical imagination, Schultz's
history motivates me to point out another problematic assumption about what counts as
"writing": Prevailing narratives promote the assumption that "writing" means writing in
English, written by and for native speakers of English. But just as Schultz is interested in
pursuing the connection between composition and the long history of public schooling in
the United States, I am interested in the connection between composition and the United
States' long history of immigration and multilingual literacy practices. Our disciplinary
histories have, for the most part, failed to explicitly call attention to the history of nonEnglish writing instruction in the United States; one history that gestures toward this
possibility is Jessica Enoch's chapter about Chicano/a writing practices and pedagogy in
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Refiguring Rhetorical Education. 16 What is most interesting to me about this chapter is
that Enoch gathers most of her evidence about rhetorical education in Laredo, Texas from
a Spanish-language newspaper, La Cronica. Enoch never discusses the paper as a
Spanish-language text; instead, she translates the articles into English and interprets them
based on that translation, never raising the question of how the newspaper's original
language - and Enoch's subsequent translation - might affect the narrative she
constructs. Besides a handful of Spanish words or phrases (accompanied by their English
translations) scattered throughout the chapter, the only evidence that clearly illustrates La

Cronica's original language is found in a photocopy of one page ofthe newspaper (140).
Enoch intends throughout Refiguring to ascribe value to otherwise neglected sites of
rhetorical education, but because she must make her research intelligible within already
existing rhetorical boundaries, she does not highlight Spanish writing practices - and in
fact she erases them through her translation. As such, the history centralizes dominant,
English-only sites of writing and writing instruction, thus reinscribing prevailing
narratives about FYC and muffling the same voices she intends to amplify.
But in spite of the limitations of Refiguring, the history helps raise important
questions about how composition has habitually defined ''writing'' as an English-only
practice and suggests important reasons for rethinking and revising our prevailing
narratives about FYC: Not only could we begin to redefine writing as a multilingual
practice, but we should begin to search for evidence of histories that would illuminate
16 In Mestiz@ Scripts, Damian Baca argues that composition historians' lack of attention to non-English
writing practices and instruction has limited its purview in substantial ways. Although the book primarily
examines contemporary Mestiz@ scripts (for a defmition of what Baca means by "Mestiz@," see page 2)
and cannot accurately be categorized as a "history" of the discipline, Baca emphasizes the need for revised
historical accounts of the discipline; he writes: "In my own tield of English Compositoin, Metsiz@s appear
only recently as unnamed linguistic 'problems' in remedial or standard first-year writing seminars. After a
few months when the semesters end, Mestiz@s curiously disappear from English Composition scholarship
and its civilized world of the art ofletters" (xv).
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immigrant literacy and learning practices in the United States. Additionally, such a
revision would enable us to more easily locate composition scholarship within
international contexts - as many scholars are already advocating ( see Homer et al. and
C. Donahue) - which would therefore widen the scope of our research as well as the
discursive sphere to include multilingual and non-English "writing" and uncover the
.
' . represents. 17
perspectives
such
wntmg

FYC and "Writing Instruction"
In spite of more recent historical scholarship that complicates prevailing
narratives about FYC, our most widely cited histories remain focused on FYC and uphold
Harvard's place as composition's institutional origin. As a result, "writing instruction"
tends to mean, for compositionists, the ''teaching of introductory college writing." And
because nineteenth-century writing instruction at Harvard is often associated with CTRP
and because prevailing narratives about FYC locate the discipline's origins there,
historical evidence of such practice at other institutions has often been interpreted as
proof that required freshman composition produced similar effects for a variety of
students across institutions and over time. ls What's more, evidence of pedagogy such as
the teaching of grammar and skills-and-drills approaches to the teaching of writing is
often understood as monolithic practice, arhetorical and disempowering for all students
no matter the context. In this section, I explore the consequences of these interpretations
for students, teachers, and the discipline as a whole, especially in terms of our

17 Xiaoye You's Writing in the Devil's Tongue begins the work of his toricizing composition in an
international vein, as he explores composition's evolution in China.
18 For evidence of this kind of interpretation in historical studies as well as proposals for the future of the
discipline, see especially those who argue against the requirement ofFYC, including Crowley
(Composition in the University), Debra Hawhee's "History and The Harbrace College Handbook," Gary
Olson's "The Death of Composition as an Intellectual Discipline," Jasper Neel's "Reclaiming Our
Theoretical Heritage," and Charles Bazerman's "The Case for Writing Studies as a Major Discipline."
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constructions of the discipline's future. In order to demonstrate how our prevailing
narratives about FYC have limited how we define '"writing instruction" in our histories,
and in order to gesture toward the effects of this boundary-making, I engage in a
metahistorical critique of our histories. Within this section, I analyze excerpts from some
of our most widely cited histories against excerpts from histories that produce competing
narratives, focusing particularly on how FYC's content, pedagogy, and student writing
are portrayed in both. I argue that we need to ham.ess and build upon those
historiographic strategies exemplified in competing narratives because they resist
centralization of FYC and enable a reconceptualization and expansion of what we mean
by "writing instruction," which ultimately affects contemporary composition scholars,
teachers, and students.
As I noted earlier, the content of the first-year course in composition has, more
often than not, been characterized in our disciplinary histories according to prevailing
CTRP narratives; most often, prevailing narratives about FYC describe the course's daily
activities according to textbook evidence. Robert Connors' description ofFYC in "The
Rhetoric of Mechanical Correctness" epitomizes many early historians' assumptions
about what has been taught, historically, in the first-year classroom. He writes:
"Throughout most of its history as a college subject, English composition has meant one
thing to most people: the single-minded enforcement of standards of mechanical and
grammatical correctness in writing" (72). Likewise, in tracing the interrelated histories of
the MLA and NCTE organizations, Myron Tuman also focuses on the exterior features of
assessment in FYC and assumes that these features adequately represent the content of
the course. Tuman describes the requirement of English A at Harvard as:
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an extension as well as a rejection of rhetoric, which throughout the
[nineteenth] century had been increasingly becoming [sic] a study of the
formal properties of literature and thus naturally expanded to include the
study of the formal properties of composition about literature. In order to
pass this writing assignment, the student was under no obligation to
demonstrate either an innovative or personal understanding of the material
under consideration - orthodoxy in interpretation and correctness in
expression, each in accordance with a prescriptive canon, were the rule.
(344)
Both Connors' and Tuman's examples rely on interpretations of the content ofFYC that
focus narrowly on how teachers may have approached instruction in grammar or the
"formal properties" of writing. As I elaborated quite thoroughly in Chapter 2, these
interpretations are problematic because they conflate "real" evidence of the content of
FYC - particularly textbook evidence - with actual pedagogical practice. For my
purposes here, I am not as interested in proving that this conflation occurs as I am in
elaborating the consequences of these interpretations as they relate to teachers, students,
and the discipline writ large.
First, in portraying FYC as a relatively content-less and mechanically oriented
course, prevailing disciplinary narratives portray the methods used to teach FYC as
streamlined and rigid, which results in unflattering and - as I will demonstrate shortly sometimes inaccurate representations of the methods used to teach writing in the United
States over the last 150 years. The college entrance exam is one apparatus that
composition historians have focused on in their critique of FYC. Although the entrance
exam at Harvard predates the establishment of English A, Patricia Donahue notes in
"Disciplinary Histories" that many scholars - beginning with Kitzhaber - have made
connections among the Harvard examination, the "'decline and fall" of rhetoric, and the
first-year course. For Kitzhaber and others, "[t]he deficiencies the examination was
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designed to reveal were the same deficiencies the freshman rhetoric course was designed
to rectify. As the scope of rhetoric began to narrow, as rhetoric became transformed into
rhetoric/composition, its connection with remediation increased" (Donahue 232). As I
discussed in Chapter 2 and as Donahue begins to illustrate in this essay, portraying the
nineteenth-century "shift" from (oral/classical) rhetoric to (written) composition as a
"decline" poses problems because it oversimplifies the practical pedagogical,
administrative, and institutional approaches necessitated by dramatic changes in
American and global culture. 19
Likewise, when we assume that the college entrance exam produces directly
negative effects for FYC - and rhetoric in general - we facilitate a problematic
oversimplification of the exam's relation to the course that carries consequences for
students and teachers. Making a direct connection between the entrance exam, an
institutional apparatus designed to exclude or rank undergraduates, and the purpose of
FYC in the nineteenth-century college obscures several important contextual facts: First,
the entrance exam existed prior to Harvard's instantiation of it; Mary Trachsel explains in
Institutionalizing Literacy that "[t]he mechanism of entrance examinations was itself a
carryover from the classical era when preparatory students were required to demonstrate
their mastery of classical texts and languages before they would be granted admission to
college" (51). Second, the exam was not primarily created by writing teachers; and
finally, the entrance exam tested not only literacy skills, but also knowledge in math,
history, science, geography, and other subjects (Trachsel 50-74).

19 By "dramatic changes in American and global culture," I refer to the rise of industrialism, increased print
literacy, and the various social movements occurring in the American public sphere throughout the
nineteenth century.
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Although I don't disagree that the way students were tested in literacy in the
nineteenth century is, from a contemporary perspective, problematic, metahistorical
analysis makes clear that criticizing the exam's definition of literacy without
contextualizing it as part of the historical record is insufficient, nor can we appropriately
shift our critique of the exam directly to FYC, because such a critique assumes that the
agents in charge of the exam were also in charge of the content of the first-year course.
Crowley's discussion of the exam helps substantiate my point about the problems that
emerge from this kind of assumption. Making a direct connection between Harvard's
entrance exam and the content ofFYC, she writes:
The function of the course that followed on the heels of the examination,
then, was to establish a site in which students might undergo the repeated
and continuous punishment earned by their failure on the exam ....
Freshman English was the site wherein students' writing was put on
continuous display so that its lacks could be remarked, and so that their
papers could be measured against each other and against Harvard's
disciplinary standard as well. This reading of the daily theme as
punishment-through-exercise explains why no exit exam was demanded at
the close of English A .... The point of the required course is not to acquire
some level of skill or knowledge that can be measured upon exit; it is
instead to subject students to discipline, to force them to recognize the
power of the institution to insist on conformity with its standards. (74)\
Here, Crowley assumes that teachers of writing at Harvard (and, implicitly, elsewhere)
were in cahoots with administrators in charge of the entrance exam. Her Foucauldian
characterization portrays composition teachers in the nineteenth century as arbitrarily
disciplinary, demeaning to students, and disengaged with the needs or desires of students
- a characterization grounded in the direct correlation Crowley makes between the exam
and methods of teaching FYC. Further, Crowley assumes in this passage that student
writing, manifested in daily themes, is merely an "exercise," perceived by students and
teachers as meaningless and punishing. These depictions not only ignore historical
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evidence that students and teachers of composition were engaged rhetorically with their
work, but such representations of students and teachers also encourage contemporary
scholars to assume they can divine the intentions and values of teachers (and students) in
the past through their participation in a specific course or set of assignments. 2o In
establishing this connection between the nineteenth-century first-year classroom and the
contemporary writing course, Crowley's historiography also pushes compositionists to
define ''writing'' according to those definitions promoted within prevailing narratives of
FYC, which define ''writing'' narrowly as "academic discourse" and "essay writing" and
fail to reflect how writing practices - both in and outside the classroom - have changed
dramatically over time.
What's more, the association made by Crowley and others between the entrance
exam and FYC becomes complicated when one moves into the late-nineteenth century, at
which time test-makers shifted their focus from testing in composition to testing in
literature, a move that many argue helped secure literature's ascension as an academic
discipline (and simultaneously ensured composition's descension into the margins).
While early instantiations of the exam might have attempted to regulate writing,
historians such as Kathryn Fitzgerald have suggested that the exam's shift in focus from
writing to literature may have instead occurred because test-makers determined that they
could not adequately test arhetorical or acontextual writing and that it would be easier to
systematically test students' knowledge ofliterature. Fitzgerald explains that:
[T]he legitimation of literature as secondary English's central component
was the contingent outcome of local material and discursive practices at
work within and between institutional sites in conditions of asymmetrical
This is not to say that historians should avoid analyzing the evidence available to them, but rather that
historians need to challenge the seemingly "common sense" assumptions that ground historiography in
passages such as this.
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power relations. The records reveal that in meetings called in the early
1890s to thrash out college/secondary school articulation, literature
became central not primarily through intellectual or ideological
discussions of its value relative to other potential topics for the English
curriculum, but rather in the process of perfecting the technology of
testing for college admission. ("From Disciplining")
In other words, the historical narrative that connects entrance exams with the pedagogical
methods employed in FYC is not as seamless as Crowley and others portray it to be.
While Fitzgerald's research is certainly not above critique, her argument is valuable, for
my purposes, because it demonstrates how questions about history might be kept open
instead of foreclosed. In particular, Fitzgerald's claim disrupts previous historians'
assumptions that test-makers were not self-reflective about the complexity inherent to
processes of writing: making the move from testing composition to literature suggests
that administrators and teachers at both the college and secondary level were likely aware
of the inherently rhetorical nature of writing. Moreover, Fitzgerald's competing narrative
about the shift points toward another way of understanding composition - not as a
discipline struggling for legitimacy, but as one that is ultimately interdisciplinary, a point
I elaborate in Chapter 4.
Conflating entrance exams with the actual content ofFYC also devalues the
everyday work of teachers and assumes the worst of students' engagement with writing
and writing instruction. When this conflation occurs, we suggest that teachers do the
same work in the classroom as exams do on their own; what's more, this conflation
assumes that students passively consume instruction, whether in the classroom or in
relation to the exam. As such, historiography that upholds this conflation produces lasting
consequences for composition teachers and students.
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Russell's history provides another good example of how decentralization ofFYC
and broader definitions of '"writing instruction" may produce significant and lasting
intellectual effects for the larger discipline. He writes that historically, "faculty [outside
of composition] have tended to mistake the inevitable struggles of students to acquire the
new rhetorical conventions of a discipline for poor writing or sheer ignorance" (18). This
misperception of writing - and writing instruction - across the disciplines affects
composition's ability to be conceived as a legitimate discipline by those outside of it;
because rhetoric and writing is often misconstrued as "transparent," then writing
instruction - in composition or across disciplines - will continue to be marginalized. But
when we define our work beyond the immediate discipline, we can identify ourselves as
well-positioned advocates for discipline-specific writing instruction and work to build
bridges between and among disciplines. Russell explains that "[a]t the curricular level, if
professionals are not aware of the role rhetoric plays in their own discipline, then they
will see little need to teach it" (17). Russell's historical research, in other words, helps us
broaden our contemporary view of what counts as '"writing instruction" and paves the
way for better communication with, and improved teaching within, other disciplines.
Our disciplinary historiography suggests that writing instruction within FYC
produces direct and specific, usually negative, effects for students. Debra Hawhee, for
example, argues in "History and The Harbrace College Handbook:' that handbooks like
the Harbrace function in the FYC classroom as material representations of CTRP that
"[articulate] what is deemed important subject matter" and that "effectively shape teacher
and student subjectivities - that is, they discipline the writer" (504). Hawhee's archival
study of the evolution (and popularity) of the Harbrace College Handbook connects
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handbooks directly to FYC, as well as its students and teachers. She concludes that it is
because of the continued use of handbooks such as the Harbrace that "the first-year
writing course remains where it began - on 'remedial' ground," which in turn keeps
"composition teachers" from "break[ing] out of their working class status" and "studentwriters" from "see[ing] themselves as authors" (522). Crowley makes a similar argument
when she contends that "[t]he continuing function of the required composition course has
been to insure the academic community that its entering members are taught the
discursive behaviors and traits of character that qualify them to join the community" (89).
Both Hawhee's and Crowley's rhetorical portrayals of students in relation to FYC
in these passages engage in what Bruce Homer, drawing on Anthony Giddens, has
critiqued as a "functionalist error" prevalent in composition scholarship; that is, both
scholars "attempt[] to explain the unintended consequences of actions by renaming those
consequences as fulfilling the needs of a social systems, imputing a teleology to those
systems, which are imagined as operating behind the backs of social actors" (122-23).21
This error, played out in Hawhee's and Crowley'S historiographic practice, carries
specific material and intellectual consequences that influence our contemporary
understanding of and approach toward students, as well as our vision of the future. First,
students are characterized as neophytes, new to writing and writing instruction. Before
entering the university and FYC, Crowley'S and Hawhee's rhetoric suggests, students did
not write and were not exposed to writing instruction. Students' writing experiences in
primary and secondary educational contexts are flatly ignored, which suggests that these
experiences lack value. Second, Crowley's historiography in particular portrays the
21

In effect, Giddens acts as a corrective here to the influence of Foucault in Crowley's and Hawhee's work.
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adoption of academic language as a zero-sum equation: If one adopts the language of the
university, one loses the language of the community; if a student assimilates to the
university culture, he or she loses hislher sense of self.22 As former university students
ourselves, many of us in composition can surely attest to the failings of this equation;
however, Crowley's historiography maintains an unself-conscious hierarchy that values
scholar over student. Third, academic discourse is assumed to be singular and monolithic
- an assumption that others, such as Russell, would trouble. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, students' needs and desires are neglected in Hawhee's and Crowley's
historiography; neither acknowledge the material and intellectual currency of mastering
the "discursive behaviors and traits of character" valued within the university context.
This neglect positions students rhetorically as passive consumers of writing instruction,
lacking agency in FYC and other academic contexts of writing.
The historiographic practices illustrated by, but certainly not unique to, Hawhee
and Crowley authorize contemporary and future teachers and scholars of writing to place
the blame for student success, failure, or resistance on a single course - FYC - rather
than on their own habits of writing, thinking, and teaching (about) students. As such,
prevailing narratives about FYC sustain problematic representations of the relation
between teacher and student, presenting this relationship as lacking the agency or
negotiation that necessarily occurs in the writing classroom. David Gold and Scott Zaluda
both offer historiographic alternatives to the prevailing historical narratives about FYC,
therefore complicating prevailing conceptions ofFYC's effect on students and student
writing. Their historiographic strategies point toward other practices that future historians
Hawhee's and Crowley's historiography lead them toward the either/or habits ofthinking explicated well
within the debate between David Bartholomae and Peter Elbow in 1995 (see "Writing with Teachers" and
"Being a Writer vs. Being an Academic").
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of composition could more systematically employ as they attempt to disrupt problems
such as those outlined above. In '''Eve Did No Wrong': Effective Literacy at a Public
College for Women," Gold looks beyond FYC to demonstrate that female students
attending Florida State College for Women (FSCW) in the early twentieth century held a
great deal of rhetorical agency within the university and in the local community. Gold
neither centralizes FYC in his analysis of student writing at FSCW nor assumes FYC
produced a direct effect on student writing, thus producing a competing narrative about
FYC in which students are framed as active and engaged within both the university and
the community, and student writing is assumed to be representative of complex rhetorical
practices. He argues: "To the extent that these [writing] classes reproduced bourgeois
subjectivity, they also encouraged students' self-confidence as writers and promoted
writing in public forums" (W179). Gold's historiography in this passage and throughout
the article encourages compositionists to perceive students, student writing, and writing
instruction generally as complex, producing multiple negative and positive effects.
Zaluda's examination of writing instruction at Howard University between 1919
and 1931 likewise provides a competing narrative about FYC and its effects on students
that broadens our definition of what counts as "writing instruction." While "college
catalogues of the teens and '20s" describe courses that engaged in "the practice of
intensive grammatical drilling in both credit-bearing and non-credit writing sections,"
Zaluda does not automatically interpret these courses as "evidence that Howard's faculty
held a view of writing as an elementary skill to be acquired or remedied prior to the study
and practice of rhetorical forms and prior to serious intellectual development" (237).
Instead, Zaluda favors an interpretation that "accord[s] essay assignments and exams" in
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the English department and outside of it "not only intellectual but [also] social and
political significance" (237). Such an interpretation is especially important in the context
of an HBCU, but implicitly, Zaluda's perspective forwards a view of composition history
that defines all writing and writing instruction - even when it involves drills and
discipline - as potentially progressive. In his examination of writing assigned across the
curriculum at Howard University, Zaluda argues that:
HBCU student and faculty writing in the field of sociology cannot be seen
simply as a mechanism for linguistic acculturation or the reproduction of
prevailing ideas. Writing in sociology and across the curriculum at
Howard University and other HBCUs was an act of demythologizing race
and culture and reinscribing them as "constantly changing" social and
political concepts. (253)
Because Zaluda, like Gold, looks both at and beyond FYC for evidence of writing
instruction at Howard, his microhistory allows for a more complicated conception of
writing pedagogy's effects on students. Drills-and-skills courses at HBCUs and
elsewhere did not just work on otherwise marginalized students, but students may have
found agency within these courses and as they moved through the writing curriculum.
Zaluda's and Gold's analyses provide valuable alternative lenses through which future
historians of composition can interpret their historical data and conceive of the future
more expansively. Additionally, analyzing Gold and Zaluda in relation to one another
highlights the advantages of metahistorical critique as a tool of analysis, in that this
critique highlights the importance of questioning our assumptions about the place ofFYC
in composition's past and present, as well as the positive rhetorical effects for students,
teachers, and the discipline at large that can emerge through a constant troubling and
broadening of the discipline's definitions of "writing instruction."
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Finally, prevailing narratives about FYC often define ''writing instruction" as
''writing instruction for introductory college English"; and as such, ''writing instruction"
is often associated with a long and troubling history of academic labor issues. For
example, both Connors and Brereton argue that the containment of writing instruction to
the first year at Harvard and elsewhere produced "a kind of teacher slavery" (Brereton
18) because, while the numbers of students enrolled in each required composition course
increased through the latter half of the nineteenth century, the course itself "demand [ed]
by its nature an essentially individualized pedagogy" (Connors, Composition-Rhetoric
188). As a consequence, FYC "came to be despised" and "bitterly resented by college
faculty members" (Connors, Composition-Rhetoric 184, 185). As a result of the blurring
between FYC and problems much larger than the single course, FYC becomes a
scapegoat for many historians, who perceive the course as directly exploitive of teachers
and the discipline at large (again engaging in the functionalist error I noted earlier). I
argue that by making FYC the scapegoat, we misdirect our focus and miss an opportunity
to change larger systems that work against many scholars and teachers - not just
compositionists - who work at the university level.
Connors outlines other negative consequences for teachers and the discipline at
large in "Licensure, Disciplinary Identity, and Workload," a chapter of CompositionRhetoric; here, he attributes unethical labor practices directly to the requirement ofFYC
in American colleges: First, FYC became a gateway course not only for students, but also
for graduate students or new college instructors with Ph.D.s in literature who were
required to teach composition as a kind of rite of passage before attaining the experience
necessary to teach advanced courses in their own specialties, and "[n]ew instructors [in
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the early twentieth century] were regularly assigned three, four, or five sections of
composition - sometimes while they were still attempting to finish their own
dissertations" (196). Therefore, "young instructors quickly came to hate rhetoric and
composition" (196). What's more, facility members' general disdain for FYC, as well as
their lack of pedagogical training, led to "exceedingly poor composition teachers" and
teaching, according to Connors (198).
While I do not doubt that poor teaching of composition occurred in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries or that the pessimistic attitudes about the firstyear course Connors describes existed, I argue that poor teaching and pessimistic
attitudes are not unique to teachers of composition or the first-year course; these kinds of
problems have always existed in all areas of education and would not be resolved if
composition achieved "true" disciplinarity or if the requirement of FYC were eliminated
within universities across America (see Jurgen Herbst). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Connors'
sweeping generalizations about teachers of composition - including those with specialties
in literature - during this time period have been complicated by other disciplinary
historians and demonstrate unconventional historiographic strategies which have the
potential to revise the discursive sphere in lasting ways. JoAnn Campbell, for example,
details the close relationship between Gertrude Buck - a rhetorician - and Laura Wylie a literary scholar - at Vassar College at the turn of the century in "Women's Work,
Worthy Work." Campbell argues that the close and respectful relationship between Buck
and Wylie resulted in a "democratic[]" English department that "shar[ed] power, rewards,
and resources, and constructed a pedagogy rooted in cooperation" (27). Together,
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Campbell shows, Buck and Wylie deliberately studied the writing process and developed
a curriculum that reflected their research (36-37).
Patricia Donahue and Bianca Falbo also complicate Connors' assumptions about
literature professors' neglect of pedagogy and rhetoric as they uncover another side of
Francis A. March, whom many have called the "father" of English studies. In "(The
Teaching of) Reading and Writing at Lafayette College," Donahue and Falbo argue that
narratives in literary disciplinary histories that "privilege[] ... the March who taught
reading, who taught literature" neglects "the 'other' March, the one who could as easily
be identified as a progenitor of composition" (45). They write, "[t]he celebration of
March as a 'pioneer' of literary study hides from consideration his nuanced attention to
writing and the interaction between reading and writing, and distorts the range of his
contribution to English study - his advocacy, as he put it, of 'the abundant use of
writing'" (52). Donahue and Falbo's microhistory, in combination with Campbell's,
further complicates and deepens our narratives about FYC and its effects on teachers in
the past and present. This complication first suggests that there is much more recovery
and revisionist work to be done before we can assume we understand what it would have
been like to teach composition a century ago; and second, it warns us that we should be
cautious when assuming that prevailing historical narratives provide clear lenses through
which we can interpret the present and future.

In fact, the problems described by Connors and Crowley - and complicated
through Campbell's and Donahue and Falbo's microhistories - are systemic, intertwined
with structures of power within the university and not exclusively locatable in the
existence and requirement ofa single course. Connors' and Crowley'S arguments are
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grounded in two faulty premises: First, they both seem to assume that teaching the
universally required course in composition is an undesirable goal for people who have
earned PhDs. This assumption, while likely applicable for some, neglects those who
enjoy - and perhaps even prefer - teaching FYC. Second, both scholars build their
arguments on the premise that men and women who hold doctorates are (or were) only
qualified for jobs within academia and would not choose or aspire to other career paths
after completing graduate school. Consequently, the rhetoric of these historians maintains
narrow and elitist myths about the purpose of higher education in the United States; their
historiographic practices, in other words, help perpetuate the divide between town and
gown that so many compositionists aim to dissolve.
Moreover, when historians and other compositionists place the blame for
unethical employment practices on FYC, members of the discipline who hope to change
those practices (of whom there are many) are likely to (mis)direct their activism toward
the discipline and the role of FYC within it, rather than at hierarchies embedded within
the university system. As I explained previously, this misdirection is precisely what
happens when disciplinary histories trace composition's pasts according to the
development ofFYC across institutions of higher education. Maintaining this singular
focus on FYC carries the rhetorical effect of naturalizing structures of power that not only
exist far beyond the course and discipline, but that also allow such inequalities to persist
at a local level. As a result, changes to practices and policies within the discipline may
resolve some problems at a local level, but they will do little to change the larger
university systems that perpetuate the problem.
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Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I have shown how metahistorical critique is a useful
analytic tool with which compositionists can identify, isolate, and revise those narratives
that produce not only a limiting sense of the discipline's history, but also a limiting vision
for the future. My critique of the historiography that both produces and resists prevailing
narratives about FYC allows the discipline, first, to recognize and move away from
narrow debates about whether or not introductory writing courses should be required, and
second, to dislodge narrow conceptions of what counts as ''work,'' "writing," and
"writing instruction" in composition studies. When we develop new narratives of origin,
we help establish the rhetorical conditions necessary to achieve what contemporary
scholars have already begun to advocate - an expansion of the discursive sphere that
acknowledges geo-political realities and maps the field of "rhetoric and composition"
onto multilingual, cross-institutional, and global contexts of writing.
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CHAPTER 4:
COMPOSITION AS A(N) (INTER)DISCIPLINE

In this chapter, I focus on the manner in which our histories frame composition as
a unique academic discipline distinct from or in opposition to other disciplines. As I have
already touched on in previous chapters, composition histories often present the
discipline's emergence as a direct response to composition's antagonistic relationship to
English literature or its failed relationship with classical rhetoric; these stories of
antagonism and decline construct the discipline's most familiar and prevailing narratives
about composition's disciplinarity. But other narratives reject stories of a clear "split"
between composition and literature or the "decline and fall" of classical rhetoric, instead
suggesting that it is more accurate to historicize the discipline as inevitably intertwined
and working with English literature and rhetoric. 1 Still other versions of composition's
history find its relation to disciplines beyond literature and rhetoric more useful in
making sense of its evolution to the present; these competing, much less prevalent,
narratives historicize composition in terms of its relationship to education, speech

I In suggesting that English literature and rhetoric are autonomous disciplines in relation to composition, I
recognize the artificial and arbitrary nature of this separation. It may make more sense, instead, to call
literature, rhetoric, and composition sub-jields of English studies rather than separate disciplines. However,
I have chosen to keep these areas separate in my discussion because composition's histories have often
treated them separately; this separation actually constitutes the heart of the problem I address in this
chapter.
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communications, English as a Foreign or Second Language (EFL or TESOL), linguistics,
modem or foreign languages, psychology, and even the sciences.
As in previous chapters, I use metahistorical critique in this chapter to trace
prevailing and competing narratives about composition's disciplinarity so as to highlight
the values and beliefs that ground our historiographic practice, a move which in turn
allows compositionists to intervene in, revise, or harness those strategies that forward our
contemporary goals and practices. Specifically, I align myself with those scholars,
including Steven Mailloux, Louise Wetherbee Phelps, and Bronwyn Williams, who
construct rhetoric and composition as an interdiscipline.
Mailloux, whose focus is on rhetoric, sees ''the historical relations among those
disciplines focused on oral and written rhetoric - on literature, speech, and composition";
he hopes the multidisciplinary historical approach he takes in Disciplinary Identities will
"encourage dialogue among the teachers and scholars most responsible for research and
training in the language arts" (2). In Composition as a Human Science, Phelps describes
composition's relationship to literature as an "accident" which "completely misrepresents
and distorts its proper relation to other disciplines" (45). She urges composition to
"reconstruct its relationship with literature, reinterpret its sometimes parasitical
relationships with other disciplines, and participate in complex networks of inquiry" and
argues that composition can only be defined as "logically subordinate to [rhetoric and
literature] if looked at from their own altitude .... However, from the perspective of
composition itself, it has a surplus of meaning with respect to any cross-discipline within
which it falls" (77-78). And in a recent article, Williams urges composition studies to
look beyond college-level writing practices and pedagogy, into fields as diverse as "K-12
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literacy education, ethnographic and intemationalliteracy studies, and media studies"
because, quite simply, the field is already moving in these directions (129). The problem,
Williams argues, is that even as compositionists move into these interdisciplinary areas of
research, they are not communicating with - or being cited by - scholars in
"complementary fields" whose research is "astonishingly similar" to that being conducted
on the fringes of rhetoric and composition (129). Williams concludes that compositionists
need to engage "a broader conception of what the field can and should be" by making
"conscious connections to the work and people in other literacy-related fields in ways
that broaden our ideas of scholarship" (130).
In aligning myself with Mailloux, Phelps, and Williams and defining composition
as an interdiscipline, I mean that composition's focus on writing practices and pedagogy
implies and necessitates interaction among myriad disciplines. I argue that defining
composition as an interdiscipline is the most beneficial for its future because this
definition encourages productive relations between and among disciplines which
obviously inform and are informed by contemporary studies of composition.
Additionally, this definition authorizes composition's work within and across disciplinary
borders - work that is already going on but is oftentimes pushed to the margins of our
discourse or redefined as something other than composition?
I agree with contemporary scholars' efforts to (re)define composition as an
interdiscipline; however, such a definition will not make sense within disciplinary
discourse until scholars begin to recognize the discipline's lack of historical discourse

2 In particular, I am thinking of scholars habitually overlooked within composition studies because their
work is intertwined with education, literacy (especially New Literacy Studies), linguistics, TESOL, writing
centers, and WAC (see for example Lucille Schultz, Joel Spring, Theresa Lillis, Roz lvanic, Allan Luke,
Alastair Pennycook, Brian Street, and others).
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about composition's interdisciplinarity. In "Seeking New Worlds," Williams points out
that:
[a]s exciting as ... cross-disciplinary scholarship ... might be to those of
us who engage issues and ideas beyond college writing, such work can
also feel as if we are pulling against the gravitational tide, that we are
making individual efforts rather than being part of a more systemic reorientation of the field. (137-38)
My project participates in the "systemic re-orientation" Williams promotes. In addition, I
contend that proposals for the discipline's future(s) - proposals like Williams' - which
call for recognition that composition's role in the academy is a necessarily
interdisciplinary one will not succeed unless our historical narratives are revised in such a
way that they systematically account for composition's strong interdisciplinary past.
I am not alone in arguing that our prevailing historical narratives of composition's
disciplinarity hold sway over its self-definition. Maureen Daly Goggin and, more
recently, Bruce Homer and Min-Zhan Lu have called for composition scholars to make
sense of the discipline by critically examining and expanding the terms with which it
defines itself. Goggin argues that compositionists need to "understand our own
complicity in the [marginalized] position we currently hold. We need, in other words, to
consider how we name and define ourselves, and how the definitions we generate may
serve as fetters" (199). For Goggin, composition studies will remain "misunderstood, ...
marginalized, and ... powerless" if its focus is relegated to the confines of the "college
writing classroom rather than more broadly to all aspects ofliterate practices" (199,
200).3

3 While I would not characterize composition as Goggin does, I must acknowledge that others in
composition would. Her point is valuable especially in light of those critics who might argue that defining
composition as an interdiscipline will dislodge its claims to legitimacy.
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And in "Working Rhetoric and Composition," Homer and Lu want the terms
"rhetoric, composition, and rhetoric and composition" to be linked ''with a rich and
changing array of practices, bodies of knowledge, and institutional sites" because such a
connection may lead rhetoric and composition to act as "an institutional space for
developing alternatives and forms of resistance to hegemonic forces and relations" (473).
At the same time, though, they worry that
this possibility is effectively limited by the tendencies to treat the meaning
of each of the terms as stable and self-evident; to use them
interchangeably and uncritically with ''writing,'' "English," and "literacy";
and to treat rhetoric and composition not as mutually dependent and
constitutive, but as mutually exclusive or in hierarchical order. (473)
Homer and Lu and Goggin want composition studies to be redefined through broader,
more flexible, and interdisciplinary terms. For Goggin, composition scholars must "find
powerfully flexible frames to redefine ourselves" in spite of "the ways in which the
academic landscape has been plowed and staked" (205). For Homer and Lu, redefinition
means asking how our work intersects with - and might be simultaneously distinguished
from - the work of scholars from disciplines as diverse as "speech and communications,
media studies, journalism, and literature," while also acknowledging how those "in the
fields of education and applied linguistics" have already contributed to composition
scholarship (487). Others including Williams, Phelps, and John Brereton suggest that
composition needs to also investigate its ties to psychology, sociology, ethnography,
media studies, and philosophy.
Although I advocate for a reenvisioning of composition's history as an
interdisiciplinary one in order to support the calls of contemporary scholars who hope
composition's future will also be interdisciplinary, I must also acknowledge the material
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risks implied in this argument: First, an embracing of composition's interdisciplinarity
can potentially limit its legitimacy and autonomy in the eyes of university administrators.
At a time when budgets are strained and departments already suffer too many financial
cuts, this concern is not a trivial one. What's more, scholars who submit interdisciplinary
research for publication face a difficult challenge as they position themselves within
multiple disciplinary boundaries at once; they must anticipate and negotiate potential
misunderstandings and tension that are not as likely to arise if publishing firmly within
clear disciplinary boundaries. If composition is to self-identify as a fundamentally
interdisciplinary discipline, are our scholars prepared to take on the additional rhetorical
and material work such self-definition implies?
I cannot claim to have answers that will satisfy all concerned parties; however, I
will say that I think it is possible for compositionists to retain and defend their autonomy
as they explore interdisciplinary connections. 4 What I call for in this chapter is not a
retraction of our claims to disciplinarity; nor do I argue that we attempt to regularly
publish outside of composition, as some scholars have suggested we might (see Williams
142). Instead, I call for a systematic recognition within our disciplinary discourse that
composition's history, contemporary research, and future interests overlap with other
disciplines. In other words, I want to encourage historians and other compositionists to
engage in a consistent unsettling of the discursive sphere, a continuous challenging of

Although I cannot claim that this proposal will necessarily alleviate or address the myriad material
realities associated with making the move to interdisciplinary self-definition, I want to restate the premise
upon which my argument is built (a premise shared with many members working in the discipline):
rhetorical choices produce material consequences. Although shifting the discursive sphere is a gradual and
slow process, the process itself is worthwhile in that each change allows for new intellectual and material
consequences, which ultimately allows for new perspectives to be made "intelligible" within disciplinary
discourse.

4
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what counts as knowledge within the rhetorical boundaries created by our disciplinary
discourse.
In this chapter as in others, I analyze textual examples from composition's
histories in relation to one another to demonstrate how and why these narratives have
been used and repeated over time. I use this analysis to identify the rhetorical effects
produced by these prevailing narratives; specifically, I show that our prevailing historical
narratives constrain the discursive sphere, therefore limiting contemporary scholars'
ability to achieve the interdisciplinary focus for which they advocate. Next, I use
metahistorical critique to examine historical accounts of composition that challenge
prevailing narratives, arguing that these examples offer important historiographic
strategies that challenge and expand the discursive sphere. These strategies, therefore,
gesture toward ways in which composition might be systematically rehistoricized as an
interdiscipline in the future. I contend that this project of rehistoricization has the
potential to benefit contemporary scholars, teachers, and students while also opening up
new possibilities for the future of a discipline that is already and has always been
engaged in interdisciplinary work.
Rhetoric's "Decline and Fall" and Composition's "Split" from Literature:
Prevailing Narratives of Antagonism
As I have already discussed in previous chapters, since Albert Kitzhaber
composed his dissertation on the history of composition,S compositionists have habitually
framed the discipline's past against developments in English literature and classical
rhetoric throughout the mid- to late-nineteenth century. Usually, this framing has been
As I explain in Chapter 2, Kitzhaber's dissertation was not published as a book until 1990 but became
available to many scholars in the late 1970s thanks to Richard Young and others. Several historians - most
notably James Berlin and Robert Connors - cite Kitzhaber in work published in the 1980s.

5
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supplemented with a focus on the fonnation of English studies at Harvard, the
institutional location which best encapsulates, for our most widely cited historians, the
"decline and fall" of classical rhetoric in the university and the "split" between English
literary studies and written communication. In this section, I trace the evolution of these
two versions of composition's prevailing narratives about disciplinarity by conducting a
metahistorical analysis of selected histories that employ these narratives. I conduct this
analysis in order to acknowledge how these narratives have served the discipline and to
demonstrate the inadequacy of such framing for contemporary composition, especially
when it aims to define itself as an interdiscipline.
In Chapter 2, I elaborated on the assumptions I see driving the "decline and fall"
narrative in relation to the development of prevailing narratives of current-traditional
rhetoric and pedagogy (CTRP). Here, I summarize the narrative and outline three specific
consequences for composition's construction of disciplinarity that emerge. In the "decline
and fall" narrative, compositionists represent the discipline's past as directly linked to the
classical rhetorical tradition but interrupted by a unified cultural shift from oral to written
rhetoric in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, a shift marked most clearly within higher
education by a change in pedagogical approaches toward rhetoric that emphasized
mechanical correctness and style over substance and invention - thus constituting
rhetoric's "decline and fall" in the American academy.
Many historians (among them Robert Connors, Michael Halloran, Sharon
Crowley, and Wallace Douglas, as I discuss in Chapter 2) take the shift for granted as a
unified one, most often describing it as a pedagogical movement from supposedly
democratic or civic rhetorical instruction to seemingly arhetorical CTRP - a movement
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unchallenged until rhetoric and composition instituted itself as an ostensibly legitimate
academic discipline in the middle of the twentieth century. While I do not dispute that
historians constructed this narrative through an examination of available historical
evidence, my argument in Chapter 2, as here, is that the "decline and fall" narrative
encourages scholars to understand composition's history as unfolding in a relatively
monolithic, unified, and linear fashion. This narrative has allowed composition to claim
legitimacy as an academic field because scholars can claim the contemporary discipline
as one that recovers a lost classical heritage. However useful the "decline and fall"
narrative may have been, it is, like all narratives, a rhetorical construction.
I call attention to the "decline and fall" narrative here because I see it as one that
problematically delimits the terms through which composition defines itself: In the wake
of smoothing out a complicated past, the narrative neglects myriad institutions,
pedagogies, students, and teachers, which could collectively offer the contemporary
discipline a broader, more nuanced, and interdisciplinary base upon which to claim
legitimacy. Let me explain: Narrating composition's history according to its ties to (or
loss of) a classical rhetorical tradition predisposes contemporary scholars, first, to
understand rhetoric as monolithic, having a clear and uninterrupted lineage and, second,
to hold up this tradition as an ideal against which disciplinary developments today or in
the future may be assessed. While having such an ideal may appear unproblematic at the
surface, I argue that this ideal, as a rhetorical construction, ensures the invisibility of
rhetorical traditions already marginalized in our scholarship (see Baca) and forces these
marginalized traditions to be interpreted according to a classical framework that
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reinforces Western values, beliefs and practices (see my discussion of Enoch in Chapter
2).

Further, understanding the contemporary discipline according to its ties to
classical rhetoric suggests that this disciplinary tradition (if it can, indeed, be called a
discipline) is central to understanding the work of contemporary composition. Let me be
clear: I do not take issue with the association of composition with rhetoric - in fact, I
think this connection is a fundamental one that must be made in any discussion about
writing. Rather, the process of centralizing a contested, often only loosely defined,
tradition in composition's conversations about disciplinarity privileges a rhetorically
constructed set of abstractions (the term "rhetoric," after all, is not a "thing" in and of
itself; the term sprouts myriad - and diverse - associations) over what some might argue
are stronger ties to more clearly defined academic disciplines such as education (see my
discussion of Fitzgerald in Chapter 2 and Schultz in Chapter 3).6 Within prevailing
narratives about rhetoric's supposed "decline and fall," this privileging consequently
erases lines that might be productively drawn between composition and disciplines other
than rhetoric, therefore dismantling scholars' efforts to define the contemporary
discipline as an interdiscipline.
Finally, defining composition according to its relationship with the classical
tradition of rhetoric actually (re)produces a problematically narrow definition of
"rhetoric," which, paradoxically, works against the desire of contemporary scholars who

I characterize rhetoric as a "contested" and "often loosely defined" discipline for two reasons: First, there
is a large body of scholarship that has called rhetoric's disciplinarity and history into question (see, for
example, collections edited by Victor Vitanza, as well as Richard Graff and Michael Left), and second,
because both composition and communications - two disciplines that are usually separate - claim it as their
own. Other scholars - including David Fleming and John Mucklebauer - have gone beyond the question of
rhetoric's disciplinarity and have highlighted the ambiguity of the tenn "rhetoric" itself.
6
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wish to challenge our assumptions about and expand what we mean by "rhetoric" and
those "traditions" associated with it. The following excerpt from Thomas Miller's The

Formation of College English helps illustrate my argument:
As the art of drawing on popular values to persuade the public about what
it ought to do, rhetoric has historically been associated with the ethical and
political concerns of moral philosophy .... While such civic concerns are a
well-recognized part of the history of rhetoric, modem rhetoric and
composition courses have largely concentrated on moving students from
the domailJ. of personal experience to the conventions of academic essays,
with public issues often providing a convenient backdrop for that
transition. (7)
Here, T. Miller makes a distinction between rhetoric and so-called personal and academic
writing; from this distinction, T. Miller expresses a desire that teachers will increasingly
"work[] to develop more explicitly politicized ways to approach sites of conflict," a
project that he sees as comprising "an integral part of the general expansion of rhetoric
and composition beyond the confines of academic discourse" (7, emphasis added).
By creating and maintaining a distinction between rhetoric and various forms of
writing habitually assigned by teachers in first-year composition (FYC), Thomas Miller
constructs a hierarchy that values explicitly politicized writing over academic or personal
writing. What's more, because this hierarchy suggests that academic or personal writing
cannot easily be defined as rhetorical,

~.

Miller's historiography devalues the work of

many teachers and students in the writing classroom. In fact, although he "hope [s] that
this movement will converge with work on community literacies and cultural studies to

revitalize and broaden rhetoric's traditional concern for how people draw on popular
values to resolve conflicts and deliberate ... shared problems" (7, emphasis added), this
hope is grounded on prevailing narratives of the "decline and fall" of rhetoric and
(re)produces the narrow definitions of rhetoric he hopes to "broaden," while also
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forwarding problematic assumptions about (seemingly apolitical) classroom writing. I
argue that T. Miller misses the opportunity to effectively expand the discursive sphere
about composition's role as a(n) (inter)discipline in that he identifies only a small portion
of writing practices and pedagogies as potentially rhetorical - and deliberately excludes
those that are academic and personal. This missed opportunity is reflected in and
perpetuated through T. Miller's historiography, which takes the "decline and fall"
narrative for granted. As a result, T. Miller's historiographic practice ultimately repeats
constrained conceptions of rhetoric and keeps classical rhetoric as the center of our
discourse about composition's disciplinarity.
As I noted above, I am not arguing that composition should sever its ties to
rhetoric, however defined; rather, I claim that composition does not need to rely on
prevailing narratives of rhetoric's "decline and fall" in the nineteenth century in order
define itself as a discipline. Composition's reliance on the "decline and fall" narrative
prevents it from exploiting the interdisciplinary characteristics inherent to the study of
both composition and rhetoric. What's more, when compositionists maintain this reliance
in their historiography, they risk an arbitrary categorization of writing practices, which
therefore constructs and perpetuates hierarchies of writing that can problematically carry
over into contemporary teaching practices - the very teaching practices that historians
such as T. Miller explicitly intend to change.
Some disciplinary historians have also critiqued the "decline and fall" narrative.
Susan Miller, for example, calls this narrative the "neoclassical" approach to composition
historiography; in Textual Carnivals, she writes that:
[The neoclassical] story of composition provides catalogues of the greats
... to create an impression that what goes on in current writing instruction
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and research is either the result of, or a needed reaction to, wellestablished precedents. In this approach, the dominant theme is continuity
and union. Historical discontinuities and fragmentations are seen not only
as unfortunate, but as the results of practices that lie on a spectrum
bounded by inadvertent idiocy and overt maliciousness. (36)
Later in the same chapter, S. Miller explicitly critiques the historiographic strategies
ingrained within this narrative, pointing out that "the language in these accounts is a
lament against fragmentation of rhetoric that might well be interpreted differently" (39,
emphasis added). For S. Miller, a different interpretation would lead scholars to
understand rhetoric's "fragmentation" not as evidence of a monolithic or linear past, but
as evidence that the discipline continually adjusts to new technologies of writing and to
the changing contexts of writing and reading over time. S. Miller's interpretation allows
for an expansive definition of rhetoric while also challenging the centrality of classical
rhetoric to composition's self-definition (39).
Susan Miller's critique in Textual Carnivals is helpful for outlining the limitations
of the "decline and fall" narrative. Indeed, at the time of its publication in 1991, S.
Miller's account of composition's history posed a formidable feminist challenge to
disciplinary historiography up to that point, in that she deliberately gave voice and value
to students and teachers, people who composition generally takes to be its "subjects." In
spite of this important intervention, however, S. Miller's argument also points to - and in
some ways participates in - another problematic prevailing narrative about composition's
disciplinarity, the "split" narrative. This narrative, which documents the separation of
composition and literature within English departments, presents its own set of problems
because it centralizes literary studies within composition's disciplinary discourse.
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The narrative is usually rendered as follows: At the beginning of the nineteenth
century, Harvard created the Boylston Professorship of Rhetoric and Oratory, to which
John Quincy Adams was first appointed. Between Adams' appointment in 1806 and
Edward T. Channing's, the third Boylston Professor appointed in 1819, the application of
classical rhetoric was emphasized at Harvard. However, because Channing used literary
examples to substantiate his lectures and because he often used these examples to
illustrate mechanical and stylistic concerns, many historians interpret his role as moving
toward literary studies while also attempting to systematize and streamline the teaching
of writing. Francis J. Child, the fourth Boylston Professor in 1851, entered the position
despising the work of reading and grading student writing and holding a firm desire to
move English studies from a rhetorical to a literary focus. In 1876, Child became the first
Professor of English, where he developed Harvard's program in English literature, and
Adams Sherman Hill became the fifth Boylston Professor, where he allowed the shift
from "rhetoric" to "composition" to prevail, creating a "split" between composition and
literary studies. According to the account published in the Bedford Bibliography for
Teachers of Writing, Hill then "continued the rule-bound focus on written composition
begun by Channing," making it "clear that composition was a second-class subject and
that rhetoric [would] hardly [be] mentioned" - thus ensuring literature's privileged
position within English departments everywhere. In fact, the Bedford account of the
history of composition composes both the "decline and fall" and the "split" narratives.
Because the book represents an authoritative and introductory but seemingly
comprehensive overview of composition's development as a discipline, its reproduction
of these narratives seems particularly significant in light of my argument here.
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The "split" narrative documented in the Bedford Bibliography and elsewhere
deserves to be questioned for three reasons: First, the narrative emerges out of historians'
limited focus on the pedagogical and intellectual decisions made by Channing, Child, and
Hill at Harvard. 7 Second, this focus has prompted compositionists to construct an
interpretation that problematically attributes these key actors with an influence over the
development of composition that carries into the twenty-first century: many historians
have argued that the "split" between literature and composition was motivated primarily
by Channing, Child, and Hill and that these figures ensured that composition would
remain locked in a "low" position in the academy from the late-nineteenth century into
the present. Finally, this interpretation is grounded upon a flawed premise (a functionalist
error) that literature's centrality within English departments actually caused the
marginalization of composition. This assumption, I contend, is not only questionable
because it misinterprets effects for a cause, but it also creates problematic rhetorical
boundaries for composition's discourse and returns the field perpetually to a construction
of its disciplinarity according to - and often against - the parallel development of English
literary studies as a discipline in the U.S. academy.
Susan Miller's historical account of composition, therefore, both resists the "split"
narrative while also inadvertently sustaining it. S. Miller argues that historians of English
studies (including Gerald Graff, Arthur Applebee, and others) have ignored the
development of composition studies while problematically romanticizing the study of
English literature. According to S. Miller, these accounts make writing invisible within

7 For my challenge to Harvard's centrality within composition's history, see Chapter 3. For challenges to
the Beclford Bibliography's representation of Channing, see my discussion of Elizabeth Larsen's and
Charles Paine's work in Chapter 2. For challenges to popular representations of Child, see Patricia Harkin's
"Child's Ballads."
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disciplinary histories of English and construct English studies as a "history of authorship
and of the authorized voice, whose origins, successes, and privileges are not bound to the
material circumstances of either readers or writers" (27, emphasis original). This version
of history, S. Miller argues, privileges the "'polished' surface oflanguage" (55), the
passive consumption of texts (27), and a "'pure' literary history" over "actual writing
practices" which "highlight[] the 'low'" elements of writing, "suggest[ing] fissures,
hesitations, conflicting purposes, and the multiple origins of ideas" (27).
While

s. Miller's analysis articulates an important corrective to popular histories

ofliterary studies in the u.s. and illuminates composition's role in the development of
English literature as an academic discipline, I contend that S. Miller's historiography
actually works against her larger purposes, in that it centralizes literature within English
studies, makes literature appear more cohesive than it actually is, and accepts as fact the
historical and continued marginalization of composition within English departments.
Take for example the following passage, in which S. Miller argues that Charles EliotHarvard's president between 1869 and 1904, largely credited with transforming Harvard
into the influential modem university we know it as today - intended to marry literature
and composition in the English department but employ them separately for specific but
complementary purposes. She writes:
... the two pursuits of literature and composition were joined immediately
as "high" and "low," advanced and elementary. Equally to the point, they
were one bourgeois effort at delight and instruction, leisure and work - a
necessary but nonetheless unified "division of labor" in Eliot's desires to
satisfy within a designated "new elite" .... Composition is clearly a site for
the "low," in all its senses. As an intrinsic portion of the new American
educational system, composition shared in the same tendencies to
institutionalize functionally "pure" systems that characterized the entire
nineteenth century. (53)
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Because her historical account of composition continually refers to and argues against
English literature's "high" place on the academic hierarchy, S. Miller's reading and
writing of composition's disciplinarity relies on the assumption that writing has always
been and is presently perceived as "low."
I do not question the veracity of S. Miller's argument about writing's historically
"low" status within specific institutional contexts; many historians have substantiated this
claim. Instead, I want to draw attention to how this assumption works to delimit
disciplinary discourse. S. Miller grounds her argument on the premise that composition
currently occupies, and has always occupied, a "low" institutional position. This premise,
as a generalization, disallows evidence to the contrary (see my discussion of JoAnn
Campbell and Patricia Donahue and Bianca Falbo in Chapter 3) and thus predisposes
composition to define its disciplinarity according to the assumption that the field
occupies, and will continue to occupy, a marginal position in the academy.
Additionally, although she means to recuperate composition's place as a
"legitimate" academic discipline, S. Miller's historiography, as represented in the passage
above and elsewhere, works from and supports three faulty assumptions that carry
rhetorical consequences for the discipline today: First, she assumes that composition's
developments are deeply intertwined with literature's; second, she argues that
composition has traditionally been pushed aside because oithe "rise" of English literary
studies; and finally, she attributes to figures such as Eliot deliberate, elitist, and ultimately
malevolent desires (in this case, she argues that Eliot used composition to stratify
students). I argue that the underlying assumptions driving S. Miller's historiography limit
the success of her larger historical project, which has the potential, theoretically speaking,
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to broaden composition's historical discourse and legitimize those writing practices and
pedagogies largely ignored within popular histories of English literature in the United
States. But because S. Miller's historical account always returns composition to its
fraught relationship with English literary studies, composition's disciplinarity is
constructed accordingly. Thus, S. Miller's historiography constrains contemporary
scholars who would define composition's past, present, and future as one that is largely
interdisciplinary in nature.
The delimiting effects of composition's prevailing narratives about its
disciplinarity are presented in high relief when examining scholarship outside the
discipline. Take for example, Daniel Coffey's 2006 article, "A Discipline's Composition:
A Citation Analysis of Composition Studies," published in the Journal ofAcademic
Librarianship. Drawing heavily on Robert Connors' account in Composition-Rhetoric,
Coffey's summary of the history of the discipline clearly echoes both the "split" and
"decline" narratives. Coffey writes:
English Departments ... sprung up widely at the end of the 19th century.
And these became the obvious - although often less than welcoming home for rhetoricians: the discipline-less, doctorate-less holdovers from an
earlier era of American higher education. As a result, for the greater part
ofthe 20th century, rhetoric-composition suffered as a weak cousin to the
academic discipline of literary ... study, and rhetoricians, who were
saddled with the additional task of composition instruction, found
themselves carrying a much heavier workload. (156-57)
Because Coffey's profession depends on tracking trends within disciplinary scholarship,
we can assume that his depiction of composition's history is representative of how a
scholar outside of composition, literature, or rhetoric might depict our history (if they are
to depict it at all). And because Coffey so easily folds both the "split" and "decline"
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narratives into the short passage above, we can see the rhetorical effects of disciplinary
historiography outside of composition studies.
Composition, Literature, Rhetoric: Prevailing Narratives of Unity

The "split" and "decline" narratives are repeated frequently in composition
scholarship; however, as illustrated by Susan Miller's critique of the "neoclassical"
narrative above, they do not go unchallenged in disciplinary histories. In Chapters 2 and
3, I presented evidence from various histories that question the accuracy of the "decline"
narrative; not only have historians recently called attention to the persistence of classical
rhetorical education in a wide range of institutions outside Harvard, but they have also
questioned historians' assumptions that the relationships among textbooks, teachers, and
students was arhetorical during the nineteenth century. Also, in Chapter 3, I used
evidence from JoAnn Campbell's and Patricia Donahue and Bianca Falbo's historical
research to demonstrate that a clear, marginalizing "split" between composition and
literature was not universally experienced within English departments in the nineteenth
century.
So although I have, in a sense, already used these scholars' histories to challenge
the viability of these narratives, I call attention to these prevailing narratives yet again in
order to demonstrate how they limit composition's discourse and produce important
consequences for those who would like to exploit composition's (inter)disciplinarity. In
this section, I analyze what I call the "unifying" narrative, a narrative which challenges
prevailing narratives of "split" and "decline" but which produces limiting consequences.
The "unifying" narrative calls for composition to understand its past not as antagonistic
to rhetoric or literature, but rather as evolving alongside, even with, both disciplines. This
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"unifying" narrative is useful for the contemporary discipline in that it acknowledges
important links among language-based disciplines; what's more, this narrative moves
composition one step closer to identifying itself as an interdiscipline. At the same time,
however, the "unifying" narrative does not go far enough because it maintains rhetorical
boundaries similar to the "decline" and "split" narratives. I contend that this narrative
makes composition intelligible only in relation to literature and/or rhetoric, thus masking
the role composition has played with(in) other disciplines.
Rather than repeating my previous discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, I focus here on
textual evidence that exemplifies how the "unifying" narrative uniquely benefits
composition's definition of itself as a discipline. These examples illuminate how
composition's relationship to rhetoric and literature has, in some cases at least, had
productive rather than marginalizing effects, especially in relation to issues of gender and
the extracurriculum. At the same time, I use these examples to illustrate the limits of the
"unifying" narrative in moving us toward an interdisciplinary understanding of
composition's past, present, and future.
Julie Garbus's and Kathryn Conway's examinations of rhetorical education at
private women's institutions during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries together
construct a persuasive version of the "unifying" narrative that carries positive
consequences for composition's understanding and representation of gender and writing
instruction. In her contribution to the Local Histories collection, Garbus highlights the
figure and pedagogy of Vida Scudder, an influential literature professor at Wellesley at
the turn of the century. Garbus argues that Scudder understood literature as a form of
rhetoric and thus should be of interest to compositionists because she offered rhetorical
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training to her female students. What's more, Garbus contends, the particular rhetoricalliterary training provided by Scudder empowered women in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries to become "educated, moral citizens who could think independently and
carefully, discern intellectual and moral truths, and articulate those truths for the good of
the community" (79). In this microhistory, Garbus refuses to assume literature and
composition were "split" within the English department at Wellesley - and this refusal is
impressive in light of existing historical literature, which equates the structure of
Wellesley's English department with actual pedagogical practice and the status of
composition in relation to literature (cf. Patricia Palmieri's Adamless Eden, cited in
Garbus 80).
In "Woman Suffrage and the History of Rhetoric at the Seven Sisters Colleges,"
Conway analyzes women's institutions (her study also includes Wellesley) during the
late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, framing her examination of rhetorical
education in relation to its effects for the woman's suffrage movement in the United
States. Like Garbus and other historians, Conway interprets the rhetorical training
provided for women at the tum of the century as highly influential. According to
Conway's study, female students studied oratory in the classroom and had the freedom to
discuss and debate suffrage because of the single-sex educational context. Women's
rhetorical training in the classroom thus trickled into the public sphere. Conway explains:
The woman suffrage movement was the first public campaign for
women's rights in the United States launched and sustained by women
who had received formal rhetorical training. These women pioneered both
in higher education and in public speaking; they were among the first
women to attend college in the United States, and many put their
education to work as pro- and anti-suffrage speakers. In particular,
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alumnae of the Seven Sisters colleges gained prominence in this public
debate. (203)8
By tracing women's education into their political and public lives, Conway's study
provides concrete examples of how rhetorical preparation has been useful for women's
participation in the public sphere in the United States. And because this training was
offered within English departments where rhetoric was neither on the "decline" nor seen
as a separate pursuit from literature or composition, Conway's account confirms both the
viability of the '"unifying" narrative as well as its use as a lens through which scholars
might better understand connections between gender and rhetorical instruction. Together,
Conway's and Garbus's microhistories demonstrate how the "unifying" narrative can
produce valuable intellectual and material effects for composition's definition of
disciplinarity today; specifically, by understanding composition, rhetoric and literature as
developing in tandem, compositionists can more effectively represent women in their
histories while also acknowledging the empowering potential of rhetorical education for
women and other marginalized populations, both at the turn of the century and today.
One interesting and perhaps surprising example of the "unifying" narrative is
evident in discussions of non-academic literary clubs popular in the nineteenth century.
Several historians, including Anne Ruggles Gere, Elizabeth McHenry, and Shirley Brice
Heath, have pointed to these clubs as important examples of the relationship between
literature and literacy development. In Intimate Practices: Literacy and Cultural Work in

us.

Women's Clubs, 1880-1920, Gere analyzes the activities of a wide variety of

8 Although my focus is not on the accuracy of Conway's history, I think it's important to note that many
historians would question Conway's claim that the woman suffrage movement was the "first public
campaign for women's rights in the United States launched and sustained by women who had received
formal rhetorical training." This claim, which is grounded on formal contexts of education only actually
highlights one of the many problems that emerge out of composition's narrow focus.
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women's clubs around the turn of the century in an effort to legitimize their activities and
define their work as intertwined with the professionalization of English studies. Gere
argues that women's clubs have been largely ignored in historical accounts of English
studies because the male-dominated discipline "had to discredit clubwomen's literary
projects in favor of their own; they stigmatized the literacy practices of women's clubs to
enhance those of professors" (214). Moreover, accounts of the history of English studies
"also reduced [clubwomen] to a single type - white, middle class, and educated," which
"made it easier to portray [the discipline] in monolithic terms" (216). Additionally,
historical accounts of the development of literature refuse to look outside of postsecondary educational institutions, meaning that:
These accounts ignore or are institutionally blinded to the fact that when
English professors were claiming their professional territory in higher
education, thousands of women's clubs conducted, outside the academy's
walls, projects of consuming and producing texts. (216-217)
In looking beyond institutional walls for the history of English studies and valuing the
women's roles in both "consuming and producing texts," it becomes clear that Gere
defines English studies as inseparably related to writing practices and pedagogy.
Although the women studied "literature," Gere sees the clubs and clubwomen as an
important component of the history of composition studies. She writes that contemporary
disciplinary histories:
... overlook the Mormon clubwomen who saw invention as the most
important part of writing, the working-class women who read their papers
at local and regional meetings, and the women from all social locations
who entered essay competitions or became published authors. (243)
Following Gere's logic through these excerpts illustrates how the "unifying" narrative
helps composition move toward self-identification as an interdiscipline, one that has
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grown (and continues to grow) through its rich association with other disciplines,
including but not limited to literary studies.
Like Intimate Practices, Elizabeth McHenry and Shirley Brice Heath's "The
Literate and the Literary: African Americans as Writers and Readers, 1830-1940"
documents the relationship between literacy and the study of literature, this time in
relation to African Americans. In this essay, McHenry and Heath resist popular
conceptions of African American literacy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
conceptions that define it as the ability to sign one's name or to read or as signified by
highly valorized figures such as Frederick Douglass and Harriet Jacobs (261). McHenry
and Heath argue that these conceptions, especially when paired with scholarly attention
to the "oral" traditions of African Americans, ignore large numbers of middle- and upperclass African Americans who participated in an impressively literate - and literary - U.S.
history (262-63). In focusing on the activities of African Americans' participation in
literary societies, McHenry and Heath assume, like Gere, that writing and reading
practices outside the academy are inextricably interrelated. They write:
The work to be done in restoring accuracy and cross-class representations
of African American writers extends beyond classrooms. Scholars need to
give much more attention to the range of written genres in relation to oral
genres of African American authors, as well as to their readership - the
people and places for whom written materials become central interaction
and action. (274)
Like Gere, McHenry and Heath refuse to separate the study of literature from writing
practice and pedagogy; in "unifying" the two, they challenge standard representations of
African American readers and writers. Additionally, their history also reveals a rich
history that marries reading to writing practices, thus challenging disciplinary discourse
that understands composition as inherently "split" from literature.
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Although Gere's and McHenry and Heath's research concentrates on what Gere
calls the "extracurriculum" and not disciplinarity within an academic context, I use these
two textual examples to suggest that the "unifying" narrative might push compositionists
to revise popular conceptions of disciplinarity; that is, when we broaden our definitions
of what counts as literary study, we can also revise definitions of composition so as to
understand it as a(n) (inter)discipline. In developing our terms, we might also resist racist
and sexist attitudes that ground our definitions of what activities count toward
disciplinarity. And just as Garbus's and Conway's research suggests positive
consequences for composition's understanding of and ability to serve marginalized
populations, so too do Gere's and McHenry and Heath's histories: In shedding light on
composition's diverse and expansive history, these historians' scholarship unsettles the
rhetorical boundaries of disciplinary discourse established through primary narratives of
"split" and "decline," allowing scholars to more easily centralize marginalized groups
within the discipline's history, development, and future.
Collectively, Garbus's, Conway's, Gere's, and McHenry and Heath's histories
demonstrate how and why the "unifying" narrative has benefited composition in
intellectual and material ways: First, the "unifying" narrative expands the discursive
sphere, allowing composition to define itself in positive relation to rhetoric and literature.
And second, in challenging prevailing narratives of "split" and "decline," the "unifying"
narrative makes visible histories of writing practice and pedagogy engaged by groups of
people habitually pushed to the margins of disciplinary discourse - which in turn allows
more scholars, teachers, and students of writing to identify themselves as a part of the
past and future of composition.
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But although questioning the "split" and "decline" narratives produces important
benefits for composition, disciplinary histories that revise the story of composition's past
and produce prevailing narratives of "unity" among composition, rhetoric and literature
often continue to limit the purview of historical and contemporary scholarship in much
the same way as the original "split" and "decline" narratives do. Even as these histories
attempt to revise and reject prevailing narratives of the history of writing instruction in
the United States, Conway's and Garbus's histories label certain pedagogical practices
"rhetorical," and Gere's and McHenry and Heath's histories define the activities of
women's and African American clubs as "literary" so as to make these practices
intelligible within contemporary disciplinary discourse. While these rhetorical moves are
not necessarily problematic in themselves, my point is that their reliance on
composition's obvious ties to literature and rhetoric delimits the possibility that these
pedagogical practices and extracurricular clubs will be defined, and therefore valued, for
their connections to a broader range of disciplines. 9
Some might point out at this juncture that scholars face an inevitable mandate to
make their research intelligible to a specific disciplinary audience; in response, I contend
that interdisciplinary research in composition will not be recognized and valued as such
until we systematically challenge our prevailing historical narratives. My claim is simple:
Until we acknowledge in our histories the multiple ways in which composition has
borrowed from, built upon, and influenced a wide variety of disciplines, contemporary

For example, writing instruction defined as "rhetorical" might also be defined in terms of educational or
political theory, speech communications, or psychology. And the participation of women and African
Americans within literary clubs might also be understood as pointing to the development of political
science, government, history, or even the study of language.

9
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calls for a recognition (or redefinition) of composition as productively interdisciplinary
will not succeed in persuading skeptical audiences. 10

Composition as a(n) (Inter)Discipline
In this section, I conduct a metahistorical critique of a variety of texts that have
established historical connections between composition and disciplines other than
rhetoric and literature. I use this analysis to argue that, although composition's history is
distinct from that of other disciplines - and although there are many reasons why we have
composed historical narratives establishing this distinction - composition has much to
gain from acknowledging our past as one that is deeply intertwined with a variety of
disciplines. First, when we revise our prevailing narratives to reflect composition's past
as interdisciplinary, we can more easily rework those historical accounts that rely
narrowly on composition's relations to "rhetoric" and "literature" to explain its
disciplinarity. Second, revising our prevailing narratives enables composition scholars to
communicate with the disciplines we so often borrow from in our scholarship and also
with those non-composition scholars with whom we interact regularly at our home
institutions. Finally, in identifying our own history as interdisciplinary, we become
identifiable to other disciplines as a valuable and mutually reciprocal resource. I argue,
therefore, that our hopes for an interdisciplinary future will flounder until the story of our
past is retold as an interdisciplinary one.
Here, I answer those scholars, such as Phelps, Williams, Mailloux, Goggin, and
Homer and Lu, who have called for composition's redefinition as an interdiscipline by

10 When I use the phrase "skeptical audiences," I am thinking of two specific groups: Those who see
composition's past primarily in tenns of its relationship to rhetoric and/or literature, and those who worry
that defming composition as an "interdiscipline" may mean the discipline will break apart at the seams or
lose its claims to academic legitimacy.
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presenting examples from the handful of disciplinary histories that have made
connections between composition and other disciplines to show how we might more
cohesively revise our prevailing narratives along interdisciplinary lines. I do this to
demonstrate, first, that composition can claim an interdisciplinary past; second, to show
how this path strengthens our claims for an interdisciplinary future; and third, to illustrate
how the construction and maintenance of a prevailing historical narrative of
"interdisciplinarity" can effectively benefit scholars, teachers, and students of
composition in the present and future, while also promoting discourse between
disciplines that is mutually beneficial.
Because they both focus on language use, the disciplines of speech
communications and linguistics are the two fields outside of English literature and
rhetoric most clearly tied to - and the most likely to be recognized as a part of composition's history. In two separate articles published in the same issue of College
Composition and Communication (CCC) in honor of its fiftieth anniversary, John Heyda
and Diana George and John Trimbur document composition's victory in what Heyda
calls the '''turf wars' of the 1950s," during which both composition and speech
communications claimed ownership of the first-year course. For Heyda and George and
Trimbur, the eventual exclusion of speech communications from the purview of rhetoric
and composition represents a loss for the discipline. Imagining what composition might
have gained from "a long-term partnership with communications," Heyda argues that a
continued relationship with communications would have helped composition remain
attentive to aural rhetorical elements such as speaking and listening, and it would have
helped composition establish a certain degree of disciplinary autonomy, perhaps even
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diffusing the power differentials it nonnally experienced within home departments of
English (680). For George and Trimbur, the divorce of communications and composition
in the 1950s
reproduces deeply-engrained logocentric allegiances to the verbal over the
visual by holding the intellectual authority of written text over the
presumably derivative and immature character of visual communication,
thereby making the image subservient to the word (697).
In reconstructing and revaluing the contributions (or potential contributions) speech
communication at one time offered to composition studies, George and Trimbur and
Heyda provide at least one trajectory through which the discipline could be effectively
rehistoricized: These histories refuse to assume that the visual and aural components of
persuasion are irrelevant within contemporary composition studies, thus disrupting the
rhetorical boundaries established by our prevailing narratives about disciplinarity. Heyda
and George and Trimbur, therefore, encourage the contemporary discipline to revitalize
its attention to the aural and the visual and look beyond composition's most widely cited
journals and scholars to those of speech communications and remain open to its offerings.
While Heyda and George and Trimbur lament a seeming "loss" of our connection
to speech communications, their arguments seem to be challenged by the fact that
compositionists today often publish in cross-disciplinary journals such as Rhetoric

Society Quarterly and Rhetoric Review, which also publish communications scholars.
Additionally, composition has turned its attention to visual rhetoric since the publication
of Heyda's and George and Trimbur's articles, and some scholars, including Krista
Ratcliffe, Michelle Balliff, and Cynthia Selfe, have recently called attention to the aural
components of composition studies. This evidence does not make Heyda's and George
and Trimbur's proposals for the future irrelevant, however; instead, it demonstrates how
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our prevailing historical narratives - which construct composition as an autonomous
discipline - may mask evidence of an ongoing and interrelated past.
Both Sharon Crowley and Robert Connors have traced the complex historical
relationship between composition and linguistics, especially as it developed around the
mid-twentieth century. Although their historiography continues to rely on some of the
problematic assumptions I have already deconstructed in previous chapters, their
acknowledgement of ties between composition and linguistics deserves attention here.
Crowley contends that scholars attempted to integrate linguistic theory into composition
practice and theory "primarily because of the intellectual poverty that characterized
instruction in writing" ("Linguistics" 481). She argues that linguistic theory appeared
attractive at this time to some scholars for two reasons: first, because compositionists
were eager to attach themselves to a discipline with some clout in the academy; and
second because of composition's historical emphasis on the study and teaching of
grammatical correctness. In spite of her problematic claim that "intellectual poverty
characterized instruction in writing," Crowley'S conclusions are worth paying attention to
because she sees the contributions of applied linguistics as ultimately positive for
composition studies. Crowley explains that, despite some scholars' reservations about the
field's viability,
[l]inguistics taught teachers to look at the language actually used by their
students as a departure for instruction; [linguistics scholars] emphatically
rejected the claim made by more traditional teachers that instruction
should present students with an ideal language to which their own
linguistic performance must be made to conform. (501-02)
Connors' brief acknowledgement of linguistics' influence in CompositionRhetoric is similar to Crowley's, though it is couched within a larger discussion of
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composition's attitude toward mechanical correctness (162-70). He uses the account to
urge compositionists to understand the "balanc[e] between formal and rhetorical
considerations [as] a delicate one" (170). Although both of these historians interpret the
ties between linguistics and composition as limited in scope, the evidence they provide of
a shared history provides an important beginning that might be revisited by scholars
interested in rehistoricizing composition as an interdiscipline. 11
Specifically, Connors' and Crowley'S interpretations oflinguistics' contribution
to composition history suggest that much more than formal grammar can be learned
about language acquisition from the study of linguistics. And indeed, some scholars
trained in linguistics, including Suresh Canagarajah and Paul Kei Matsuda, have recently
received attention in composition scholarship. But because most composition scholars are
unlikely to have received formal training in linguistics, some may perceive such
knowledge as unnecessary to effectively study or teach writing. Connors's and Crowley'S
accounts imply, however, that when we recognize and borrow from linguistics as a part
of our (inter)disciplinary history, our understanding and treatment of students - especially
our ability to appropriately approach and accommodate their writing practices - will
grow. Further, as theoreticians of writing who understand our history as linked to that of
linguistics, we can continue to learn from, build upon, and perhaps even contribute to
conversations in which the two disciplines share mutual interests about the nature of
language and language learning.

11 Also see Martin Nystrand et aI., "Where Did Composition Studies Come From? An Intellectual History."
In this article, Nystrand et ai. argue that composition's history can best be traced according to theoretical
developments in literature and linguistics; they trace composition's development according to the primary
theoretical frames (formalism, structuralism, and dialogism) that have influenced it, theoretical frames
shared by linguistics and literature.
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What's more, when composition begins to consistently recognize linguistics as
relevant to its history and its future, the discipline is more likely to acknowledge subfields oflinguistics, including applied linguistics, sociolinguistics, and second-language
acquisition, as equally relevant. Matsuda has drawn attention to composition's habitual
sidelining of second-language studies, or Teaching English to Speakers of Other
Languages (TESOL). In "Composition Studies and ESL Writing: A Disciplinary Division
of Labor," Matsuda argues that in refusing to historicize TESOL as a part of composition
studies, scholars "reinscribeOthe view that the sole responsibility of teaching writing to
ESL students falls upon professionals in another intellectual formation: second-language
studies" (700)0 12 But because "ESL students in most cases are required to enroll in
composition courses, and since many ESL writers also take professional writing courses,"
Matsuda contends, "ESL writing issues should be as much a concern for composition
specialists as they are for second-language specialists" (715). The first step toward
mutual understanding between disciplines (he is careful not to suggest that the disciplines
merge), according to Matsuda, is understanding that TESOL and composition share a
history that led to a "disciplinary division of labor" between 1941 and 1966. Once this
history is integrated into our narratives, Matsuda argues, both disciplines can understand
their work as mutually informative and potentially transformative on an institutional level
(715).
Matsuda's microhistory demonstrates how an awareness of composition's
historical relationship with linguistics and second-language studies can lead to an
interdisciplinary revision of the "split," "decline," and "unifying" narrative that will

12 A similar refusal of responsibility also exists between composition scholars and K-12 specialists, a
disciplinary division I address below.
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benefit composition scholars seeking a deeper understanding of language and writing
teachers hoping to better serve their students. However, Matsuda's historical account of
TESOL also calls attention to the monolingual presumptions that ground our prevailing
narratives: When we trace composition's disciplinarity according to its historical
relationship to (or separation from) classical rhetoric and literature, the question of
language is rarely raised as significant to this history. However, as John Trimbur points
out in "Linguistic Memory and the Politics of U.S. English," the question oflanguage

should be raised when discussing the recent history of higher education in the U.S.; he
writes that "the U.S. university has drastically curtailed the educational role oflanguages
other than English - whether Greek and Latin in the old-time American pietistic colleges
or German for those Americans who went to German universities to get PhDs" (583).
Once the question of language is raised in relation to composition's historywhether in the context of the language used in "old-time" American colleges,
international study, the study of modem languages, or non-native speakers and writers of
English - our disciplinary past, and thus our sense of disciplinarity, becomes much more
complex. As Bruce Homer and John Trimbur point out in "English Only and U.S.
College Composition," disciplinary histories have taken for granted the monolingualism
of composition studies, which they argue "replaced the bilingualism (in principle if not
always in practice) of the classical curriculum" (595). Homer and Trimbur argue that the
institutionalization of FYC led composition to privilege English as a "living language"; to
marginalize the study of modem languages as an activity of reading (602-03); and
ultimately to uphold a "tacit language policy of unidirectional English monolingualism"
(594) that manifests itself in the contemporary discipline. Homer and Trimbur intend to
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"pose an alternative way of thinking about composition programs, the language of our
students, and our own language practices that holds monolingualism itself to be a
problem and a limitation ofD.S. culture and that argues for the benefits of an actively
multilingual language policy" (597).
I agree with Homer and Trimbur that "monolingualism itself' poses a problem but not just because of the institutionalization of FYC (and its monolingual bias) in
universities during the nineteenth century. I argue, also, that composition's approach
toward the writing of its history - our historiographic practice - has likely participated in
the masking of "an actively multilingual" past that stretches far beyond the "bilingual"
classical curriculum or the study of modem languages that Homer and Trimbur hope to
recuperate. Matsuda's microhistory ofTESOL and composition, as well as Jessica
Enoch's and Damian Baca's histories, which I discussed in Chapter 3, hints at the
importance of recognizing the immigration - and thus multilingual- history of the
United States and the consequences this history must have had on teachers and students
of writing from the nineteenth century on (see also Samantha NeCamp's research on the
Moonlight Schools). Because composition studies is historicized as inevitably
monolingual, and because acquisition of an international perspective is seen as a
contemporary project, the discipline overlooks evidence of a multilingual past - a past
that could further enrich our disciplinary links to linguistics and TESOL, as well as to
modem languages and classics.
Just as the above historical accounts document the disappearance of speech
communications, linguistics, TESOL, and modem languages from composition's
purview, the discipline has also lost sight of its connection to the field of education. This
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loss is notable especially since many of the mid-century scholarly conversations
surrounding composition's development took its connection to education, at least at the
secondary level, for granted. For example, in his 1959 address to the Conference on
College Composition and Communication (CCCC), Kitzhaber attempts to resolve the
problems associated with first-year composition (FYC) by focusing on the bridge
between high school and college. He proposes that, instead of abolishing FYC, college
writing professors should work collaboratively with high school teachers and
administrators to provide appropriate preparatory work in language, literature, and
rhetoric. Although proposals such as Kitzhaber's are made occasionally in our
scholarship and at conferences such as CCCC, many in the discipline no longer see K-12
education as composition's responsibility.
Some of our lack of contemporary attention to composition's connections with
education can perhaps be explained by the academy's attitude toward pedagogy, as well
as composition's desire to be perceived as a "legitimate" academic discipline. The history
of composition's relation to education has been documented by scholars such as
Mariolina Salvatori and Margaret Marshall. In Pedagogy: Disturbing History, Salvatori
presents a documentary history of how pedagogy has been perceived and defined within
the academy; she is particularly "interested in calling attention to some of the
questionable rationales that historically have allowed English departments to look at
teacher preparation with suspicion, derision, and condescension" (6). She believes that an
"investigation of the historical precedents that foster dismissive attitudes toward
pedagogy must begin with the recuperative gesture, one that aims at recapturing a version
of pedagogy's past that will make such dismissals problematic and self-indicting" (7). By
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recuperating and revaluing education's reputation within contemporary English
departments, Salvatori's history offers a clear lens through which composition can
identify its past as intrinsically - and fruitfully - connected to the field of education. And
with this revaluation, composition can learn from ongoing and overlapping educational
research while also opening up mutually beneficial lines of communication between the
disciplines.
In Response to Reform: Composition and the Professionalization of Teaching,
Marshall provides a historical account of the rhetoric used to describe teacher
professionalization, literacy, and writing instruction. Marshall argues that scholarteachers within contemporary composition studies continue to be marginalized because of
this discursive history; she believes that "attending to the echoes of prior discourses and
being conscious of the ways language and argument construct (and limit) our
conceptions" is a primary step in subverting composition's historically "low" status
within the academy (16-17). She demonstrates how compositionists might
"reconceptualize what it means to prepare for and enter the profession, especially the
relationship between scholarship and teaching. Such an examination also repositions
those of us who have chosen to teach the literacy of written discourse as something other
than powerless victims" (2-3). With Marshall and Salvatori, I agree that retracing
composition's disciplinary history as one intertwined with the discipline of education
benefits compositionists hoping to see themselves as agents or their discipline as
legitimate. In addition, such a retracing encourages compositionists to value the field of
education as an equally legitimate discipline. The field of education deserves our
attention not only because of what we can give it, but because of what we can learn from
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it: among many other things, the discipline can infonn our understanding ofliteracy, of
student identity in the classroom, of effective pedagogical practice, and it can help us
bridge gaps in our knowledge about writing pedagogy and practice in primary and
secondary schools.
As I already discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the discipline's contemporary
negligence of composition's connections to the field of education may account for some
of its negligence of the history of writing practices and pedagogy at nonnal schools,
which were responsible for the education of the nation's K-12 teachers (see my
discussion of Kathryn Fitzgerald, Beth Ann Rothennel, and Kenneth Lindblom et al. in
Chapter 2), and at primary and secondary schools (see my discussion of Lucille Schultz's

The Young Composers in Chapter 3). In addition, composition's negligence of its ties to
education might also help explain how and why the history of writing instruction for
vocational purposes and/or for adults has escaped our attention. David Gold, Susan Kates,
and Karyn Hollis have emphasized the important role played by vocational schools in
rhetorical education, especially for relatively powerless groups of people in the United
States.
In one chapter of Rhetoric at the Margins, Gold documents the history of writing
instruction at Texas Woman's University (TWU), which provided vocational training for
white women at the turn of the century. Gold insists that TWU and institutions like it
need to be examined in composition histories as sites of rhetorical education and action.
He explains that
... for white women in Texas, gender-centered vocational education
represented an important avenue of socioeconomic and political
achievement.. .. Unlike many of their peers at elite private women's
colleges in the East, students at TWU were consistently encouraged to
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write and speak in public forums, to take part in political discourse, and to
think of themselves as rhetors. (68)
Whereas Gold's study focuses on a traditional university context, both Kates and Hollis
historicize writing instruction at two separate schools established out of the workers'
education movement in the U.S. during the 1920s. At Brookwood Labor College and the
Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women, Kates and Hollis find, "educators promoted the
study of rhetoric as a deeply democratic and socially responsive endeavor" (Kates 18),
and students "used writing to remake their discursive selves, forging new and more
powerful 'real world' identities in the process" (Hollis 37). These three historians - and
Kates and Hollis in particular - illustrate how composition's prevailing narratives about
its disciplinarity can mask activities and institutions that fail to fit within our discourse
because they cannot clearly be defined according to academic disciplinary divisions. As a
consequence, Kates' and Hollis' research challenges the rhetorical boundaries of the
discursive sphere; the educational practices they document cannot easily be made
intelligible within prevailing narratives of composition's disciplinarity. Together, Gold's,
Kates', and Hollis' historical research highlights the rich connections that can continue to
be developed between the fields of composition and education, while also gesturing
toward research that is needed to more fully understand of composition's
interdisciplinary past.
The histories I have discussed in this final section provide clear starting points
from which we can approach the rehistoricization project I advocate throughout this
chapter. We might also explore composition's interrelation with areas closely related to
those I have already discussed here, including professional writing, journalism, creative
writing, and media studies. While scholars such as Jeff Rice, Katherine Adams, and
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Alexandria Peary have offered starting points along these lines, their histories - like
many of those I have already discussed - remain marginal in relation to scholarship that
repeats our prevailing historical narratives. Until we engage in a systematic project that
recognizes composition's past as a fundamentally interdisciplinary one, I argue that these
important historical accounts will remain marginal and will thus immobilize our calls for
an interdisciplinary future.

Conclusion
The rehistoricization project I envision does not mean a dismissal of
composition's ties to literary studies or rhetoric; rather, this project would draw from
these ties while acknowledging others. It would refuse arbitrary disciplinary boundaries
and resist the pressure to "purify" composition through rhetorical processes of
disciplinary exclusion and neglect. And perhaps most importantly, this project would
construct itself as dialogic at its heart, mutually beneficial for composition as well as the
disciplines it engages. This interdisciplinary rehistoricization would seek out points of
connection as well as division - at what points do our disciplinary interests converge,

.

where do they separate, and toward what ends? What can we give to, and what can we
learn from, these overlapping disciplines? And finally, what can we take from
composition's historical position as an interdiscipline? Beginning with these questions,
composition can construct an interdisciplinary narrative of the past, which will in turn
allow it to pursue a rich and interdisciplinary future.
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CONCLUSION

When I began this project, I was not aware of composition's extensive historical
knowledge. I did not expect to find that composition has published more than 150 books
and articles about the history of writing instruction in the United States. I was not yet
familiar with the many voices that today echo and overlap with one another as I write the
words that must conclude this project. In fact, I began this study familiar only with James
Berlin's, Susan Miller's, Robert Connors', and Sharon Crowley'S histories and the early
conversations about historiography that seemed to have dwindled by the mid-90s. Given
the decade that had elapsed since the publication of Crowley's 1998 history, I wondered
why I kept hearing their voices, their versions of history, instead of others in
contemporary scholarship. I did not know what else was out there, and once I began
searching, I found much more than I expected (even today, I am sure my search is
incomplete). I suspect the same is true of many compositionists, particularly those whose
research interests are not historical.
Thus, the impetus for the project: If certain versions of our disciplinary history
prevail in the disciplinary imaginary, even in spite of a growing body of scholarship
challenging these narratives, what are the material and intellectual consequences for
contemporary scholars, teachers, and students? In other words, how can we identify and
analyze the effects of historiography? And once we have considered the consequences of
our historiographic practices, how can we effectively revise disciplinary discourse so as
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to illuminate competing versions of history, encourage complexity in our narratives,
harness new rhetorical strategies, and therefore enable different consequences? Although
some, such as Lisa Mastrangelo and Melissa Ianetta, have recently critiqued specific
versions of our history that deserve revision, I contend that our prevailing historical
narratives will persist until we systematically analyze and critique disciplinary
historiography.l Metahistorical critique allows for this level of analysis, in that it provides
a methodical approach with which to read and analyze how a textual corpus, having a
shared rhetorical purpose, evolves over time and produces lasting consequences. While
the process is imperfect in that reading and interpretation are ultimately subjective
activities, my analysis of three prevailing historical narratives in this dissertation
demonstrates the value of metahistorical critique for the discipline.
At its heart, metahistorical critique pushes composition scholars to question
problematic versions of our history and evaluate the consequences of using these
narratives, thus applying measured critique to both historical and non-historical
scholarship. Take for example Kurt Spellmeyer's contribution to the Composition Studies

in the New Millenium collection, "Education for Irrelevance?" In this essay, Spellmeyer
proposes a new future for rhetoric and composition that would do away with its ties to
literary studies because "[w]hen compositionists emulate English studies, we are
emulating irrelevance, world evasion, and failure" (82). In order to take this stance,
Spellmeyer grounds his argument on two prevailing historical narratives - the "decline
and fall" and "split" narratives - both of which I challenged in Chapters 2 and 4. He
writes: "In some ideal sense, the curriculum as we know it reaches back to ancient
I See Mastrangelo's "Lone Wolf or Leader ofthe Pack? Rethinking the Grand Narrative of Fred Newton
Scott" (College English 2010) and Janetta's "Disciplinarity, Divorce, and the Displacement of Labor
Issues: Rereading Histories of Composition and Literature" (CCC 2010).
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Greece, but it actually took shape about a hundred years ago with the decline of the
liberal arts college and the rise of the modem university" (85-86).2
For some, Spellmeyer's proposal might be compelling in that he argues that FYC
should not occupy the center of the discipline but should instead occupy the center of the
university curriculum by becoming interdisciplinary and reaching "across existing
divisions of knowledge while addressing the most important issues our society now
faces" (87). But because his proposal is grounded on an assumption that composition's
history is inextricably bound to literary studies and is not already interdisciplinary, as I
argue in Chapter 4 it is, Spellmeyer's conception of the future will likely be unconvincing
for many. First, Spellmeyer's proposal disparages literature, one of the disciplinary allies
composition might need to enact his vision. And second, Spellmeyer deliberately presents
his argument as a radical solution that some might argue is not all that radical, in that
many universities already see FYC as central to the university as a general education
course (see Fosen) and many compositionists already see FYC as an appropriate venue in
which to raise socio-political concerns. In fact, some might argue that this has always
been FYC's role in educational contexts which generally fall outside the purview of
prevailing historical narratives, such as HBCUs (see Jarratt, Zaluda, and Royster and
Williams), normal schools (see Fitzgerald, Lindblom et aI., and Rothermel), vocational
colleges (see Kates and Gold), and other venues for adult education (see Hollis, Greer,
and NeCamp).
In addition to highlighting how historical narratives are used for specific and
consequential rhetorical purposes, metahistorical critique demonstrates the process

Given the content of the remainder of the essay, I interpret Spellmeyer's nod toward the shift from the
liberal arts to the modern university as equivalent to the decline of rhetoric and rise of literature.

2
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through which historical narratives work to demarcate the rhetorical boundaries of
disciplinary discourse. For example, I argue in Chapter 3 that because prevailing
narratives about first-year composition (FYC) locate the discipline's origins at Harvard in
the late nineteenth century, scholarship outside the boundaries suggested by this origin
point - outside institutions of higher education, outside the classroom, outside contexts of
monolingual writing and writing instruction, and outside the U.S. - often remains
marginal within composition studies. While the process of demarcation is inevitable in
that the production of academic knowledge is made possible by the existence of discrete
disciplines, the boundaries are flexible and ultimately depend upon the decisions made by
those conducting new research as well as those in editorial and administrative power.
Metahistorical critique calls attention to this flexibility, demanding that scholars, editors,
and publishers employ and enable the production of scholarship that will challenge
boundaries and open up new possibilities for future investigation and discovery.
Further, because it analyzes texts in relation to one another, metahistorical
critique helps compositionists not only assess those narratives that dominate disciplinary
discourse, but it also encourages scholars to understand and attribute value to prevailing
narratives. In Chapter 2, for example, I raise questions about current-traditional rhetoric
and pedagogy (CTRP) not only because I see problems associated with its continued
currency in composition scholarship, but also because I want to illuminate the uses to
which CTRP has been put in disciplinary discourse. While I interpret the discipline'S
continued use of CTRP as a relevant pedagogical category as ultimately disabling, I
understand and appreciate that the contemporary discipline has found prevailing
narratives about CTRP useful in establishing legitimacy. Maintaining a critical awareness
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about both the limits and possibilities of prevailing historical narratives is necessary for
the future because such awareness allows compositionists to move forward with selfreflexivity about those motives that drive the writing of history and the values, beliefs,
and practices represented therein. Through this critical awareness, we should expect our
new or revised narratives to travel, and we will be better prepared to evaluate the
consequences of these narratives.
Further, metahistorical critique allows composition historians and non-historians
to harness powerful historiographic strategies that allow for an enduring unsettling and
revision of our narratives. These strategies include a consistent opening up of questions
about the past; the simultaneous consideration of multiple and diverse sources; and a
demand that our readings and renderings of history are always portrayed with a rhetorical
complexity that acknowledges the lived and negotiated interaction between historian and
text. I include examples of historians engaging compelling strategies in each analysis
chapter: In Chapter 2, I present Jane Greer's microhistorical account of socialist
pedagogy at work in Plain English, a textbook for an adult-education correspondence
course; her analysis refuses to settle the tensions that inhere within the textbook, between
what Greer calls the textbook author's desire for liberatory pedagogy and concerns about
mechanical correctness demanded by dominant culture. In Chapter 3, I discuss Scott
Zaluda's examination of curricula and student writing in and outside ofFYC at Howard
University in order to demonstrate how consideration of a variety of materials, especially
in contexts beyond FYC, can disrupt prevailing assumptions about writing practices and
pedagogy. And I conclude Chapter 4 with a call for a systematic rehistoricization of
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composition as an interdiscipline; such a project will necessitate a historiographic
approach that continually acknowledges the complexity of composition's past.
And finally, metahistorical critique reveals gaps in our historical knowledge,
illuminates alternative interpretations of existing evidence, and outlines paths for new and
necessary historical research. My analysis reveals several underdeveloped or blind spots
within existing historical scholarship: histories ofK-12 writing practices and pedagogies;
histories of working-class, vocational, and adult education in writing; histories of
multilingual writing and instruction in the U.S.; and international histories of
composition. Recognition of these gaps in our knowledge underlines composition's
disciplinary biases and points us toward new areas of research, which will surely demand
the complication and revision of prevailing narratives while also identifying new
questions that must be asked of composition's past.
The cumulative benefits of metahistorical critique ultimately carry over to the
field's understanding of its present and future. With a more systematic acknowledgement
of the historical complexity of writing pedagogy and practice, we will approach our
reading, writing, and thinking of contemporary students and teachers with a deeper
awareness of the challenges and rewards inherent to the teaching and learning of writing
no matter the time or place. As I show in Chapter 2, composition's historicization and
subsequent rehistoricization of Edward T. Channing demonstrates the multiple ways in
which a pedagogue and administrator such as Channing can be read by contemporary
scholars. When we refuse to foreclose questions about Channing by vilifying him as a
key player in the "decline and fall" of classical rhetoric, we can consider alternative
explanations - as Charles Paine and Elizabeth Larsen do - that account for the socio-
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historical and institutional context in which he worked. While Channing may have made
choices that ultimately helped move composition to the margins of English studies at
Harvard, interpreting him as a figure struggling to make sense of a rapidly changing
world helps us identify with - instead of against - him and reminds us to proceed with
caution as we make our own choices as scholars, teachers, and administrators in the
present and future.
If we are to allow for other questions and narratives about the discipline to
emerge, and if we intend to promote ethical ways of engaging with teachers, students,
and the world, we must continually interrogate the prevailing narratives that shape the
field, as well as our habits of thinking, reading, and writing about the history of writing
instruction in the United States. In situating multiple histories in relation to one another
through a cultural-rhetorical lens, this project enriches composition's understanding of
the history of writing and rhetorical education in the United States, emphasizes gaps and
inconsistencies in our current historical knowledge, contributes to conversations about
the politics of historiography, and defines disciplinary historiography as a rhetorical
practice that reflects and shapes the field's larger values and beliefs - a practice which
ultimately yields significant theoretical and material consequences for the discipline and
its agents.
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APPENDIX A
The following table provides an alphabetical list of the historical texts cited within this dissertation along with
indications of how I categorized each (as a macro- or microhistory), as well as indications of whether and how each
used (repeated, challenged, rejected) the prevailing narratives discussed in Chapters 2 (CTRP), 3 (FYC), and 4 (DISC).
For obvious reasons, I was not able to discuss every text in relation to every narrative in my analysis. However, I hope
that this list will help make my method of reading visible and enable others to productively critique my categorizations,
and/or to engage additional research in the future.
If a text's category is listed as "N/A," I mean that the text refers to composition's history and carries
N

-....J

implications for historiographic practice, but did not clearly fit into one of the two available categories: For example, in

VI

Mestiz@ Scripts, Damian Baca analyzes contemporary writing and visual rhetorical practices - suggesting that the
book might not be categorized as a history at all - but at the same time, Baca argues that his analysis of present
practices "must be comprehended historically: they are texts that speak to the Mesoamerican past while simultaneously
addressing the colonial present" (2). Other texts, such as Patricia Donahue's "Disciplinary History" and Susan Miller's
"Composition as a Cultural Artifact" take a meta-analytical view of disciplinary history, taking stock of contemporary
practices. Some texts, such as Joseph Harris' A Teaching Subject and James Berlin's Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures
are grounded in and narrate history but ultimately make a proposal for the future. And still others, such as Daniel

Coffey's "A Discipline's Composition," account for composition's history but were composed for an audience outside composition. If
"N/A" is listed in place of narratives, this means that I did not find evidence of the author working with any of the narratives central to
my analysis. For a chronological listing of the same set of histories as well as analysis oftheir citation/reception, see Appendix B.
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Institutionalizing Literacy

X

2008

Trimbur, J.

"The Dartmouth Conf."

X

2006

---

"Linguistic Memory"

1986

Tuman, M.

"From Astor Place"

X

X

X

X

1996

Varnum, R.

Fencing with Words

X

X

X

X

2007

Weidner, H.

"A Chair 'Perpetually ... '"

X

X

X

X

2007

Welsch, K.

"Thinking Like That"

X

X

1978

Wozniak, J.

English Composition

2001
(1991)

Wright, E. &
Halloran, S.

"From Rhetoric to Comp."

Zaluda, S.

"Lost Voices ... Harlem"

1998
-

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

I
I
I
I

APPENDIXB
The following table provides a chronological list of the historical texts I cited
within this dissertation. For each text, I have included quasi-quantitative data to establish
citation patterns and to substantiate my claims that certain historians have been more
influential than others in narrating the discipline's past. I call this data quasi-quantitative
because it is not comprehensive: Half of it comes from the Arts and Humanities Citation
Index (AHCI), and the other half of it comes from my own tracking of citations through
each text included in this list (Times Cited in Histories).
Neither of these methods of citation tracking and analysis are error-free: AHCI is
limited in that it only tracks a text's citation in journal articles, and it is limited even
further in that it does not search all possible journals (for example, it does not find
citations for texts published in two important journals for the discipline: JAC and
Composition Studies). Additionally, common names such as "Miller" and "Harris" turn

up thousands of results (even when restricted by first -name initials), making it difficult to
ensure the accuracy of my account. Further, my tracing of citations through the histories
cited in the dissertation is also incomplete because of my own fallibility as a reader.
What's more, I could have gathered additional data - for example, I might have collected
institutional or faculty surveys or analyzed course syllabi - to better understand the
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prominence as disciplinary historians, I have listed the cumulative totals of all references
to Berlin, Connors, and Crowley at the beginning of the table. These numbers include all
texts authored by these historians, not all of which were cited within my dissertation (this
is especially true of Connors because many of his early articles were folded into

Composition-Rhetoric).

PUB
DATE

AUTHOR

TITLE
(Short)

AHCI

Times Cited
in Histories
(+), (-) = (total)

NIA

Berlin, J.

ALL

187

(+) 25, (-) 19 = 44

NIA

Connors, R.

ALL

245

(+) 20, (-) 15 = 35

NIA

Crowley, S.

ALL

163

(+) 13, (-) 7 =20

31

(+) 13, (-) 13 = 26

1954
(1990)

Kitzhaber, A.

Rhetoric in American

1976

Douglas, W.

"Rhetoric ... Meritocracy"

1

(+) 4, (-) 0 =4

1978

Wozniak, J.

English Composition

7

(+) 4, (-) 1 =5

1980

Berlin, J.

"Richard Whately"

2

(+) 1, (-) 0 =1

1982

Halloran, S.

"Rhetoric in American"

18

---

1984

Berlin, J.

Writing Instruction

80

(+) 9, (-) 5 = 14

1986

Crowley, S.

"The Current-Traditional"

2

---

1986

Tuman,M.

"From Astor Place"

0

---

1987

Berlin, J.

Rhetoric and Reality

128

(+) 11, (-) 11 = 22

1987

Halloran, S.

"Rhetoric and the English"

1

(+) 2, (-) 1 =3

1987

North, S.

The Making of Knowledge

104

(+) 0, (-) 3 =3

1988

Phelps, L.

Composition as a Human

36

---

1989

Crowley, S.

"Linguistics and Comp."

5

---
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PUB
DATE

AUTHOR

TITLE
(Short)

AHCI

Times Cited
in Histories
(+), (-)= (total)

1990

Crowley, S.

The Methodical Memory

31

(+) 6, (-) 2 =8

1991

Miller, S.

Textual Carnivals

86

(+) 13, (-) 3 = 16

Russell, D.

Writing in the Academic

Halloran, S.
(Wright, E.)

"From Rhetoric to Comp."

1992

Campbell, J.

"Controlling Voices" and
"Women's Work"

1

(+) 7, (-) 3 =10

1992

Larsen, E.

"The Progress of Literacy"

0

---

1992

Nelms, G.

"The Case for Oral"

1

---

1992

Traschel, M.

Institutionalizing Literacy

7

(+) 2, (-) 0 =0

1993

Adams, K.

A History of Professional

4

(+) 2, (-) 0 =0

1993

Brody, M.

Manly Writing

19

(+) 1, (-) 0 =0

1993

Clark, G. &
Halloran, S.

"Introduction" (Oratorical
Culture in Nineteenth)

29

(+) 3, (-) 2 =5

1993

Nystrand, M.

"Where Did Composition"

44

---

1993

Strain, M.

"Toward a Hermeneutic"

JAC

---

1994
(2001)

McHenry, E. &
Heath, S.

"The Literate ... Literary"

7

---

1994

Gere, A.

"Kitchen Tables ... Rented"

31

1994

Miller, S.

"Composition as a Cultural"

1

---

1995

Brereton, J.

The Origins of Composition

14

(+) 9, (-) 3 = 12

1995

Connors, R.

"The New Abolitionism"

7

(+)11,(-)0 =11

1995

Conway, K.

"Woman Suffrage"

4

(+) 5, (-) 0 =5

1995

Simmons, S.

"Radcliffe Responses"

0

(+) 3, (-) 0 =3

1996

Berlin, J.

Rhetorics, Poetics ...

38

1991
(2002)
1991
(2001)
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60 (22)
= 82
10 (0)
=10

(+) 6, (-) 4 = 10
(+) 5, (-) 3

=8

(+) 4, (-) 0 =4

---

PUB
DATE

TITLE
(Short)

AUTHOR

AHCI

Times Cited
in Histories
(+), (-) = (total)

JAC

---

Comp
Studies

---

1996

Fitzgerald, K.

"From Disciplining"

1996

Lerner, N.

"The Institutionalization"

1996

Varnum, R.

Fencing with Words

12

(+) 2, (-) 1 =3

1996

Salvatori, M.

Pedagogy

9

(+) 4, (-) 0

1997

Connors, R.

Composition-Rhetoric

54

(+) 12, (-) 14 = 26

1997

Gere, A.

Intimate Practices

56

(+) 4, (-) 0 =4

1997

Harris, J.

A Teaching Subject

47

(+) 1, (-) 0 =1

1997

Miller, T.

The Formation of College

37

---

1998

Crowley, S.

Composition ... University

54

(+) 7, (-) 5 = 12

1998

Zaluda, S.

"Lost Voices ... Harlem"

1

---

1999

George, D. &
Trimbur, J.

'" Communication Battle'"

3

---

1999

Greer, J.

"No Smiling Madonna"

4

1999

Hawhee, D.

"Composition History"

6

---

1999

Heyda, J.

"Fighting over Freshman"

0

(+) 1, (-) 0 =1

1999

Matsuda, P.

"Composition Studies"

14

---

1999

Paine, C.

The Resistant Writer

9

(+) 1, (-) 0 =1

"Reframing the Great"

1

---

"History in the Spaces Left"

9

(+) 2, (-) 0

=1

(+) 6, (-) 0

=6

1999
1999

Roemer, M.
(et al.)
Royster, J. &
Williams, J.

(+) 1, (-) 0

1999

Schultz, L.

The Young Composers

9

2000

Goggin, M.

Authoring a Discipline

10

---

2000

Goggin, M. &
Beatty, S.

"Accounting for Well-"

0

---
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=4

=

I

PUB
DATE

AUTHOR

TITLE
(Short)

AHCI

Times Cited
in Histories
(+), (-) = (total)

---

2001

Adams, K.

A Group of Their Own

2

2001

Fitzgerald, K.

"A Rediscovered Tradition"

3

(+) 4, (-) 1 =5

2001

Kates, S.

Activist Rhetorics

18

(+) 6, (-) 0

2001

Strickland, D.

"Taking Dictation"

4

---

2001
(1991)

Wright, E. &
Halloran, S.
Homer, B. &
Trimbur, J.

"From Rhetoric to Comp."
[see 1991 - Halloran, S.]

[see
above]

---

"English Only and U.S."

20

---

[see
above]

-----

2002
2002
(1991)

Russell, D.

Writing in the Academic
[see 1991 - Russell, D.]

2002

Harkin, P.

"Child's Ballads"

0

2003

Rothermel, B.

"A Sphere of Nob Ie Action"

2

2003

Matsuda, P.

"Process and Post-Process"

6

2004

Hollis, K.

Liberating Voices

8

2004

Marshall, M.

Response to Reform

0

2005

Carr, J. (et al.)

Archives ofInstruction

8

2005

Rice, J.

"The 1963 Composition"

Comp
Studies

---

2006

Coffey, D.

"A Discipline's Comp."

0

---

2006

Fosen, C.

"University Courses, Not"

Comp
Studies

---

2006

Mailloux, S.

Disciplinary Identities

11

---

2006

Trimbur, J.

"Linguistic Memory"

3

---

2007

DeGenaro, W.

"William Rainey Harper"

0

---

"(The Teaching of)"

0

---

Local Histories (ed. coil.)

6

---

2007
2007

Donahue, P. &
Falbo, B.
Donahue, P. &
Moon,G.
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(+) 1, (-) 0

=6

=1

--(+) 3, (-) 0

=3

--(+) 1, (-) 1 =1

PUB
DATE

AUTHOR

TITLE
(Short)

AHCI

Times Cited
in Histories
(+), (-) = (total)
(+) 1, (-) 0 = 1

2007

Donahue, P.

"Disciplinary Histories"

0

2007

Garbus, J.

"Vida Scudder"

1

---

2007

Hawk, B.

A Counter-History

4

---

2007

Lindblom, K.
(etal.)

"Mid-Nineteenth-Century"

1

---

2007

Rothermel, B.

"Our Life's Work"

0

---

2007

Weidner, H.

"A Chair' Perpetually ... ",

1

---

2007

Welsch, K.

"Thinking Like That"

0

---

2008

Baca, D.

Mestiz@ Scripts, Digital

2

---

2008

Enoch, J.

Refiguring Rhetorical Ed.

8

---

2008

Gold, D.

Rhetoric at the Margins

4

2008

Trimbur, J.

"The Dartmouth Conf."

2

---

2009

Gold, D.

"'Eve Did No Wrong'"

--

---

2009

Jarratt, S.

"Classics and Counter ... "

--

---

2010

Mastrangelo, L.

"Lone Wolf or Leader ... "

--

---

2010

Miller, T.

The Evolution o/College

--

---

2010

Peary, A.

"The Licensing ... Poetic"

--

---
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(+) 3, (-) 0 =3
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